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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the role of corporate governance and agency 
conflicts in determining corporate performance, foreign investment and corporate 
financial decisions. For this purpose, it uses firm-level corporate governance and 
ownership data from Jordan. Jordan is an economy in which the prevailing corporate 
structures and regulatory mechanisms provide a data set that lends itself particularly 
well to the examination of these issues. 
First, we provide a detailed and timely review of ownership and corporate governance 
structure characteristics for a unique database which we hand-collected from a sample 
of 519 firm-year observations of financial and non-financial Jordanian listed firms 
between 2004 and 2006. This work significantly contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge, by providing a detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance 
structures in Jordan as one of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. 
Second, we investigate the relationship between internal corporate governance structure 
and firm performance. Our analysis reveals that traditional managerial agency 
explanations (i.e. conflict between managers and shareholders) do not appear to hold in 
the Jordanian context. Instead, the main agency concern for Jordanian firms seems to be 
the one between founding families and minority shareholders. Our findings support the 
view that CEO duality has an adverse effect on firm performance. However, CEO 
membership on the board and concentrated ownership tend to have a positive effect on 
company performance. The presence of strong foreign equity ownership in firms 
enhances their firm performance and complements the relatively weak monitoring by 
domestic institutional investors.  
Third, we investigate the relationship between corporate governance and foreign 
investment decisions, by focusing on the influence of founding family ownership and 
control on foreign equity ownership. We document that founding family ownership and 
founding family control exert a significant influence on foreign investors‟ decisions. 
Our findings suggest that foreign investors are less likely to invest in Jordanian firms 
with higher founding family ownership and control. Institutional investors and board 
characteristics have a negative effect on foreign ownership. Additionally, we find that 
X 
 
firms with greater growth potential and large firms seem to be more attractive to foreign 
investors and they avoid firms that pay high dividends. 
Fourth, we analyse the potential links between corporate governance and corporate cash 
holdings. This work significantly contributes to the existing literature on cash holdings 
by investigating the impact of founding family ownership and large foreign ownership 
on corporate cash holdings. We find strong evidence that the levels of founding family 
ownership exert a significant influence on cash holding decisions of Jordanian firms. 
We document a non-linear relationship between founding family ownership and cash 
holdings. In addition, we provide evidence that the presence of large foreign investors 
leads to lower cash holdings. Finally, we detect that corporate cash holding is positively 
associated with market-to-book value and dividends and negatively associated with cash 
flow, leverage, size and tangibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The need for corporate governance arises from the potential conflicts of interest 
between those who control the firm and those who supply it with external financing. 
Berle and Means (1932) argued that the separation of ownership from control leads to 
conflict of interest mainly between dispersed shareholders (owners) and managers 
(controllers). When there are asymmetric information problems and imperfect 
contractual relations between managers and shareholders, managers have incentives to 
pursue their own objectives at the expense of shareholders. For example, managers 
might adopt sub-optimal financial and investment strategies and spend more on luxury 
projects and empire building rather than on value maximizing projects. They may also 
engage in transfer pricing, whereby they sell assets or output from the company they 
manage at a lower than market price to a company they own. Managers may also 
engage in activities that make them indispensable, resist takeover and increase their 
managerial private benefits through consuming perks
1
. The consequences of these 
divergences are often referred to as agency costs, which are conventionally defined as 
the costs of structuring, bonding and monitoring an incentive contract between 
shareholders (principal) and managers (agent).  
Recently, a growing body of literature has shifted attention toward a different agency 
problem, namely the expropriation of small investors by large controlling shareholders, 
which seems to be of greater concern in many countries (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; and Denis and McConnel, 2003 among 
others). In countries where ownership is concentrated in the hands of large owners, 
agency conflicts do not solely occur between managers and other investors but also 
between large/controlling owners and minority shareholders. Although controlling 
                                                 
1
 See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), Shleifer and Vishny, (1997) and Tirole 
(2006) for review of how managers may not act in the firm‟s best interest.  
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shareholders have an interest in protecting their wealth by making sure that the 
company is well managed, the presence of large shareholders is also associated with 
potential costs as they have incentives to extract private benefits from the firm at the 
expense of all other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
There has been a great deal of empirical work providing evidence that corporate 
financial decisions and firm performance are affected by the presence of agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders (see, among others, Jensen, 1986 for debt 
financing; Gompers et al., 2003 for accounting and stock price performance; Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004 for cash holdings decisions; Hu and Kumar, 2004 for dividend decisions; 
and Datta et al., 2005 for capital structure decisions). It is suggested that when the 
interests of managers and shareholders are not aligned, due to the absence of strong 
corporate governance
1
, managers tend to prefer lower than optimal leverage, hold large 
amounts of cash, pay lower dividends, over-invest and hence exhibit significant 
underperformance. Accordingly, several elements of firms‟ board structure (e.g. board 
size, proportion of non-executive directors on the board, CEO duality), ownership 
structure (e.g. managerial ownership, ownership concentration, identity of large 
owners), corporate financial policies (e.g. leverage, dividend, cash holding) have been 
suggested as potential mechanisms to control for agency problems arising from 
dispersed ownership as well as concentrated ownership (see Gillan, 2006 for a survey 
for recent research).  
However, despite the substantial evidence on these issues, prior research has mainly 
focused on developed countries, in particular on the USA and UK, and hence relatively 
little is known about corporate governance in emerging countries. In an attempt to 
                                                 
1
 Corporate governance is a board term for a variety of corporate controls and accountability 
mechanisms intended to protect the interest of shareholders. 
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provide more insights into these issues, we hence choose an emerging economy, namely 
Jordan, with corporate governance characteristics which are significantly different. 
In Jordan and most of the Arab countries, most firms are family firms where the founder 
and/or family members usually hold important positions in management and on the 
board of directors. Controlling family owners are involved in management of the 
organizations, as chairman of the board or board members and often control senior 
management positions. Moreover, it is reported that
1
, due to family influence, the 
appointment of managers and directors may be influenced by kinship or friendship, 
rather than based solely on ability or education. Therefore, one common characteristic 
here is the alignment between management and controllers/large shareholders
2
. 
However, it does not mean that these firms are free of agency-costs. The agency 
problem that seems to prevail is not simply between managers/controllers and outside 
investors. Rather, the major conflict of interest is between founding families as 
controlling shareholders and other shareholders. Within the agency framework we 
consider in this study, the principal is the minority shareholders and the agent is the 
founding family ownership, who are normally expected to act in the best interests of all 
shareholders. Therefore, it is important to consider the consequences/implications of 
this type of agency problem on firm performance and consequently corporate financial 
decisions and foreign investment decisions. This is the main objective of this thesis.  
The Jordanian setting is a particularly interesting environment in which to conduct our 
study for a number of reasons. First, given the prevalence of founding family ownership 
and the presence of founding family members in Jordanian firms, the sample lends itself 
                                                 
1
 See for example: World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): 
Corporate Governance Country Assessment (Jordan) (June, 2004) and Corporate Governance in 
the Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan countries of the MENA region: MENA Regional 
Corporate Governance Working Group (2003). 
2
 We use large shareholders and controllers interchangeably throughout the thesis.  
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well to examining hypothesized relations between founding family ownership and 
corporate performance, foreign ownership and the corporate financial decisions of 
Jordanian firms. Second, the Jordanian sample provides a natural laboratory for testing 
the effects of foreign equity investors on corporate financial decisions and performance. 
The market liberalization of the Amman Stock Exchange opened the gateway to foreign 
investment in Jordanian listed firms. Jordanian data are unique because of the high 
involvement of foreign investors in the Jordanian stock market. In fact, foreign 
investment in the capital market is one of the highest in the world (OECD, 2006)
1
. 
Third, banks and other institutional investors have significant business relationships 
with companies, since most banks are family-controlled
2
, individually or through family 
related group companies. Fourth, there is a great deal of evidence that Jordanian boards 
of directors are generally characterized as corporate devices that provide a weak 
disciplinary function, mainly due to lack of independence from controlling 
shareholders, an absence of rules governing the composition of the board of directors, 
inadequate guidelines governing the balance of power between executive and non-
executive directors, and the lack of awareness of the concept of independent directors. 
Fifth, following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, financial sector regulation has 
been strengthened through the Company Law 1997, Jordan Securities Law; 2002, 
Insurance Law 1999, and the Banking Law 2000. Despite these reforms, however, 
relatively few works examine in detail the evolution of the ownership and corporate 
governance structures in Jordan (see e.g., Omet, 2005 and Omar, 2007). 
                                                 
1
 MENA-OECD Investment Programme National Investment Reform Agenda Workshop for the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Monday 19th June, 2006. Available on line:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/29/38148879.pdf  
2
 For example Jordan Bank owned by the Al Kori family, Union Bank owned by the Salfiti 
family, Jordan Arab Investment Bank by the Al-Qadi family, Jordan National Bank by the Al-
Muasher family, and Jordan Commercial Bank by the Al-Sayegh family.  
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There are five important aspects of our study, which differentiate it from previous 
research. First of all, distinct from most previous literature, our study addresses an 
agency problem, the agency problem between managers/controllers (i.e. founding 
families) and outside investors, which has not been extensively researched in prior 
research. By doing so, we will extend earlier studies that mainly focused only on the 
classic agency problem between dispersed shareholders and managers in countries 
where corporations have a widely dispersed ownership and also between managers and 
controlling shareholders on the one side and controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders on the other, in countries where ownership is concentrated.  
Second, we attempt to establish a direct link between founding family ownership and 
control and corporate governance. In doing so, we investigate whether the presence of 
founding family ownership leads to better corporate performance. We also examine if 
the presence of founding family ownership on the board leads to a lower foreign 
ownership in Jordanian firms. In addition, we are the first to examine the effect of 
founding family ownership and large foreign investors on corporate cash holdings.  
Third, our study contributes towards filling a gap identified in relation to corporate 
governance in the Arab region. Recent surveys and reports of corporate governance 
literature in the Arab World (Saidi, 2004; 2005; and Najib, 2007) has suggested 
shortcomings in the implementation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) principles and standards, compared to industrialized countries. 
Any attempts to initiate corporate governance action plans and corporate sector reforms 
in these countries, require information and detailed assessment in order to set priorities 
and inform government. In this respect, there is need for a detailed analysis of corporate 
governance in the Arab region (Omet, 2005). Whilst this thesis focuses on Jordan, the 
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analysis will be valuable to other Arab economies in the Middle East, all of which share 
a common heritage, culture, language and religion and where there are strong 
similarities in regulatory and institutional environments and in the corporate ownership 
structure of firms.  
Fourth, to conduct our empirical investigation, we employ pooled-OLS and cross-
sectional methodologies that help us to control for the endogeneity problem, which can 
arise in this context for several reasons (e.g. reverse causality, unobserved 
heterogeneity). In particular, we use pooled-OLS with one year lagged explanatory 
variables and average cross-sectional regression approaches in an attempt to reduce the 
potential problem of endogeneity.  
Fifth, an important limitation in the existing literature is the limited availability of 
detailed information on board and ownership structure at the firm level in emerging 
markets. However, a significant improvement in disclosure in Jordan after important 
changes in economic and accounting regulations (Omar, 2007) makes it possible to 
utilize Jordanian companies‟ firm-level data to conduct our analysis. This is a 
significant advantage since, given the arguments in the literature that ownership 
structure can be both a potential cause of agency conflicts and a solution to them (see, 
Ang et. al. 2000; and Morck et al., 1988 amongst others), there is further need for 
detailed knowledge of ownership characteristics at the firm level. Taking this 
motivation as a starting point, in the initial phase of our thesis we hand-collect board 
and ownership structure data for 519 firm-year observations of financial and non-
financial Jordanian listed firms for the years 2004-2006, in order to present this unique 
database and to provide, through extensive descriptive statistics, a timely review of 
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ownership and corporate governance structure among publicly listed companies, both 
financial and non-financial, in Jordan.  
Chapter 2 presents a detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance structure in 
Jordan by focusing on ownership and board structure among publicly listed companies. 
Although there are several previous studies comparing ownership structure and board 
composition across countries (see among others, La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2002; Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Black et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2007), these studies are 
confined to summary statistics for overall governance and particular governance 
measures. Therefore, relatively little information is available concerning the governance 
choices firms make in practice. Chapter 2 aims to fill this gap in Jordan. Specifically, 
our analysis will focus on two important questions. First, what are the main corporate 
governance characteristics in Jordan, as one of the Middle East and North African 
(MENA)
1
 countries? Second, how does governance vary across firms and across 
sectors?  
Chapter 2 presents three important features concerning Jordanian companies. First, most 
firms, both financial and non-financial, are family firms. The boards and management 
are frequently dominated by the founding families. Founding family members are 
involved in the management of the institution, as chairman of the board, board members 
or senior managers. In particular, our results show that founder chairmen, founder 
family board members and founder family CEO members all have substantial presence 
in the management of Jordanian companies and this trend increases over time. The 
prevalence of founder family control of important positions in management and on the 
                                                 
1
 The MENA region covers the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the 
United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. 
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board of directors reflects a lack of separation between ownership and control, which 
may be a source of agency conflict between families and other shareholders in the 
company, especially minority shareholders. In addition, board size is relatively constant 
over time, with an average of nine directors, a large proportion of who are non-
executives. Furthermore, role duality, whereby the chairman of the board is also the 
CEO, is still common, although decreasing slightly over time.  
Secondly, another important feature of Jordanian companies, despite the fact that 
CEOs‟ salaries and compensations are modest, is that in cases of duality, the CEO's 
mean salary and compensation is above the total sample mean by about 34 per cent and 
43 per cent respectively. Similarly, founder and family CEO salary and compensation 
are significantly higher than average. These findings of high compensation packages for 
founder, family and dual-role CEOs may reflect use of power in their own interest.   
Thirdly, we find that Jordanian firms are characterised by the presence of strong, large 
shareholders, the three main categories being family shareholders; local financial 
institutions; and foreign shareholders. We notice that family owners have an important 
involvement in all sectors, especially as controlling owners may exercise their power by 
influencing firm policies, decision-making and exercising their voting rights to control 
managers‟ actions, in their own interests. Local institutional owners, too, have 
sufficiently large holdings in Jordanian firms to be in a position to influence company 
performance by contributing to, monitoring or ratifying the board's decisions, and 
focusing on projects that add value for shareholders. In addition, for the most part, the 
evidence suggests that the role of foreign investors in the Jordanian market is highly 
significant. Foreign board directors constitute a relatively increasing proportion of the 
10 
 
board in every sector, and a significant proportion of shares are owned by large foreign 
blockholders.  
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance and 
corporate performance. While there is a large body of finance and law literature that 
explores the interactions between corporate governance and firm performance in a 
number of countries, by using multi-country studies or country case studies
1
, these 
studies have focused largely on either the Anglo-American context or the Asian 
experience. Moreover, confusion still exists as to whether specific governance 
mechanisms can adequately protect investors' wealth. The inconsistency of findings as 
to the governance role of several firm specific characteristics is evident in a number of 
survey papers on corporate governance (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Denis, 2001; Denis and McConnel, 2003; and Gillan, 2006). Furthermore, prior studies 
also ignore important aspects of the board structure, such as CEO‟s board membership, 
which could have important effects on the effectiveness of governance.  
Chapter 3 aims to address this gap by providing a detailed investigation of the impact of 
ownership and board structure on corporate performance. The main issues we address in 
this chapter are as follows. First, we consider whether the classical agency theory of 
conflict between managers and shareholders holds for Jordanian firms. Second, we 
examine the impact of various corporate governance mechanisms (board size, 
composition, duality, CEO board membership, ownership concentration, large domestic 
institutional investors and large foreign ownership) on firm performance in Jordan. 
Furthermore, we suggest several policy implications from the findings of this study. 
                                                 
1
 See Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 
2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Florackis, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Ghosh, 2006; and Black et al., 2006 among others. 
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The results in Chapter 3 reveal a negative relationship between founding family 
ownership and corporate performance, suggesting that the main agency concern for 
Jordanian firms seems to be the one between founding family and other shareholders. 
This finding is robust and does not change significantly with either board attributes or 
the presence of other large shareholders. The traditional managerial agency 
explanations do not seem to hold. Instead, another agency issue, conflict between 
founding family shareholders and other shareholders, seems to hold in the Jordanian 
context.  
Our analysis fails to detect any significant impact of board size or non-executive 
directors on firm performance. With regard to the role of the CEOs, the findings support 
the view that CEO duality has an adverse effect on firm performance.  However, CEO 
membership in the board tends to have a positive effect on company performance. The 
result suggests that if the CEO is a board member, he or she may facilitate and 
participate in the decision making process rather than dominate the decisions of the 
board, as may be the case when he/she is CEO and COB together. 
Ownership concentration is shown to be significant and positively related to the 
performance of Jordanian firms. The inverse relationship found between performance 
and domestic institutional investors, however, suggests that domestic institutional 
investors are passive in disciplining management. However, the empirical results show 
that foreign investors have a significant and positive effect on firm performance. This 
implies that the monitoring function of foreign investors enhances firm performance 
and complements the relatively weak monitoring by domestic institutional investors. 
Further more, we find that corporate performance is positively associated with 
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dividends; and negatively associated with size. Finally, leverage has no significant 
impact on performance.  
In Chapter 4, we empirically investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
and other firm characteristics and foreign investment decisions. However, the existing 
studies have mainly looked at the stock preferences of U.S. investors, or those of 
foreign investors in single high-income countries with uniformly high investor 
protection laws and accounting standards. In the case of the latter, none of the previous 
studies have looked at the relationship between corporate governance and foreign 
ownership in different regional areas such as the Arab and MENA countries. 
Furthermore, none of the empirical papers on foreign ownership, that we are aware of, 
has attempted to combine founding-family ownership and control (i.e. founding family 
involvement in the board of directors) in investigating the impact on foreign ownership 
in the emerging markets setting. Finally, very few studies have investigated the impact 
of board structure on foreign ownership; an exception is Mangena and Tauringana 
(2007). 
In this chapter, we aim to address these issues by examining whether differences in 
foreign ownership across listed companies in the Jordanian market are related to 
company differences in corporate governance mechanisms and other firm 
characteristics. Specifically, our analysis focuses on two important questions. First, how 
do founding family ownership and control affect the investment decisions of foreign 
investors in the Jordanian market? Second, how do other potential corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e. institutional investors and board characteristics) and firm-specific 
characteristics (i.e. market-to-book-ratio, size, leverage and dividends) affect 
investment foreign investors in the Jordanian market? 
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Our results reveal that founding family ownership and founding family control exerts a 
significant influence on foreign investors‟ decisions. More specifically, our finding 
suggests foreign ownership is likely to be lower in firms in which founding family 
ownership is high and in family controlled firms (i.e. when founding family members 
are on the board of directors). The results also suggest that firms with large domestic 
institutional ownership tend to have lower foreign holdings. Board characteristics (i.e. 
board size and the proportion of non-executive directors) also have a negative effect on 
foreign investors, although the impact is significant only for board size. This result 
suggests that foreign investors perceive large boards as likely to encounter problems of 
coordination, control, and decision-making. Regarding firm-specific characteristics, we 
find that firms with higher growth potential (high market-to-book equity ratios) and 
large firms seem to be more attractive to foreign investors and they avoid firms that pay 
high dividends. Finally, leverage is not related to the level of foreign investment.  
Following the lead of a few influential papers written recently (in particular Opler et al., 
1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; and Guney et al., 2007) Chapter 5 
attempts to establish a link between corporate governance and one of the most 
important corporate governance policy decisions, namely cash holdings. However, there 
are several important features of our analysis, which, we believe, extend the literature 
on empirical determinants of cash holdings. Our first major contribution in this chapter 
is concerned with the empirical investigation of the impact of founding family 
ownership on corporate cash holdings. Prior researches provide support for the 
significant influence of managerial ownership on cash holdings decisions (see, e.g., 
Opler et al., 1999 and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). However, to the best of our knowledge, 
this study is the first to investigate the relationship between founding family equity 
ownership and cash holdings. Second, to our knowledge, this study is the first to test the 
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effect of large foreign investors, which is an issue that is neglected in the existing 
literature examining the determinants of corporate cash holdings. Third, our findings 
enhance our understanding of corporate cash holdings of firms operating in an emerging 
market.  To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyse corporate cash holdings in 
an emerging equity market, namely Jordan, one of the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries.  
The empirical results in Chapter 5 provide strong evidence that the levels of founding 
family ownership exert a significant influence on cash holdings decisions of Jordanian 
firms. These results provide support for a non-linear relationship between founding 
family ownership and cash holdings. More specifically, the estimated coefficients of 
founding family ownership and founding family ownership squared suggest that 
founding families move from alignment to entrenchment as their shareholdings in the 
firm increase. In addition, we provide evidence that the presence of large foreign 
investors leads to lower cash holdings. Furthermore, our result provides evidence that 
local institutional investors do not have any significant impact on corporate cash 
holdings. Jordanian company board characteristics do not have any important impact on 
corporate cash holdings. Finally, the results suggest that corporate cash holding is 
positively associated with market-to-book value and dividends; and negatively 
associated with cash flow, leverage, size and tangibility.  
Chapter 6 presents the overall conclusion of this work, and draws together the various 
themes analysed in this study. In particular, we draw attention to the contributions of the 
research to understanding of the types and extent of agency conflicts inside the firm, 
and the impact of these conflicts on company value, foreign ownership and key 
corporate decisions, such as cash holdings.  
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2.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a detailed picture of firm-level corporate 
governance structure in an emerging market by focusing on ownership and board 
structure among publicly listed companies in Jordan. Several previous studies compare 
ownership structure and board composition across countries (e.g. Roe, 1993; La Porta et 
al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Dahya et al., 2008). There are also some individual 
emerging country studies, namely, Hussain and Mallin, (2002), Bahrain; Elsayed, 
(2007), Egypt; Ghosh (2006), India; Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Malaysia; Black et al. 
(2006), Russia, and Choi et al. (2007), Korea, but these typically are confined to 
summary statistics for overall governance and particular governance measures. 
Therefore, relatively little information is available concerning the governance choices 
firms make in practice. In other words, it is not clear what form firm-level governance 
actually takes in emerging markets
1
. 
This study is an attempt to fill this gap in an emerging market, specifically, Jordan, as 
one of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. To the best knowledge of 
the researcher, this study is the first attempt to study in detail the evolution of the 
ownership and corporate governance structure among publicly listed companies, both 
financial and non-financial, in Jordan. 
An important shortcoming, especially in emerging markets, is limited availability of 
detailed information on board and ownership structure at the firm level. Taking this 
motivation as a starting point, in the initial phase of our thesis we hand-collected board 
and ownership structure data for 519 firm-year observations of financial and non-
                                                 
1
 There are, to our knowledge, only two studies that examine in detail firm-level governance in 
emerging markets. These are: a survey of 116 Brazilian firms, which was conducted in 2005 
(Black et al, 2008); and one of 370 Indian firms, conducted in the first half of 2006 
(Balasubramanian et al., 2008). 
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financial Jordanian listed firms for the years 2004-2006. The purpose of this chapter is 
therefore, to present this unique database and to provide, through extensive descriptive 
statistics, a timely review of ownership and corporate governance structure among 
publicly listed companies, both financial and non-financial, in Jordan. Specifically, our 
analysis will focus on two important questions. First, what are the main corporate 
governance characteristics in Jordan, as one of the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries? Second, how does governance vary across firms and across sectors?  
Our detailed analysis of Jordan provides three important features concerning Jordanian 
companies. First, most firms, both financial and non-financial, are family firms. The 
boards and management are frequently dominated by the founding families. Founding 
family members are involved in the management of the institution, as chairman of the 
board, board members or senior managers. In particular, our results show that founder 
chairmen, founder family board members and founder family CEO members all have 
substantial presence in the management of the Jordanian companies and this trend 
increases over time. The prevalence of founder family control of important positions in 
management and on the board of directors reflects a lack of separation between 
ownership and control, which may be a source of agency conflict between families and 
other shareholders in the company, especially minority shareholders. Furthermore, 
board size is relatively constant over time, with an average of nine directors, a large 
proportion of who are non-executives. However, it may be doubted whether this will 
greatly contribute to independent corporate governance, as these members may owe 
their positions to a controlling owner. Additionally, role duality, whereby the chairman 
of the board is also the CEO, is still common, although decreasing slightly over time.  
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Secondly, another important feature of the Jordanian companies, despite the fact that 
CEOs‟ salaries and compensations are modest in Jordanian firms, is that when the same 
person holds the title of CEO and Chairman (duality), the CEO's mean salary and 
compensation is above the total sample mean by about 34 per cent and 43 per cent 
respectively. Similarly both founder CEO salary and compensation are above the 
sample mean by about 9 per cent and 11 per cent, and those of family CEOs by about 
13 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively. 
Thirdly, our findings show that in Jordan ownership tends to be concentrated. We find 
that Jordanian firms are characterised by the presence of strong, large shareholders, the 
three main categories being family shareholders, local financial institutions and foreign 
shareholders. We notice that family owners have an important involvement in all 
sectors. Their holdings may create a source of power for them. Families as controlling 
owners may exercise their power by influencing firm policies, decision-making and 
exercising their voting rights to control managers‟ actions, in their own interests. This 
could be at the expense of overall firm value and the interest of minority shareholders 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Local institutional owners, too, have sufficiently large holdings in Jordanian firms to be 
in a position to influence company performance by contributing to, monitoring or 
ratifying the board's decisions, and focusing on projects that add value for shareholders. 
In addition, the evidence suggests that the role of foreign investors in the Jordanian 
market is highly significant. Foreign board directors constitute a relatively increasing 
proportion of the board in every sector, and significant proportions of shares are owned 
by large foreign block holders. This raises an important question about the role - and 
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determinants - of foreign ownership in enhancing corporate governance within 
Jordanian companies. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the 
characteristics of the Jordanian corporate governance system. Section 2.3 presents an 
overview of the Jordanian Capital Market.  Section 2.4 explains the data set and 
variables used in our analysis. Section 2.5 presents the findings discussed in relation to 
relevant literature. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
2.2. Overview of Jordanian Corporate Governance 
The Jordanian legal system and its corporate legal framework are derived from French 
Civil Law. Accordingly, any obligations, responsibilities or rights must be supported by 
legislation in order to be enforceable. Corporate governance concepts and rules are 
contained in many Jordanian laws including, among others, The Company Law (1997), 
The New Securities Law (2002)
1
, The Banking Law (2000) and The Insurance 
Regulatory Act (1999). 
The Company Law (CL) 22 of 1997 (most recently amended in 2002) lies at the centre 
of Jordan's legislative corporate framework, providing the legal framework for locally 
registered companies, including public shareholding companies. The important aspects 
of the CL relevant to the issue of corporate governance are related to shareholder rights.  
Shareholders in Jordan enjoy considerable rights in terms of access to secure methods 
of ownership registration, ability to transfer shares, right to obtain relevant information 
on a timely basis, participate and vote in general shareholders' meetings, and sole 
authority to elect/dismiss board of director members. The CL is regulated and 
                                                 
1
 The Temporary Securities Law NO. (23) for the Year 1997 and its amendments are replaced 
by this Law. 
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implemented by the Controller of Companies, a unit of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade.  
Closely related is The Securities Law (SL) of 2002, which provides the legislative 
framework for supervision of the activities of the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), Securities Depository Centre (SDC), and market 
intermediaries. Part of its mandate is to protect investors, and to ensure fairness, 
efficiency and transparency. In fact, JSC has made important progress over the last 
years toward enhancing corporate governance quality. In 2004, the JSC required 
companies to comply with Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting 
Standards, including International Accounting standards (IASs) and Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRs)
1
. In addition, every listed company is required to set up an Audit 
Committee, independent of company management, as a sub committee of the board of 
directors; at least three members must be non-executives, to comply with the audit 
committee requirements
2
. JSC is empowered to suspend trading of securities, de-list 
issuers and to impose fines
3
. Omar (2007) reports a significant improvement in 
disclosure in Jordan after important changes in the economic and accounting 
regulations.  
The SL of 2002 strengthened the power not only of the JSC but also contributed in 
enhancing corporate governance practice in Jordan. The ASE operates an automated 
order-driven Electronic Trading System. Listing requirements are reviewed and 
updated. The SDC, a non-profit private body, provides deposit and clearing and 
                                                 
1
 Articles 14 and 16 of JSC Directives of Disclosure, Auditing and Accounting Standards of 
2004. Similar articles exist in the Banking and Insurance Laws. 
2
 Articles 15 of JSC Directives of Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing 
Companies of 2004. The Banking Law of 2000 (Article 32, 33). 
3
 Articles 19 and 22 of SL 76 of 2002.  
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settlements of securities, transfer of ownership, and registry services for all public 
shareholding companies
1
.   
Jordan's 2004 Corporate Governance ROSC (Report on Observance of Standards and 
Code)
2
 provides an assessment of the corporate governance framework in Jordan, 
benchmarked against the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (i.e. the rights of the shareholders, 
equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, 
timely and accurate disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the board). 
The report shows (Figure 2.1) that Jordanian compliance compares favourably with the 
world average. 
Jordan generally has a high level of financial development compared to the remaining 
countries of the Middle-East and the North-African (MENA) region (see Table 2.1). 
Furthermore, the Jordanian banking sector is described as „„well developed, profitable, 
and efficient" (Creane et al., 2004). Despite these improvements, however, up to date 
corporate governance laws or best practices have not been implemented in Jordan, 
although a draft corporate governance guide is under review.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 There are around one million investors registered with the SDC at the end of 2007, of them 
947.6 thousand Jordanian investors, 41.2 thousand Arab investors, 3.8 thousand non-Arab 
investors, according to Samir Jaradat, CEO of Securities Depository Centre. Source:  Al-Raai 
Newspaper, Saturday, January 12, 2008, Issue 13612, Vol. 37.   
2
 World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Corporate 
Governance Country Assessment (Jordan) (June, 2004). Available on line: 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/jor_rosc_cg.pdf. 
22 
 
Figure 2.1: Compliance with OECD principles; Jordan and the world 
 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange Evaluation
1
. 
 
Bank governance is regulated not only by the Company Law (1997) and the Securities 
Law (2002) but also the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) Law (1971); and the Banking 
Law (2000) from which CBJ derives its supervisory powers. Recent measures by the 
CBJ toward enhancing corporate governance in the Jordanian banking system include 
the issue in 2004 of the Bank Directors‟ Handbook on Corporate Governance and a 
Corporate Governance Code for banks, published in 2007 which draws upon existing 
international best practice
2
.  
                                                 
1
 Tarif, J. (2005). “The Jordanian Experience with Corporate Governance Codes, MENA 
Regional Corporate Governance Forum: Advancing the Corporate Governance Agenda in 
MENA, 14-15 September, at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/41/35381697.pdf. 
2
 In particular the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the guidance issued by the 
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. 
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                Table 2.1: MENA countries: financial development index, 2002-2003 (based on qualitative and quantitative data, scale 0-10*) 
 
Country 
Financial 
Development Index 
Banking 
Sector 
Nonbank 
Financial 
Sector 
Regulation and 
Supervision 
Monetary Sector 
and Policy 
Financial 
Openness 
Institutional 
Environment 
Jordan 6.9 7.1 6.3 8.7 6.3 8.0 5.4 
Egypt  5.4 6.0 6.3 5.3 5.6 6.0 3.2 
Saudi Arabia 6.4 7.8 3.3 8.0 6.4 8.0 4.2 
Lebanon 7.0 8.7 3.3 7.7 8.3 7.0 5.2 
Bahrain 7.7 7.3 5.0 9.3 7.8 8.0 8.9 
Morocco 5.5 5.6 4.7 7.3 6.8 4.0 3.8 
Libya 1.0 1.3 0.7 2.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 
MENA 
Countries 
(Average) 
5.0 5.5 3.3 5.7 5.1 5.9 4.2 
 
* Scale: very low = below 2.5, low = 2.5 - 5.0, medium = 5.0 – 6.0, high = 6.0 – 7.5, very high = above 7.5. 
Source: Creane et al., (2004). 
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The Jordanian Insurance sector is supervised by the Insurance Commission (IC), an 
independent agency, established in 1999, whose regulatory powers include corporate 
governance and internal controls. It has powers of de-licensing, rehabilitation or 
liquidation of companies. Furthermore, in 2006 (coming into effect in 2007)
1
, the 
Insurance Commission issued instructions dealing with corporate governance for 
insurance companies, based on international best practice as reflected in the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Core Principles.  
2.3. The Jordanian Capital Market 
Amman Financial Market (AFM) was founded in 1976; in the mid-1990s restructuring 
of the market took place to increase its size and liquidity. Under the new Securities Law 
(Securities Law No. 23 of 1997), AFM was replaced by three new institutions, the 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE)
2
, and the 
Securities Depository Centre (SDC)
3
. The restructuring separates the supervisory and 
legislative role from the executive role of the capital market, with the executive role 
performed by ASE and SDC, while JSC plays the supervisory and legislative role. 
Emphasis has been placed on enhancing the reliability of information, transparency and 
disclosure, means of trading, clearing and settlements. The change from traditional to 
electronic trading has increased the efficiency and the speed of trading.  
The number of listed companies on the ASE increased from 66 companies in 1978 to 
227 by the end of 2006 (Table 2.2). In the same period, market capitalisation experience 
                                                 
1
 Official Gazette 4804 dated 16/1/2007. 
2
 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) started its operations on March 11, 1999. 
3
 Securities Deposit Centre (SDC) was established on May 10, 1999. 
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grew from just 286.12 Million Jordanian Dinars (JD)
1
 in 1978 to JD 26667.10 million 
by the end of 2005.  
Table 2.2: ASE: Market Development (Selected Indicators), 2000-2006 
Year 
No. of 
Listed 
Companies 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(JD Million) 
Capitalization of 
the Market as a % 
of GDP 
General 
Weighted 
Price Index 
(point)* 
Value 
Traded (JD 
Million) 
2000 163 3,509.60 58.4 1330.5 334.7 
2001 161 4,476.40 71.5 1727 668.7 
2002 158 5,029.00 80.4 1700.2 950.3 
2003 161 7,772,80 116.8 2614.5 1855.2 
2004 192 13,033.80 184.7 4245.6 3793.2 
2005 201 26,667.10 326.6 8191.5 16871 
2006 227 21,078.20 233.9 5518.1 14209.9 
 
* At the end of 2006, the ASE developed a new index based on free-float shares. The index is 
calculated by weighting according to the market capitalization of free-float shares in companies 
and not the total number of listed shares for each company.  
Source: Various ASE Annual Reports. 
 
The ratio of market capitalisation (MCAP) to GDP has grown from 37 per cent in 1978 
to 326.6 per cent in 2005; this is one of the highest ratios among emerging markets, 
indicating both a well established stock market and a relatively high level of securities 
trading (OECD, 2006)
2
. For example, in 2005, the average market capitalization for 
emerging Asia was 39.8 per cent of GDP, 54.7 per cent for emerging Europe, and 49.5 
per cent for Latin America (Saadi-Sedik and Petri, 2006). Among Arab countries Jordan 
                                                 
1
 The Jordanian Dinar (JD) has been pegged to the U.S. Dollar since 1995 (JD 1 = $ 1.41). 
2
 MENA-OECD Investment Programme: Jordan National Investment Reform Agenda 
Workshop, 2006. Available on line:  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/29/38148879.pdf. 
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also has the largest market capitalization in terms of per cent to GDP (Arab Monetary 
Fund, 2005). 
As a result of regulatory and supervisory changes in the Jordanian Capital Markets 
Jordan‟s image as a safe investment environment protected by a stringent regulatory 
system has been improved, although Arab and international investors may be able to 
achieve additional diversification by investing in the ASE (Saadi-Sedik and Petri, 
2006). As a result, foreign investors account for almost half the market capitalization of 
all sectors in 2007 (Table 2.3). Foreign ownership of market capital is one of the highest 
in the world (OECD, 2006)
1
.  
Table 2.3: Percentage of Non-Jordanian Ownership in Listed Companies by Sector 
as a percentage (%) of Market Capitalization (2002-2006) 
Year Financial Sector Services Industry All Market 
2001 47.43 19.67 27.87 38.51 
2002 47.56 26.79 26.09 37.43 
2003 46.28 24.29 30.1 38.84 
2004 47.44 25.59 36.79 41.26 
2005 49.77 26.19 38.09 45.04 
2006 47.73 36.55 43.71 45.53 
2007 50.73 36.15 51.88 48.95 
This table reports foreign investor ownership in companies listed at the ASE as of year-end 
from 2001-2007 as a percentage of total market value. Financial sector includes Banks, 
Insurance, Diversified Financial Services and Real State sector. Services sector includes Health 
Care Services, Educational Services, Hotels & Tourism, Transportation, Technology & 
Communication, Media, Utilities & Energy, and Commercial Services. Industry sector includes 
Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, Chemical Industries, Paper & Carton, Printing & 
Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & Extracting, Tobacco & Cigarettes, Engineering & 
Construction., Electrical Industries, Textile, Leather & Clothing, and Glass & Ceramics. 
Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports.  
                                                 
1
 MENA-OECD Investment Programme: Jordan National Investment Reform Agenda 
Workshop, 2006. Available on line:  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/29/38148879.pdf.  
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Nevertheless, there is still scope for further reform of the Jordanian equity market. The 
availability of investment instruments in ASE is limited, being confined to stocks and 
bonds, while derivatives and short selling are not used. Furthermore, the volume of 
trading in the bond market - in which development bonds, treasury bonds and corporate 
bonds are traded - is small and the market is underdeveloped. For example, in the years 
2004, 2005 and 2006 the market value of traded bonds was only JD 6 million, JD 3.2 
million and JD 1.9 million (of which JD 1.0 million were treasury bills) respectively. 
The low level of new issues and bond trading volume suggests that Jordanian 
companies do not rely heavily on the bond market to finance their business activities 
and that the stock market is not a major source of new investment finance.  
2.4. Data Collection and Sampling 
In order to collect data on ownership and governance structure of Jordanian firms, 
initially we use a sample that includes all firms, both financial and non-financial, listed 
on the Amman Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2006. As of 31 December 2004, 2005 and 
2006 the total number of companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, including 
financial and non-financial companies was 192, 201 and 227 respectively (total 620 
companies). However, only 519 annual reports covering all sectors could be used, 
whereas the remainder could not be included in the sample because they were 
suspended or floated price companies and are excluded due to illiquidity and incomplete 
data (i.e. missing data) during the period of study. The following table (Table 2.4) 
illustrates the distribution of the sample across all sectors: Financial, Services and 
Industry (Manufacturing)
1
.  
                                                 
1
 At the end of 2006, the ASE implemented a new sector classification of companies listed. According to 
this classification, listed companies in ASE are classified into three major sectors, further classified into 
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Table 2.4: Sample of Jordanian Companies during the period of Study (2004-2006) 
Panel A. Number of Companies in Each Year 
Year Sector 
Number of Companies 
in Each Year (ASE) 
Sample 
(Observations) 
Sample (%) 
2004 
Financial sector 70 63 90.00 
Services sector 42 35 83.33 
Industry sector 80 61 76.25 
Total  192 159 82.81 
2005 
Financial sector 77 68 88.31 
Services sector 43 37 86.05 
Industry sector 81 63 77.78 
Total  201 168 83.58 
2006 
Financial sector 90 84 93.33 
Services sector 49 44 89.80 
Industry sector 88 64 72.73 
Total  227 192 84.58 
Grand Total 620 519 83.71 
Panel B. Number of Companies in Each Sector 
All Years 
Financial sector 237 215 90.72 
Services sector 134 116 86.57 
Industry sector 249 188 75.50 
Total 620 519 83.71 
This table presents the characteristics of the sample in terms of its proportion in each year and 
each sector. In Panel A and B the third column shows the total number of firms in each year 
(sector) as reported in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE); the fourth column contains the total 
number of the sample, and the fifth column shows the proportion of our sample with respect to 
the figures in the ASE. 
The Financial sector includes Banks, Insurance, Diversified Financial Services and Real Estate. 
The Services sector includes Health Care Services, Educational Services, Hotels & Tourism, 
Transportation, Technology & Communication, Media, Utilities & Energy, and Commercial 
Services. The Industry sector includes Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, Chemical 
Industries, Paper & Carton, Printing & Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & Extracting, 
Tobacco & Cigarettes, Engineering & Construction., Electrical Industries, Textiles, Leather & 
Clothing, and Glass & Ceramics.  
Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
numerous sub categories: the financial sector includes four-sub sectors, the services sector includes 
eight sub-sectors, and the industry sector includes eleven-sub sectors.  
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The rationale for choosing 2004 as the start of the study period is that more corporate 
governance (i.e. board and ownership information) is found in the annual reports of 
companies since 1
st
 April 2004, which is when the ASEs' revamped listing requirements 
came into effect (The issuance of the Directives of Disclosure, Auditing and 
Accounting Standards)
1
.  2006 was chosen as the end of the study period as it was the 
latest financial year for which all companies published annual reports, which were 
available at the time when data collection started
2
.  
Information on firm ownership, board, managerial salary scales, bonuses and other 
benefits, and firm-specific accounting data is hand-collected from secondary sources, 
primarily the mandatory disclosure reports of these firms to the Jordan Securities 
Commission. The frequency of all variables is annual, and the values are measured as of 
the end of December for each year. Table 2.5 provides definitions of variables used in 
the analysis. 
The annual reports of Jordanian public trading companies are prepared in accordance 
with and are considered consistent with international accounting standards (IAS)
3
. The 
annual  reports  supplied by management are also subject to external auditing, to  certify 
that they are  prepared  in  accordance  with  statutory  and  professional  principles 
(international  auditing  standards)
4
. Finally, listed companies have been required since 
                                                 
1
 Recently, the Securities Law No. 76 for 2002 was issued and amended the previous Law. 
Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards under this Law came into 
effect on 1/3/2004, and the Law required companies to comply with them. 
2
 Companies are required to submit their audited financial statements to JSE for public release 
within three months of their financial year-end, Article 4 of the Directives of Disclosure and 
Auditing and Accounting Standards (2004), 
3
 Article 16 of JSC Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards of 2004 
and Article 184 of CL 22 of 1997 mandate internationally accepted standards for listed firms. 
Similar articles exist in the banking and the insurance laws.  
4
 Article 18 of JSC Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards of 2004.  
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1997 to form auditing committees from the board of directors, which exercise oversight 
over the preparation of annual reports
1
. 
As a further check on reliability, data pertaining to Jordanian public trading companies 
are also obtained from other sources, such as the Amman Stock Exchange annual 
company guide, Jordan Securities Commission (JSC)
2
, the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE)
3
, the Securities Depository Centre (SDC)
4
, and the companies' websites. These 
sources are used to verify the figures and statistics collected from annual reports.  
The names of company founding families are derived from the Memorandum of 
Association of each company under investigation, obtained via the archive held by the 
Companies Control Department, a unit of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. As a 
further robustness check, three experts from the financial sector, stock market and 
Companies Control Department gave their insight in order to correctly identify the 
founding families. However, it is uncommon in Jordan for two or more families to have 
the same family name. Furthermore, it is easy to check whether the founding family is 
still in the firm or not, because the average age of Jordanian firms in our sample is low 
(i.e. 22 years).  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Article 17 of JSC Directives of Disclosure and Auditing and Accounting Standards of 2004. 
The Banking Law of 2000 (Articles 32, 33) also mandates audit committees, with the same size 
and composition requirements as those for listed companies. 
2
 http://www.jsc.gov.jo/ 
3
 http://www.exchange.jo/  
4
 http://www.sdc.com.jo/english/  
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Table 2.5: Definitions of Variables 
Panel A. Board Variables 
Board size The total number of directors on the board  
Executive directors The number of executive directors on the board 
Non-executive 
directors 
Sum of all non-executive directors on the board 
Non-executive 
directors ratio  
The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the number of total 
directors on the board 
Family board directors The number of family directors on the board 
Family board directors 
ratio  
The ratio of the number of family directors to the number of total directors 
on the board 
Foreign board directors The number of foreign directors on the board 
Foreign board directors 
ratio  
The ratio of the number of foreign directors to the number of total directors 
on the board 
Duality The position of CEO and chairman of board are held by one person 
Founder CEO dummy One indicates that the CEO is the founder of the firm; zero otherwise 
Family CEO dummy One indicates that the CEO is a member of the founding family; zero 
otherwise 
Founder Chairman  
dummy 
One indicates that the Chairman is a member of the founding family; zero 
otherwise 
Executive salary The annual salary paid to executive directors in Jordanian Dinar  
Total directors‟ 
compensations 
The annual cash compensation (salary + bonuses + and other benefits) paid 
to executive directors in Jordanian Dinar  
Panel B. Ownership Variables 
Board ownership The percentage of ordinary shareholding by all directors  
Executive ownership The percentage of equity ownership held by executive directors and their 
immediate families  
Non-executive directors 
ownership 
The percentage of equity ownership held by non- executive directors and 
their immediate families  
No. of large shareholders No. of  large shareholders in a company 
First largest shareholder The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
Three largest 
shareholders 
The percentage of shares held by its three largest shareholders (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
Five largest shareholders The percentage of shares held by its five largest shareholders (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more)  
Sum of largest 
shareholders 
The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the  substantial shareholders 
(that is, shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
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Table 2.5. Definitions of Variables (continued) 
Identities of the largest Shareholders 
Local shareholders 
(Jordanian) 
The percentage of shares owned by Jordanian/local  shareholders (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
Individual/Families Percentage of shares owned by individual/family (that is, shareholding of 5 
per cent or more) 
Banks Percentage of shares owned by banks (that is, shareholding of 5 per cent or 
more) 
Insurance companies Percentage of shares owned by insurance companies (that is, shareholding 
of 5 per cent or more) 
Financial Firms Percentage of shares owned by Financial Firms (that is, shareholding of 5 
per cent or more) 
Companies (non-
Financial) 
Percentage of shares owned by Companies (non-Financial) (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
State/State agencies Percentage of shares owned by Government and its agencies (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
Foreign ownership Percentage of shares owned by non-Jordanian shareholders (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
Individual/Families Percentage of shares owned by individual/family (that is, shareholding of 5 
per cent or more) 
Banks The proportion of ordinary shares owned by banks (that is, shareholding of 
5 per cent or more) 
Insurance companies Percentage of shares owned by insurance companies (that is, shareholding 
of 5 per cent or more) 
Financial firms Percentage of shares owned by Financial Firms (that is, shareholding of 5 
per cent or more) 
Companies (non-
Financial) 
Percentage of shares owned by Companies (non-Financial) (that is, 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more) 
Governments Percentage of shares owned by Governments (that is, shareholding of 5 per 
cent or more) 
Float Percentage of shares held under the disclosure threshold 
Panel C. Financial variables  
Market-to-book ratio  The ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity, 
plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets. 
Size The natural logarithm of total market capitalization  
Firm Age  Age of incorporation (years) 
The sample consists of 519 firms for the period from 2004-2006. All variables are measured at the end of 
each year.  
Sources: The Amman Stock Exchange, the Jordan Securities Commission, the Securities Depository 
Center, the Companies Control Department, the Central Bank of Jordan, the Insurance Commission and the 
Jordan Insurance Federation. 
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Table 2.6 presents some preliminary insights about Jordanian companies. We compared 
descriptive statistics for a number of variables (Market-to-book ratio, Size and Age) for 
all sectors and by sector. Market-to-book ratio for all Jordanian listed firms (financial 
and non-financial) averages 1.57 per cent and ranges from 0.73 per cent to 6.19 per 
cent. The mean Size measured by the log of market capitalization for all companies is 
7.35 (i.e. about US$ 163.10 million). The age of all firms, measured by years, varies 
greatly – from 1 year to 77 years and the mean is 21.79 years.  
Among sectors, it appears that the Services sector is performing better than other sectors 
in our sample. Our data shows that (not reported in the table), among services sub-
sectors, the highest Market-to-book ratio is found in the Media sector (2.26) and the 
lowest is found in Utilities & Energy (1.29). Among all sub-sectors (Financial, Services 
and Industry), the highest Market-to-book ratio is in the Media sector (2.26) and the 
lowest is in the Glass & Ceramic Industries sector (0.89).  
Size measured by the log of market capitalization for companies is higher in the 
financial sector than in other sectors and this average appears to be driven by the 
average size of banks (8.41)
1
. However, among the sub-sectors (not reported in the 
table), the highest average size is found in the Technology & Communications sector 
(8.55), whereas the lowest is found in the Chemical Industries sector (6.82). 
Companies in the Industrial sector are older (22.58 years). The industrial companies are 
well settled companies in the Jordanian economy. Within the industrial sector, Mining 
& Extraction Industries are the oldest (29.54 years), on average, whilst Printing & 
Packaging are, on average, the youngest (12.17 years). However, among sub-sectors, 
the older companies seem to be in the Utilities & Energy sector (56.67 years), on 
                                                 
1
 Arab Bank plc alone accounts for 36.1 percent of total market capitalization in 2006.  
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average, and the younger ones in the Diversified Financial Services sector (11.08 
years).  
Table 2.6: Primary Descriptive Statistics for all Sectors 
       Mean Median 25% 75% Observations 
Panel A. All Sectors  
Market-to-book ratio 1.57 1.36 1.11 1.84 519 
Size 7.35 7.22 6.88 7.74 519 
Age 21.79 15 12 31 519 
Panel B. By Sectors (2004-2006) 
Market-to-book ratio     
Financial sector 1.58 1.32 1.15 1.82 215 
Services sector 1.62 1.43 1.11 1.97 116 
Industry sector 1.54 1.35 1.05 1.81 188 
Size      
Financial sector 7.48 7.3 6.94 8 215 
Services sector 7.38 7.42 7 7.71 116 
Industry sector 7.18 7.05 6.79 7.45 188 
Age      
Financial sector 21.31 17 11 30 215 
Services sector 21.40 14 12 31 116 
Industry sector 22.58 15 13 31.5 188 
 
This table reports some primary descriptive statistics for the whole sample. Market-to-book 
ratio is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity to the book value of assets. Size is the natural log of the market capitalizations 
of firms in Jordanian Dinar. Age is the age of firms (years). 
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2.5. Related Literature and Findings  
Corporate governance literature, mainly, deals with the agency problem that arises from 
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The literature suggests several elements related to the ownership and corporate 
governance structure of companies (internal governance mechanisms) may help to 
reduce the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, and hence have an 
impact on firm performance. The main governance mechanisms in this respect are 
ownership structure (e.g. managerial ownership, ownership concentration, largest 
shareholders and largest identity) and board structure (e.g. board size and composition, 
CEO duality) of companies
1
. 
2.5.1. Board Structure  
The board of directors plays a pivotal role in ensuring that managers act in the best 
interests of shareholders, most of the management decisions are delegated to managers, 
and the board of directors retains ultimate control by ratifying and monitoring major 
managerial decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the board of directors is 
viewed as an essential mechanism in corporate governance, to monitor top management 
discretionary behaviour and ratify major decisions (Fama, 1980; Hart, 1995; and Denis, 
2001). Taking these arguments as a starting point, in this section, therefore, we will 
present, through extensive descriptive statistics, facts on board structures in Jordanian 
listed firms. 
                                                 
1
 See Gillan (2006) for a survey of recent research.
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2.5.1.1. Board Size and Composition 
The board, as the agent of the shareholders, is an internal governance body established 
to monitor management behaviours on behalf of shareholders and to protect them from 
managers who may pursue their personal interests or otherwise act in a manner contrary 
to the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
Board size is widely believed to be an important factor in determining the effectiveness 
of corporate governance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Jensen, 1993). However, existing 
studies disagree as to the effect of board size. Some researchers claim that large boards 
reduce value because, as board size increases, difficulties of coordination, 
communication and process outweigh the advantages of having more people to draw on 
(Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; and Florackis et al, 2009).  Raheja (2005), too, 
claims that larger board size results in a less effective monitoring role, because of free-
riding problems. Others argue that larger boards are more effective because they can 
offer a wider perspective and better guidance as the strategic options of the firm (e.g. 
Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Kiel and Nicholson (2003) find a positive relationship 
between board size and corporate performance, leading to the inference that large 
boards are effective in representing shareholders' interest. 
In addition to board size, board independence is thought to have an impact on firm 
value. Boards dominated by non-executive directors are said to provide more 
independent monitoring and to be more likely to be independent of the CEO (Jensen, 
1993; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Non-executive directors may also contribute 
positively to the quality of directors' deliberations and decisions and provide strategic 
direction leading to enhanced performance (Pearce and Zahra 1992). Harris and Raviv 
(2008) note the potential of non-executive directors, provided they have the requisite 
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knowledge, incentives, and abilities, to monitor, discipline, and advise managers, 
thereby contributing in alleviating conflicts of interest between insiders and 
shareholders.  Conversely, there are studies that argue that non-executive directors often 
lack information about the firm, are too busy to contribute effectively, do not bring the 
requisite skills to the job, and may owe their position to management, giving them an 
incentive to accept management decisions to safeguard their positions in future 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Franks et al., 2001; Hart, 1995). Raheja (2005) hence 
argues that the inclusion of insiders is needed because they are an important source of 
firm-specific information which can enhance decision-making, although she warns of 
the potential for distorted objectives due to private benefits and lack of independence 
from the CEO. 
The Company Law in Jordan sets the basic requirements for board structure, liabilities 
and responsibilities.  Boards in Jordanian companies have a one-tier board structure in 
which both executive and non-executive directors sit on the same board. The board of 
directors is elected by the Company's General Assembly by means of a secret ballot for 
a four-year term. The board size ranges from three to thirteen members. Jordan has no 
legal requirements for board independence. However, according to the JSE, at least 
three members must be non-executive, to comply with the audit committee 
requirements. We follow the definition of the JSE to determine the non-executive 
directors. This specifies that "Any member of the Board of Directors shall be 
considered as non-executive, if the member is neither an employee of the Company nor 
receiving a salary there from"
1
. Furthermore, the CL makes no stipulation as to board 
members‟ skills, independence, possible committee functions, and board performance 
                                                 
1
 Article 15-b of JSC Directives of Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing 
Companies of 2004. The Banking Law of 2000 (Article 32, 33). 
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evaluation. Nor does it require the separation of the Chief Executive Officer and the 
Chairman of the Board positions, or that the CEO must be a member of board. A person 
may be a voting member of a board of directors and also serve as the company's CEO.  
In practice, most firms have relatively modest boards. Table 2.7 shows the breakdown. 
About two-thirds of our sample firms have boards with 3-9 members (i.e. 359 firms out 
of 519 firms), with an overall mean of 8.63 members. Only 160 firms (31 per cent) have 
more than 10 directors. 
Table 2.7: Size of the Board of Directors 
 No. of directors No. of firms Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
3 11 2% 2% 
4 2 1% 3% 
5 45 9% 12% 
6 18 3% 15% 
7 110 21% 36% 
8 21 4% 40% 
9 152 28% 68% 
10 29 6% 74% 
11 87 17% 91% 
12 19 4% 95% 
13 25 5% 100% 
This table shows the frequency and percentage of Board size of 519 (both financial and non-
financial) firms for the period from 2004 to 2006. Board size is the total number of directors on 
the board.  
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As far as board structure is concerned, Table 2.8 reports detailed information on board 
size and composition. 
Table 2.8: Board Size and Board Composition 
 
2004 2005 2006 
All Years 
(2004-2006) 
Total board size 8.71 8.70 8.50 8.63 
Executive directors 1.15 1.01 0.96 1.04 
Non-executive directors 7.56 7.69 7.54 7.60 
Non-executive directors ratio  85.91 87.64 88.03 87.26 
Founding family board directors 1.87 1.85 1.95 1.89 
Founding family board directors ratio  22.14 22.68 23.01 22.62 
Foreign board directors  0.97 0.96 1.05 1 
Foreign board directors ratio  11.13 11.09 11.92 11.41 
CEO and board members  68.55 67.86 67.19 67.82 
No. of observations 159 168 192 519 
This table reports the average numbers of the Board of Directors, number and percentage of 
executive directors, number and percentage of founding family board members, number and 
percentage of foreign board members and, finally, the percentage of CEO who are also board 
members to total boards. The sample consists of 519 (both financial and non-financial) firms 
for the period from 2004 to 2006. All variables are measured at the end of each year. 
Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 2.5.  
 
In 2004 the Jordanian boards appear to be composed, on average, of about nine 
individuals, and this number is stable over time. This finding shows that firms in Jordan 
have relatively moderate board size, ranging between three as the smallest and 13 as the 
largest number. These figures confirm that publicly listed firms in Jordan, on average, 
meet the requirement of the Company Law (1997)
1
. Moreover, average board size is in 
line with recommendations on good practice and beneficial impact on firm performance 
                                                 
1
 Article 132a of CL of 1997 states that "The management of a public shareholding company is 
entrusted to a Board of Directors whose members shall not be less than three and not more than 
thirteen".  
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proposed by, inter alia, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), who discuss the 
effect of board sizes on firm performance and recommend boards of fewer than 10 
directors, and preferably eight or nine. They contend, moreover, that the involvement of 
more people slows the decision-making process.  
In terms of board composition, the mean percentages of non-executive directors on the 
boards for all the years are above 85 per cent, suggesting that non-executive directors 
remain in the majority of Jordanian boards. In 2004, the average firm's board consisted 
of 1.15 executives and 7.56 non-executives and this value remained relatively constant 
over time. Therefore, on average, firms tend to have at least seven non-executive 
directors. Thus, it can be seen that the existing non-executive directors fulfilled the 
requirements by the international standards
1
'
2
. Previous studies such as Weisbach 
(1988), Byrd & Hickman (1992), and Brickley et al. (1994) show that when there are 
more external board members, performance of the firm tends to be better, since outside 
directors support the beneficial monitoring and advisory functions to firm shareholders. 
However, other researchers such as Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) suggest that boards 
expanded for political reasons (politicians, environmental activists, etc.) often result in 
too many outsiders on the board, which does not help performance. 
Founding family board members represent 23 per cent (2 members) of the board size, 
and this value is relatively constant over time. The proportion of non-Jordanian 
members (foreign members) in company boards has increased over time as shown in 
Table 2.8.  
                                                 
1
 The Cadbury report (1992) recommends that there should be at least three non-executives on 
the board and the subsequent Hampel Report (1998) recommends that at least 33 per cent of the 
board should be composed of non-executive members. 
2
 This also fulfils the requirements of the Insurance Commission instructions of corporate 
governance for insurance companies, 2006. Article 4b.1 indicates that non-executive directors 
should be at least one-third of the board of an insurance company. 
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The results show that about 68 per cent of the CEO's are also members of the board; 
although Jordanian Company Law (1997) does not require that the CEO must be a 
member of the board.  
The following, Table 2.9, provides comparison between Jordan and other countries in 
terms of board size and proportion of non-executive directors.  
Table 2.9: Board Size and Proportion of Non-executive Directors (Comparison) 
Country 
No. of 
observations 
Board size 
Proportion of non-
executive directors 
Source 
USA 
452 firms, 1981 to 
1991 
12.25 0.54 Yermark, 1996 
UK 
587 firm-year, 1999 
to 2005 
7.37 0.5 
Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2009 
Malaysia 
347 firms, 1996 to 
2000 
8 0.5 
Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006 
India 198 firms, 2003 10.48 0.67 Ghosh, 2006 
Korea 
457-464 firm, 1999 
to 2000 
6.75 0.32 Choi et al., 2007 
Bahrain 21 firms, 2001 10.5 0.82 
Hussain and 
Mallin, 2002 
Egypt 
92 firms, 2000 to 
2004 
8 N/A Elsayed, 2007 
Jordan 
519 firms, 2004-
2006 
8.63 0.87 
Our own 
calculations  
This table shows a comparison between Jordan and other countries with regard to board size 
and proportion of non-executive directors.  
 
The above table shows that the board size of the Jordanian companies is similar to those 
in other countries such as Egypt and Malaysia, but smaller than boards in the USA, 
India and Bahrain. On the other hand, the proportion of non-executive directors in the 
Jordanian boards is higher than in any of the countries listed, the closest being another 
Middle Eastern country, Bahrain. The two western countries, USA and UK, together 
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with Malaysia, all have proportions of around 50 per cent, that is, an even balance 
between executive and non-executive directors, while in Korea, non-executive directors 
are a distinct minority at just over 30 per cent.  
We have so far investigated the overall board composition. In the following, we will 
look at board composition in more detail within each sub-sector. Table 2.10 provides 
details of board size and composition by sector.  
It can be noticed from Table 2.10, panel B, that the board size in the financial sector 
(8.67) is bigger than in the non financial sectors (8.61). Companies in the financial 
sector tend to have, in general, large board size. As Hayes et al. (2005) also document, 
financial firms have on average larger boards than manufacturing firms. Among sub-
sectors, the Utilities and Energy sector reports the highest board size, with an average of 
11.33, followed by Banks (10.29), Hotels & Tourism (9.87), Educational Services 
(9.59), and Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries (9.25). The lowest board size reported 
is for Real Estate (6.77).  
Non-executive directors have on average seven seats on the board of financial and non-
financial firms (88 per cent and 87 per cent respectively). The financial sector has the 
highest proportion with about 88 per cent, whereas the services sector has the lowest 
proportion with about 86 per cent. Among sub-sectors, the lowest proportion can be 
found in the Media Sector with 77.97 per cent, whereas the highest proportion is in the 
Glass & Ceramic Industries with 95.71 per cent.  
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Table 2.10: Board Compositions by Sectors 
 
 
 N 
Board 
size 
Total 
exec 
Total 
nonexc 
Ratio 
Total 
family 
Ratio 
family 
Total 
foreign 
Ratio 
foreign 
Panel A. Board Composition by  Sector         
Banks   45 10.29 1.09 9.20 88.88% 1.87 17.24% 2.78 27.14% 
Insurance   75 9.01 0.81 8.20 90.87% 1.84 18.50% 1.12 18.98% 
Diversified Financial Services   39 8.85 1.41 7.44 82.66% 1.36 17.20% 0.87 10.48% 
Real Estate  56 6.77 0.73 4.04 87.08% 1.57 26.14% 0.25 3.21% 
Total Financial Sector  215 8.67 0.73 6.04 87.98% 1.66 19.45% 1.20 13.35% 
Health care Services  7 8.57 1.71 6.86 79.90% 0.71 9.04% 0.57 6.80% 
Educational Services  17 9.59 2 7.59 80.88% 3.4 34.53% 0.94 8.97% 
Hotels & Tourism  30 9.87 0.9 8.97 90.36% 2.87 29.46% 1.2 10.35% 
Transportation  18 8.11 1 7.11 86.56% 1.28 17.87% 0.94 11.69% 
Technology & Communication  3 7 1 6 85.71% 0.00 0.00% 3 42.86% 
Media  6 9.17 2 7.17 77.97% 2 21.85% 0 0.00% 
Utilities & Energy  9 11.33 0.67 10.66 93.94% 0 0.00% 0.67 5.58% 
Commercial Services  26 7.35 0.96 6.39 86.64% 1.88 26.84% 0.73 9.56% 
Total Services Sector  116 8.91 1.19 7.72 86.32% 2.01 23.15% 0.92 9.90% 
Pharmaceutical & Medical Ind.  16 9.25 1.57 7.68 82.85% 1.38 15.61% 1.25 12.32% 
Chemical Industries   28 7.75 1.18 6.57 84.73% 2.04 23.96% 0.43 7.91% 
Paper & Cartoon   9 6.56 0.67 5.89 89.26% 1.22 23.33% 0.56 5.93% 
Printing & Packing  6 8.83 0.5 8.33 94.45% 3.17 35.65% 0.5 5.56% 
Food & Beverage  34 7.18 0.71 6.47 89.53% 2.03 26.94% 0.91 15.25% 
Mining & Extracting   33 9.15 1.06 8.09 88.10% 1.61 18.26% 1.67 16.92% 
Tobacco & Cigarettes  6 10 1.67 8.33 83.50% 3.5 34.85% 0 0.00% 
Engineering & Constr.  20 8.45 1.05 7.4 86.05% 2.5 33.60% 0.5 5.54% 
Electrical Industries   12 8.17 1.09 7.08 80.90% 1.75 25.66% 0.67 7.41% 
Textile, Leather & Clothing  18 10 1.06 8.94 89.09% 2.83 28.55% 0.39 3.79% 
Glass & Ceramic   6 9 0.5 8.5 95.71% 2.33 31.87% 0.67 8.59% 
Total Industry Sectors   188 8.42 1.03 7.39 87.01 2.06 25.30% 0.81 10.11% 
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Table 2.10: Board Composition by Sector (continued) 
Panel B. Board Composition by Financial and Non-Financial Sectors 
Total Financial Sector  215 8.67 0.73 6.04 87.98% 1.66 19.45% 1.20 13.35% 
Total Non-Financial (Services and Industry) Sectors 304 8.61 1.09 7.52 86.75% 2.04 24.48% 0.86 10.03% 
Total All Sectors   519 8.63 1.04 7.59 87.26% 1.89 22.62% 1 11.41% 
 
This table reports mean values for board size, composition, family and foreign board members by sectors (Panel A.) and by Financial and Non-financial sectors (Panel B.). 
Board size is the sum of all executive and non-executive directors. Total exec is the sum of all executive directors; Total non-exec is equal to the sum of all non-executive 
directors; Ratio is defined as the proportion of non-executive directors on total board. Total family is the sum of all founding family directors; Total foreign is equal to the sum 
of all foreign directors; Ratio family is defined as the proportion of founding family directors on total board; Ratio foreign is defined as the proportion of foreign directors on 
total board. 
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Founding family members represent a good proportion in all sectors with, on average, 
two seats on the board in financial and non-financial sectors, as shown in Panel B 
(Table 2.10). The highest percentage is in the industrial sector with about 25 per cent, 
and the lowest is the financial sector with 19 per cent. Within the non-financial sub-
sectors (i.e. Services and Industry), it is noticeable that around 4 out of 10 seats on the 
board in Tobacco & Cigarettes are held by families, and a similar number in printing 
and packing, representing around 35 per cent of the total board, followed by 
Educational Services with 3 out of 9 seats (35 per cent). In the same vein, within the 
financial sector, Real Estate has the largest family representation with about 2 seats out 
of 7 (26 per cent), followed by Insurance with about 2 seats out of 9 seats (19 per cent).   
Regarding foreign directors, the Financial sector reports the highest proportion with 
about 13 per cent, about 2 seats out of 9, followed by Industry, with about 10 per cent, 1 
seat out of 8 and last, Services, with about 10 per cent, 1 seat out of 9. Within the non-
financial sub-sectors, the Technology & Communication sector reports the highest 
proportion with about 42.86 per cent of the total board, about 3 seats out of 7, followed 
by Mining and Extraction Industries, with about 2 seats out of 9 (17 per cent) occupied 
by foreign members. Within the Financial sector, it is noticeable that the proportion of 
foreign directors is highest in the Banks sector with about 3 seats out of 10 (27 per 
cent), followed by Insurance with about 1 seat out of 9 occupied by a foreign director. 
The findings, generally, suggest that firms in Jordan have relatively moderate board 
size. They tend to be dominated by non-executive directors. Our findings also show that 
in almost every sector (Technology and Communication and Utilities and Energy being 
the only exceptions), a significant presence of founding families is observable, 
amounting to anything from 9 per cent to more than 35 per cent of board membership. 
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Ratios of foreign membership are more widely distributed, ranging from just 3 per cent 
to as high as 42 per cent, with only two sectors, media and Tobacco and Cigarettes 
having no foreign board members. Generally, it appears that where the family ratio is 
high, the foreign ratio is relatively low, and vice versa, although there are a few sub-
sectors, such as the majority of the financial sub-sector, where the two are more evenly 
balanced. Despite the difference between individual sectors and sub-sectors, however, it 
can be said that the corporate sector in Jordan is to a substantial degree owned and 
controlled by founding families or groups of families or foreign owners. 
2.5.1.2. Are the CEO and Chairman the Same Person? 
Another important corporate governance variable is the influence on the board's 
effectiveness of the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) duality. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that the positions of board chairman (COB) and CEO should be separated, to 
mitigate the agency problem. Similarly, the Cadbury (1992) report on corporate 
governance of UK firms warns of the high probability of a opportunistic behaviour on 
the part of insiders in the absence of a separation of the two positions. However, there is 
no consensus in the literature, as to whether the separation of the two positions 
increases efficiency. Fosberg and Nelson (1999), studying a change of  leadership 
structure in an effort to control agency problems, find that corporate performance 
improved significantly in the three years following the change to a separate leadership 
structure. On the other hand, other studies find a negative relationship; for example, 
Rahman and Haniffa (2005) from a study on Malaysian corporations find that 
accounting performance of companies with CEO‟s with role duality perform worse than 
companies with separate roles. This result is similar to the findings of Dahya et al. 
(1996) from a study in the UK, that accounting performance of companies declines with 
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role duality. Moreover, some studies find no relationship between duality and corporate 
performance (Brickley et al. 1997; Hudaib and Haniffa, 2006). 
In the light of the discussion above, with regard to the separation of the two leading 
roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Table 2.11 reports detailed information 
about Non-dual, Dual, Founder CEO and Family-member CEO and Founder Chairman. 
Table 2.11 shows that 78.23 per cent of the companies have non-dual leadership (firms 
have split the roles of Chairman and CEO), and only 21.77 per cent across all sectors 
(Financial, Services and Industry sectors) practice dual leadership for the entire three-
year period. These results suggest that it is still common in Jordan for the chairman of 
the board to be also the CEO of the company. However, the number of companies with 
role duality decreases slightly from about 23 per cent in 2004 to 21 per cent in 2006. 
This figure is close to that reported in previous work. For example the corresponding 
figure reported by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) for Malaysian firms is 25.70 per cent, and 
that for the Ghana Stock Exchange 17 per cent (Coleman and Biekpe, 2006); 14 per 
cent in Bahrain (Hussain and Mallin, 2002), and 13 per cent in the UK (Florackis et al., 
2009). 
Founder CEOs are found in 36.80 per cent of the companies during the sample period 
where the proportion of companies with a founder CEO in 2004 is 37 per cent and this 
value is relatively stable over time. However, the number of family-member CEOs is 
10.21 per cent for the entire period. The proportion of companies with a family-member 
CEO increases from 6.92 per cent in 2004 to 13.54 per cent in 2006. Another important 
finding of our study is that founder Chairman also appears in about 65 per cent of the 
companies in the Services sector, Industry sector and Real Estate sector. Founder 
Chairman increases from about 64 per cent in 2004 to 67 per cent in 2006.  
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Table 2.11: Duality for all Sectors (Financial and Non-Financial). 
Year 2004 2005 2006 All Years (2004-2006) 
Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent Freq. Per cent 
Non-dual 123 77.36% 132 78.57% 151 78.65% 406 78.23% 
Dual 36 22.64% 36 21.43% 41 21.35% 113 21.77% 
Founder CEO 59 37.11% 62 36.90% 70 36.46% 191 36.80% 
Family CEO 11 6.92% 16 9.50% 26 13.54% 53 10.21% 
Founder Chairman*  70 64.22% 75 64.10% 90 67.16% 235 65.25% 
No. of observations 159 168 192 519 
This table reports the frequencies and the percentage of Dual and Non-dual, Founder CEO, Family-member CEO and Founder Chairman for all sectors 
(Financial and Non-Financial). Non-dual is where the CEO and board chair positions are separate, Dual where CEO is also chairman of the board, 
Founder CEO when the CEO is the founder of the firm, Family-member CEO when the CEO is a member of the founding family and Founder Chairman 
when the Chairman of Board is a member of the founding family. 
* This figure is related to the Services sector, Industry sectors and Real Estate sector only (360 Companies for three years 2004-2006).  
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To investigate these issues further, Table 2.12 provides detailed information about 
Duality, Founder COE and Family-member CEO by sectors. 
Table 2.12: Duality by Sectors. 
 2004 2005 2006 
All Years 
(2004-2006) 
Financial sector  
Dual (%) 19.05 19.12 20.24 19.53 
Founder CEO (%) 28.57 29.41 32.14 30.23 
Family CEO (%) 11.11 14.71 17.86 14.88 
No. of observations 63 68 84 215 
Non-Financial sectors  
Dual (%) 25.00 23.00 20.9 22.22 
Founder CEO (%) 42.71 42.00 38.06 39.81 
Family CEO (%) 4.17 6.00 11.19 10.19 
No. of observations 96 100 108 304 
This table reports the percentage of Dual, Founder CEO, and Family-member CEO for 
Financial and Non-Financial sectors. Dual where CEO is also chairman of the board, Founder 
CEO when the CEO is the founder of the firm and Family-member CEO when the CEO is a 
member of the founding family. 
 
It is shown that, surprisingly, the number of companies with role duality in the financial 
sector increases from 19.05 per cent in 2004 to 20.24 per cent in 2006, and the mean for 
the entire three-year period is 19.53 per cent. One possible explanation for this is the 
increment in the number of listed companies at the ASE in 2005 and 2006 where the 
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same person holds the title of CEO and Chairperson
1
. Contrary to that, in the non-
financial sectors, the number of companies with role duality decreases from 25 per cent 
in 2004 to 21 per cent in 2006, and the mean for the entire three-year period is 22 per 
cent.  
In the financial sectors, the results show that the proportion of Founder CEOs increases 
from 29 per cent in 2004 to 32 per cent in 2006, and the mean for the entire period is 30 
per cent. In the same line the proportion of Family CEOs increases from 11 per cent in 
2004 to about 18 per cent in 2006, and the mean for the entire period is 15 per cent.  
For non-financial sectors, it can be seen that the role of Founder CEO's is slightly 
weakened in favour of Family members. The proportion of positions held by Founder 
CEOs decreases from 43 per cent in 2004 to 38 per cent in 2006. On the contrary, the 
positions held by Family CEOs increase quite significantly during the period of study, 
from 4 per cent in 2004 to 11 per cent in 2006.   
Our findings so far give an indication of the influential role of families in the Jordanian 
equity market. We find that founder family members hold important positions in 
management and on the board of directors. This also shows us that, in the Jordanian 
experience, there is no separation between ownership and control, which may increase 
the agency conflict between the founding families and other shareholders in the 
company, especially minority shareholders. Such a view may be supported by the 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence offered by Fama and Jensen (1983) and 
Morck et al. (1988), to the effect that agency conflicts are increased where ownership 
and control are combined.   
                                                 
1
 The companies listed at ASE increased by the end of 2006 to 227, compared with 201 by the 
end of 2005 and 192 by the end of 2004 (ASE annual reports, 2005 and 2006). 
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2.5.2. How Much are CEOs Compensated? 
It is widely acknowledged that management compensation provides an important 
corporate governance tool for reducing agency conflicts and improving the performance 
of the company (Dong and Ozkan, 2008). Using pay-for-performance rewards to 
managers can play an important role in aligning the interests of owners and managers. 
There is extensive empirical research on the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990), based on 
a large sample of US firms, find that a US$ 1000 increase in shareholder wealth leads to 
a US$ 3.25 increase in CEO pay. Hall and Liebman (1998), also for a US sample, find a 
positive association between CEO compensation and the financial performance of the 
firm. In contrast, the evidence from the UK does not lead to clear-cut conclusions. For 
example, Gregg et al. (2005) provide evidence for a weak relationship in large UK 
firms. Recently, Ozkan (2007) finds that performance has a positive but insignificant 
impact on director pay for a sample of large UK firms. Finally, Dong and Ozkan (2008) 
find that institutional investors, as a whole, make no appreciable difference in the 
determination of director pay level and pay–performance relationship. However, after 
they divide institutions into “dedicated” and “transient” groups, they find that dedicated 
institutions restrain the level of director pay and strengthen the pay–performance link. 
In Jordan, companies have to disclose board compensation, including that of the CEO. 
Article 4-b-18 of JSC Directives of Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of 
the Year 2004 stated that the Board of Directors‟ report shall include "The benefits and 
remunerations of the Chairman, members of the Board of Directors, and Senior 
Executive Management, during the fiscal year, including payments received by any of 
them such as fees, salaries, bonuses, and otherwise, and their travel and transport 
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expenses within the Kingdom and abroad". Stock options or additional stock awards are 
non-existent in Jordan. Our results show that not all companies disclosed the 
compensation of the CEO. In the sample, about 71 per cent of companies have disclosed 
these items.  
Table 2.13 provides information about CEO salary and compensation in Jordanian 
Dinars (JD) during 2004-2006 for the all sectors (financial and non-financial). 
Table 2.13: CEO Compensation in thousands Jordanian Dinars (JD
1
) for the 
entire period (2004-2006) 
  Observations Mean Min Max 
CEO salary  373 62,296.0 11,050.0 419,000.0 
CEO compensation 373 80,146.0 11,050.0 539,620.0 
      
CEO=Chairman salary (Duality) 90 83,325.0 16,000.0 281,666.0 
CEO=Chairman compensation 
(Duality) 
90 114,225.0 21,000.0 539,620.0 
Founder CEO salary 140 67,982.0 11,200.0 281,666.0 
Founder CEO compensation 140 89,186.0 12,845.0 372,814.0 
Family CEO salary 45 70,416.0 12,000.0 268,000.0 
Family CEO compensation 45 102,721.0 14,400.0 539,620.0 
This table reports mean values of salary and total compensation of CEOs. Salary is defined as the 
annual salary paid to CEO and CEO compensation defined as the annual compensation (salary + 
bonuses + and other benefits) paid to CEO.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Jordanian Dinar (JD) has been pegged since 1995 to the U.S. Dollar (JD 1 = $ 1.41). 
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The mean salary is JD 62,296.00 (i.e. about US$ 87,837.00) and the mean 
compensation (salary and bonus) is JD 80,146.00 (i.e. about US$ 113,006.00) during 
the study period for all sectors (2004-2006). In addition, some CEOs in Jordan receive 
other benefits which can not be quantified, such as a car, accommodation, driver and 
cellular phone. Our sample results show that about 31 per cent of CEOs have company 
cars, 6 per cent have a driver, and 1.5 per cent has received accommodation.  
The figures in this table illustrate one important feature of the Jordanian firms: when the 
same person holds the title of CEO and Chairperson (Duality), the CEO‟s mean salary 
and compensation is above the total sample mean, an increase of about 34 per cent and 
about 43 per cent respectively. Similarly, Founder CEO mean salaries and 
compensation are above the sample mean by about 9 per cent and 11 per cent, those of 
Family CEOs by about 13 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively.  
According to our sample results, there are large variations in salary and total 
compensation. Cash salary varies from JD 11,050.00 to JD 419,000.00, while total 
compensation varies from JD 11,050.00 to JD 539,620.00. Therefore, more insight into 
the nature of the rates in different sectors is provided in Table 2.14. 
Table 2.14 presents descriptive statistics for CEOs salaries and compensation by sectors 
(Financial and Non-financial sectors) in Jordanian Dinars (JD) during the sample period 
(2004-2006). 
The statistics show that the level of salary and total cash compensation paid to the 
CEOs increases by 24 per cent and 33 per cent respectively during the sample period. 
This trend is in line with what is reported by other researchers in other countries, such 
as Florackis and Ozkan (2009) in the UK, who find that the level of salary and total 
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cash compensation paid to executive directors increased by 34 per cent and 43 per cent 
respectively between 1999 and 2005.  
Table 2.14: CEO Compensation in thousands Jordanian Dinar (JD) by Years and 
Sectors  
Panel A. All Sectors  
 2004 2005 2006  All Years 
(2004-2006) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
CEO salary 54,645.0 61,164.0 67,842.0 62,296.0 
CEO compensation 65,296.0 83,420.0 86,629.0 80,146.0 
No. of observations 95 122 156 373 
Panel B. By Sectors (2004-2006) 
  Mean Min Max 
Financial sector      
CEO salary  77,942.0 11,475.0 419,000.0 
CEO compensation  109,632.0 11,475.0 539,620.0  
No. of observations  
 129 129 129 
Non-Financial sectors     
CEO salary  54,026.0 11,050.00 281,666.00 
CEO compensation  64,557.0 11,050.00 290,266.00 
No. of observations  
 244 244 244 
Panel A reports mean values of salary and total compensation of CEOs for the sample period. 
Panel B reports mean values of salary and total compensation of CEOs for Financial and Non-
Financial sectors. Salary is defined as the annual salary paid to CEO and CEO compensation 
defined as the annual compensation (salary + bonuses + and other benefits) paid to CEO 
 
Our results also show that the mean salary for CEOs in the financial sector is JD 
77,942.0 and the mean compensation is JD 109,632.0 during the sample period. Within 
the financial sector there is large variation in salaries and compensation. Reported cash 
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salary varied from JD 11,475.00 in the Real Estate sub-sector to JD 419,000.00 in the 
Banks sub-sector. Similarly, total compensation varies from JD 11,475.00 for the Real 
Estate sub-sector to JD 539,620.00 for Banks.  
Banks report the highest mean salary for CEOs in the Financial sector, followed by 
Insurance, Diversified Financial and Real Estate, with JD 212,659.00, JD 83,030.00, JD 
60,236.00 and JD 46,061.00 respectively. The highest CEO compensation is reported in 
Banks, followed by the Diversified Financial, Insurance and Real Estate sub-sectors, 
with JD 297,500.00, JD 120,329.00, JD 97,229.00 and JD 54,672.00 respectively.  
The mean salary for CEOs in the Non-financial sectors is JD 54,026.0 and the mean 
compensation is JD 64,557.0 during the entire period (2004-2006). Within the Non-
financial sectors there is large variation in salaries and compensation. Cash salary varies 
from JD 11,050.00 in the Chemical Industries sector to JD 281,666.00 in the Tobacco & 
Cigarettes sector. Similarly, total compensation varies from JD 11,050.00, in the 
Chemical Industries sector to JD 290,266 in the Tobacco & Cigarettes sector.  
The Industry sector reports the highest mean salary and compensation for CEOs in the 
Non-financial sectors, followed by Services with JD 54,605.00 and JD 53,033.00 
respectively for salary and JD 66,400.00 and JD 61,404.00 for CEO compensation 
respectively.  
To summarize, CEO salary and compensation are substantially higher than the average 
when the CEO is a founder or family member. The most marked difference, however, is 
in the case of duality, when CEO salary and compensation are almost a third higher than 
the average. Both salary and compensation are higher in the financial than non-financial 
sectors; while the minimum rates observed are similar in the two sectors, the maximum 
rates in the financial sectors are almost twice those in the non-financial sectors.  
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2.5.3. Evolution of Ownership   
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is the subject of an 
important and ongoing debate in the literature. A number of researchers view the 
ownership structure of the firm as a potential source of agency conflict or a potential 
solution for it and find an association between ownership structure and corporate value 
(see, Ang et. al. 2000; and Morck et al., 1988 amongst others).  
It is useful to examine in detail the ownership characteristics of Jordanian firms at the 
firm level as an indicator of the expected agency cost. The following sections therefore 
report extensive descriptive statistics for board ownership both executive and non-
executive directors, largest shareholders (shareholders with more than 5 per cent 
ownership)
1
, the average shareholders by typology, and finally, foreign ownership. 
2.5.3.1. Managerial Ownership 
The level of managerial equity ownership can be important in determining the extent of 
agency problems a corporation faces. Managerial ownership has been suggested as a 
potential incentive mechanism, which serves to align interests of managers with those 
of shareholders since it provides directors incentives towards firm value maximization 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The greater their share of direct ownership, the greater 
share of the cost of undertaking non-value maximizing actions is borne by managers. A 
positive relationship between the level of managerial ownership and performance is 
therefore expected (see for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988; 
Mehran, 1995; Florackis et al., 2009). However, another strand of literature indicates 
                                                 
1
 The Instructions of Issuing Companies Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards 
instructions for the Year 2004, which came into effect as of 1 March 2004, required Jordanian 
listed companies to disclose "The names of the Company‟s large shareholders and the number 
of shares owned by each of them where such constitutes (5 per cent) or more in comparison 
with the previous year" (Article 4-b-4). 
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that the relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs (the alignment 
effect) may not be linear (see for example, McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and 
Keasey, 1999; Florackis, 2005 and Davies et al, 2005 among others). In particular, the 
association between the level of executive ownership and firm performance is observed 
only up to a point; thereafter there is a decline in firm performance. This is what is 
called the entrenchment hypothesis. It is argued that either low or high levels of 
ownership increase alignment of interest and have a positive relation with firm value. In 
contrast, intermediate levels of ownership increase entrenchment and enable managers 
to exercise more controlling power, for example to allocate firm resources for their own 
interests, possibly to the detriment of other shareholders. This is why the relationship 
with firm value becomes negative. 
Jordanian quoted companies
1
 are required to disclose in their financial statements the 
names of all the board members, the number of securities issued by the Company which 
are owned by any member of its Board of Directors, any member of its Senior 
Executive Management or any of their relatives
2
. According to the Company Law of 
1997 directors must be shareholders; each company, in its Memorandum of 
Association, must specify the number of shares which must be held by each member to 
qualify for nomination as a member of the board of directors
3
.  
Table 2.15 provides information on the evolution of board ownership during the study 
period (2004-2006) for all sectors (financial and non-financial). We report data on 
average ownership by board. Board Ownership is divided into its respective sub-
categories of executive and non-executive directors.  
                                                 
1
 Article 4-b-17 of JSC Directives of Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing 
Companies of 2004. 
2
 Relatives are Husband, Wife and Minor Children.  
3
 Article 133a of CL of 1997.  
58 
 
Table 2.15: Average Percentage of Ordinary Shares Held by Insiders 
 
  
2004 2005 2006 
All Years 
(2004-2006) 
Board ownership   50.03 47.30 47.84 48.34 
  Executive  ownership  6.72 5.58 4.83 5.65 
       Non-executive ownership  43.31 41.72 43.01 42.69 
No. of observations    159 168 192 519 
This table reports mean values of shareholding by insider ownership. Board ownership is 
defined as the total percentage of ordinary shareholdings by all directors; Executive ownership 
represents the percentage of ordinary shareholdings by Executive directors; Non-executive 
ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by Non-executive directors.  
 
The findings in this table illustrate one important feature of Jordanian firms; 
approximately half the market is held by the board of directors, around 48 per cent. 
Board ownership shows a decreasing pattern, the average ordinary shareholding 
decreased by approximately 2 per cent over the three years.   
Among the board of directors, executive ownership shows a decreasing tendency; the 
total ordinary shares held by executive directors decreased from 6.72 per cent in 2004 to 
4.83 per cent in 2006, an average decrease of 2 per cent in three years. This is not the 
case for non-executive directors, whose average level of ownership seems to be stable 
over time.  
The findings, overall, show that approximately half of the market is held by the board of 
directors. The results suggest that, according to our sample, the reduction in managerial 
ownership seems to involve mainly executive directors. Conversely, non-executive 
ownership shows a stable pattern over time.  
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To investigate these issues more, Table 2.16 provides, by sector, detailed information 
about Board, Executive, and Non-Executive Ownerships. 
Table 2.16: Average Percentage of Ordinary Shares held by Insiders by Sectors for 
Entire Period (2004-2006) 
  Financial sector  Non-Financial sectors All sectors 
Board ownership 48.19 48.45 48.34 
Executive ownership 6.64 4.95 5.65 
Non-executive ownership 41.55 43.5 42.69 
No. of observations  215 304 519 
This table reports mean values of shareholding by insiders by sectors (Financial and Non-
Financial sectors). Board Ownership is defined as the total percentage of ordinary 
shareholdings by all directors; Executive ownership represents the percentage of ordinary 
shareholdings by Executive directors. Non-executive ownership represents the percentage of 
ordinary shareholdings by Non-executive directors. 
 
The findings, generally, suggest that firms in Jordan are dominated by board ownership 
in both the financial and non-financial sectors. Almost half the market for all sectors is 
held by the board of directors. Executive ownership in the financial sectors is higher 
than in the non-financial sectors by about 2 per cent. On the other hand, non-executive 
director ownership represents a large portion in all sectors, although it is greater in the 
non-financial sectors by almost 2 per cent.  
The highest board ownership is reported in the Services sector with around 54 per cent, 
(not reported in the table) followed by the Financial sector with 48.19 percent and 
finally, the Industry sector with about 45 per cent. 
Within sub-sectors the highest board ownership is found in Technology & 
Communications, about 94 per cent, followed by Hotels & Tourism with 71 per cent 
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and the lowest board ownership is found in Glass & Ceramic Industries with 
approximately 25 per cent. On the other hand, the highest executive ownership is found 
in the Paper & Carton Industry with about 18 per cent, while the lowest executive 
ownership is reported for Utilities & Energy.  
2.5.3.2. Ownership and Identities of Large Shareholders  
When ownership is dispersed, individual shareholders do not have incentives to monitor 
the behaviour of managers. They can act as 'free-riders' and are more likely to rely on 
others to govern the management (La Porate et al., 1999). In contrast, in the situation of 
concentration of ownership among large shareholders (i.e. individuals/families, 
financial, non-financial, and other largest )
1
, there may be greater incentives to be 
involved in the control process than small ones, due to their greater capability to bear 
the expense of collecting information on management behaviour, to the benefit of 
corporate performance (Stiglitz, 1985). However, the presence of a large shareholder 
may lead to higher agency costs inside the firm, since large shareholders may have 
incentives and power to expropriate minority shareholders and to divert corporate 
resources (Sheifer and Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 1999 and Holderness, 2003).  
Several empirical papers investigate the relationship between large shareholders and 
corporate performance, and generally find mixed results. For example, McConnel and 
Servaes (1990) find a positive correlation between shareholdings of large investors and 
corporate performance based on market-to-book ratio. Leech and Leahy (1991) find a 
positive relationship between external shareholders and performance for the UK 
companies. Seifert et al. (2005) find a positive relationship between ownership of 
institutional investors and market-to-book ratio in Germany. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
                                                 
1
 We use large shareholders and blockholders interchangeably throughout the chapter.  
61 
 
find a positive relationship between the five largest shareholders and corporate 
performance of Malaysian listed companies.  
On the other hand, a study by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) finds an insignificant 
relationship between stockholding by 5 and 20 largest shareholders on firms' 
performance by using ROE as a performance measure. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) 
find no difference in the performance of various firms, whether shareholding in their 
corporation is concentrated or dispersed. Moreover, recent findings by Davies et al. 
(2005) and Mura (2007) indicate a strong negative correlation between blockholders 
and corporate value for UK companies.  
2.5.3.3. Foreign Ownership  
Monitoring may also be performed by foreign investors, in the view of Khanna and 
Palepu (1999), as emerging markets integrate with the global economy. Several studies 
on international business suggest a likelihood that foreign investors will have more 
positive performance effects on local firms than domestic institutions, especially in 
emerging market economies. For example, Hanousek et al. (2004) show that foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on corporate performance, attributed to a better 
monitoring ability. Mitton (2002) and Lins (2003) both find that firm performance is 
positively related to outside ownership in emerging markets. Moreover, recent findings 
in Turkey (Aydin et al, 2007) show that foreign equity investors have significant and 
positive effects on firm performance. This supports the view that foreign investors 
complement domestic institutions as external governance agents. Following the market 
liberalization of the Amman Stock Exchange in 1995 foreign investors are increasingly 
investing in Jordanian listed firms and in the view of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), such 
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involvement can provide incentives for shareholders to monitor managerial 
performance and act in a manner that enhances firm value. In an Indian context, Khanna 
and Palepu (1999) find that as emerging markets become integrated into the world 
economy, foreign investors exercise a valuable monitoring role.  
Listed companies in Jordan are required, by law, to disclose the names of the company's 
large shareholders (that is, those with shareholdings of 5 per cent or more) and the 
number of shares owned by each of them
1
.    
Table 2.17 presents detailed descriptive statistics about ownership concentration and 
largest shareholders in Jordanian firms.  
Our results show that the total average number of blockholders (shareholders of 5 per 
cent and more) in the sample companies is 3.53 and this number ranges from 1 to 8 
largest shareholders. The average number of local (Jordanian) blockholders is 2.86 and 
this number ranges from zero to 7. Finally, the average number of foreign blockholders 
is 0.67 and this number ranges from zero to 4.   
The figures in the table show an important feature of the Jordanian companies, 
according to our sample, that more than 46 per cent of the market is held below the 
disclosure threshold (5 per cent).  
The figures in Table 2.17 also show that, on average, the sum of stakes of all investors 
that hold equity greater than 5 per cent is 53.55 per cent of shares during the sample 
period and it seems stable over time. In fact, this proportion is larger than is found in 
Continental Europe and USA and UK, 49.6 per cent and 10.9 per cent respectively, but 
                                                 
1
 JSC Instructions of Issuing Companies Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards 2004, 
Article 4b4. 
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within the range of those in France and Germany, 52.4 per cent and 58.1 per cent 
respectively (Thomsen et al, 2006).  
Table 2.17: Largest Shareholders* 
    2004 2005 2006 
All Years 
(2004-2006) 
Number of large local shareholders 2.93 2.83 2.84 2.86 
Number of large foreign shareholders 0.62 0.70 0.67 0.67 
Total number of  larges shareholders 3.55 3.53 3.51 3.53 
Largest shareholder 28.93 29.80 30.03 29.29 
Three largest shareholders 46.91 46.47 47.79 47.09 
Five largest shareholders 52.57 51.78 53.16 52.53 
Sum of all shareholders with ownership 
greater than 5 % 
53.64 52.87 54.05 53.55 
Float 46.36 47.13 45.95 46.45 
No. of observations  159 168 192 519 
* Reported disclosure rule is 5 per cent. 
This table shows the number and the percentage of shares by the largest shareholder in the 
firms. Largest is equal to the percentage of outstanding equity held by its largest shareholder; 
Three largest shareholders is the percentage of outstanding equity held by its three largest 
shareholders; five largest shareholders is the percentage of outstanding equity held by its five 
largest shareholders. Sum of all shareholders is equal to the sum of all largest shareholder above 
the disclosure threshold (5 per cent). Float is equal to the total percentage of ordinary 
shareholding held below the disclosure threshold. 
 
Among the largest shareholders, the largest shareholder owns, according to our sample, 
29.29 per cent, the three largest own 47.09 per cent and the five largest own 52.53 per 
cent and these figures seem stable over time. Moreover the largest shareholder owns 
one-third of the stocks in all listed companies. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
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Jordanian system is characterised by the presence of strong blockholders. Thus, the 
main agency in the Jordanian market problem seems to be between largest shareholders 
and minority shareholders. If this is the case, more policies need to be in place to protect 
minority rights.  
Table 2.18 shows, for all listed firms, the distribution of the major blockholders in the 
entire period (2004-2006). Blockholders are divided into four ownership categories for 
both local ownership and foreign ownership. To delve deeper into this issue and provide 
further evidence to the existing literature, this study makes a distinction between the 
two most important categories of foreign shareholders, namely, foreign financial 
institutions and foreign industrial corporations (i.e. companies). Since the nature of 
these two different classes of investors and their motivations are fundamentally 
different, the aggregation of them into one common class of shareholders masks certain 
important results which can only be determined if they are analysed separately. 
Controlling block owners as a group own, on average, 53.55 per cent, with 40.80 per 
cent for local (Jordanian) ownership and 12.75 per cent for foreign (non-Jordanian) 
ownership. 
Among large local shareholders, 16.92 per cent of shares are held directly by large 
individuals/families. Our result is in line with what is reported in previous studies (see, 
La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and 
Amit 2006, among others) who find that in many countries around the world, including 
Western Europe, South and East Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, the 
vast majority of publicly traded firms are family controlled. This finding also confirms 
our earlier findings on the influential role of families in the Jordanian equity market. 
This also shows us that, in the Jordanian experience, there is no separation between 
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ownership and control, which may increase the agency conflict between families and 
other shareholders in the company especially minority shareholders.  
Large financial institutional holders, such as banks, insurance companies, financial and 
brokerage firms), account for approximately 14 per cent. This low proportion of 
ownership can be explained by underdevelopment of investment, mutual, and pension 
funds. Another reason may be that the investment instruments are still limited to stocks 
and bonds, derivatives and short selling are not used in the Jordanian equity market. 
Large institutional shareholders as a group appear to be interested in Insurance, 
Financial and Real Estate (17.70 per cent) and in Services (16.35 per cent). Their 
weakest participation is in the Banking sector (2.31 per cent). 
Companies (non-financial) as blockholders are interested more in Services (6.85 per 
cent), Manufacturing (5.83 per cent), Insurance, Financial and Real Estate (3.03 per 
cent), and finally, Banking (1.98 per cent).  
State/State agencies
1
 as large shareholders held on average 5.01 per cent and the vast 
majority of this proportion is owned by The Social Security Corporation
2
.   
This low proportion of government ownership observed in the Jordanian market is in 
contrast to what is reported in other countries. For instance, the State ownership of large 
publicly traded companies in Singapore, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain is 45, 25, 35, 
and 30 per cent respectively (La Porta et al.1999).  
                                                 
1
 The government (state) shares are either shares owned by government through the Jordan 
Investment Corporation or by a government agency such as the Social Security Corporation.  
2
 The Social Security Corporation is a government-owned and managed entity whose main 
objective is to provide pensions to all insured persons after retirement or in case of disability or 
to their heirs after death and to insure them against Work Injuries and Occupational Diseases. 
The Social Security Corporation has an investment unit called "The Investment Unit", which 
was established in 2003 for investing the funds of the Social Security Corporation. 
The stock portfolio of the Social Security Corporation is considered as the biggest portfolio in 
the ASE, at 3 billion JD and is well diversified (Al Fanik, 2006). 
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Table 2.18: Structure of Capital and Largest Shareholders Identity in Jordanian Listed 
Firms for the entire period (2004-2006)* 
 
  Banks 
Insurance, 
Financial and 
Real Estate 
Services  Manufacturing 
All Listed 
Firms 
Local ownership       
Individual/Families 13.40 19.03 13.97 17.66 16.92 
Institutional Investors 2.31 17.70 16.35 12.17 14.06 
Companies (Non-
financial) 
1.98 3.03 6.85 5.83 4.81 
State/State Agencies 8.25 0.80 9.97 5.00 5.01 
Sum of local shareholders 
with ownership greater 
than 5% 
25.94 40.56 47.14 40.66 40.80 
Foreign ownership       
Individual/Families 2.77 0.94 3.18 2.69 2.23 
Institutional Investors 23.80 7.64 5.76 2.61 6.80 
Companies (Non-
financial) 
2.25 0.79 2.36 6.88 3.47 
Governments 1.66 0.00 0.22 0.15 0.25 
Sum of foreign 
shareholders with 
ownership greater than 5% 
30.39 9.37 11.52 12.33 12.75 
Sum of all shareholders 
with ownership greater 
than 5% 
56.33 49.93 58.66 52.99 53.55 
Float 43.67 50.07 41.34 47.01 46.45 
No. of observations  45 170 116 188 519 
* Reported disclosure rule is 5 per cent. 
This table reports mean values of shareholding by large shareholders (local and foreigners). 
Individual/Families is defined as the total percentage of ordinary shareholdings by individual/families; 
Institutional Investors represents the percentage of ordinary shareholding by banks, insurance, financial and 
brokerage firms; Companies’ ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by non-financial companies; 
and State or its agencies' ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by the government or its 
agencies. Governments' ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by the foreign government.  Sum 
of local (foreign) shareholders is equal to the sum of local (foreign) large shareholders above the disclosure 
threshold (5 per cent). Sum of all shareholders is equal to the sum of all large shareholder above the 
disclosure threshold (5 per cent). Float is equal to the total percentage of ordinary shareholding held below 
the disclosure threshold (i.e. 5 per cent). 
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An explanation for the low proportion of government ownership in Jordan is the 
privatization programme that Jordan launched in 1996, as a part of its wider economic 
reform programme. So far, 66 transactions in the privatization programme have been 
completed. More than US$ 1300 million   and over US$ 1 billion have been attracted in 
investments associated with privatization, particularly in telecom, water, transport and 
other privatized sectors. The first major step towards privatization was that of the 
Telecommunication Corporation, which was transformed into a public shareholding 
company in 2000. The privatization programme in Jordan ranks as one of the most 
successful programmes in the Middle East Region (The World Bank Group)
1
. The 
percentage of capital owned by the state as a blockholder is important for almost all 
sectors except Insurance, Financial and Real Estate.  
Table 2.18 also presents, for all listed firms, the percentage of shares owned by 
foreigners. Foreign investors as large shareholders held on average 12.75 per cent. One 
important finding from our study is that, as we can notice, large foreign investors have 
an important involvement in all sectors, especially the Banking sector. Foreigners as 
large shareholders hold 30.39 per cent in the banking sector, which is higher than total 
local holdings (i.e. 25.94 per cent). One possible explanation is that the Jordanian 
banking sector has been developing rapidly. Creane et al. (2004) indicate that the 
banking sector of Jordan is „„well developed, profitable, and efficient". Furthermore, 
foreign investors in Jordan enjoy complete freedom of capital movement and no taxes 
on capital gains or cash dividends, in an attractive investment structure and open 
economy.  In fact, the foreign investors' contribution in the Jordanian capital market is 
                                                 
1
 For more details, please see: The Executive Privatization Commission: http://www.epc.gov.jo. 
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one of the highest in the world (OECD, 2006); for example, foreign investors' account 
for almost half the market capitalization of all sectors in 2007. 
As for the identity of the shareholders, we notice that individual/family investors as 
large owners have an important involvement in all sectors. They account for the highest 
percentages of first, second and third largest owners, as shown in Table 2.19.  
Table 2.19: Large Shareholders' Identity in Jordanian Listed Firms* 
   First Largest Second Largest Third Largest 
 Freq.  Percent Freq.  Percent Freq.  Percent 
Identity of Large Local        
Individual/Families 190 36.82 155 33.26 121 33.06 
Financial Investors 121 23.45 128 27.47 103 28.14 
Non-financial Investors 118 22.87 90 19.31 61 16.67 
Total  429 83.14 373 80.04 285 77.87 
Identity of Large Foreign        
Individual/Families 16 3.10 6 1.29 21 5.74 
Financial Investors 46 8.91 57 12.23 45 12.30 
Non-financial Investors 25 4.84 30 6.44 15 4.10 
Total  87 16.86 93 19.96 81 22.14 
Grand Total  516 100 466 100 366 100 
No Large owners 3 53 153 
No. of observations  519 519 519 
* Reported disclosure rule is 5 per cent. 
This table reports the identity of the first, second and third largest shareholders (local and 
foreigners). Individual/Families is equal to the percentage of the large shareholders when they 
are individual/family; Institutional Investors is equal to the percentage large shareholders when 
they are banks, Insurance, Pension fund, Financial and Brokerage Firms; Non-Financial 
Investors is equal to percentage of  large shareholders when they are non-financial companies; 
State or its agencies' and Municipalities. No Large owners' means the company do not have a 
largest owner.  
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As large shareholders, their holdings may create a source of power for them. They may 
seek to satisfy their own family interests. Families as controlling owners may exercise 
their power by influencing firm policies, decision-making and exercising their voting 
rights to control managers‟ actions. This may result in suboptimal investment decisions, 
excessive compensation and substantial influence in selecting managers and directors, 
which can impede the efforts of more capable third parties in managing firms 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Among local investors financial investors constitutes the 
second percentage and non-financial investors came third.  
In contrast, for foreign investors, financial investors show the highest percentage for 
first, second, and third foreign block owners, followed by non-financial investors and 
individual/family investors constituted the lowest percentage. 
To summarize, we have shown that Jordanian firms are, to a significant degree, subject 
to the influence of blockholders, with the largest shareholder holding on average close 
to a third of the shares in any firm, while overall, more than half of ownership is in the 
hands of small numbers of large shareholders (with more than 5 per cent). These large 
shareholders are predominantly local and, specifically, families. Nevertheless, foreign 
owners also have substantial influence, with large foreign blockholders accounting for 
at least 10 per cent or more of share ownership in most sectors, and 30 per cent in 
banking, where they outweigh local investors. Sectoral differences notwithstanding, 
therefore, it is clear that family members and foreign investors both have a significant 
ability to influence decision-making in Jordanian listed companies via using their 
substantial shareholding power.   
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2.6. Conclusion  
In this chapter we provided a detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance 
structure of Jordanian listed companies, both financial and non-financial. We presented 
descriptive statistics on the board and ownership structure of a sample of financial and 
non-financial firms based on 519 companies for the years 2004 to 2006. A key 
motivating factor for this work is that it is the first study on evaluation of ownership and 
board structure in Jordan. It contributes to fill a gap in the literature related to emerging 
markets and, more specifically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries.  
Our detailed investigation of Jordanian firms shows three important features concerning 
Jordanian companies. First, most firms, both financial and non-financial, are family 
firms. The boards and management are frequently dominated by the founding families. 
In particular, our results show that founder chairman and founder family directors 
constitute a relatively increasing proportion of the board, although founding family 
CEOs members represent a large proportion of the management of the Jordanian 
companies and show an increasing pattern over time.  Our findings give an indication of 
the influential role of families in the Jordanian equity market. This is evidence that, in 
the Jordanian experience, there is no separation between ownership and control, which 
may be a source of agency conflict between the founding families and other 
shareholders in the company, especially minority shareholders.  
Board size is relatively constant over time, and we find that, with an average of 9 
directors, an increasingly high proportion whom are non-executives. It is still common 
to see in Jordan that the chairman of the board is also the CEO. However, the number of 
companies with role duality decreases over time.  
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Secondly, although CEOs‟ salaries and compensation are generally modest, when the 
same person holds the title of CEO and Chairman (Duality), the CEO's mean salary and 
compensation is above the total sample mean by approximately 34 per cent and 43 per 
cent respectively. Similarly both founder CEO salary and compensation are above the 
sample mean by approximately 9 per cent and 11 per cent, and those of family CEOs by 
about 13 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively. 
Thirdly, our findings show that in Jordan ownership is characterised by the presence of 
strong, large shareholders, notably, family shareholders, local financial institutions and 
foreign shareholders. Family owners have an important involvement in all sectors. Their 
holdings may create a source of power for them. As a result, they are in a position to act 
in their own interests and may pursue private benefits rather than increase overall firm 
value or the rates of return to minority shareholders. Local institutional owners also 
hold large holdings in Jordanian firms. They may therefore influence company 
performance by contributing to, monitoring or ratifying the board's decisions, and 
focusing on projects that add value for shareholders.  In addition, the findings show 
increasing numbers of foreign directors on the board, moreover, in every sector, 
significant and increasing proportions of shares are owned by large foreign 
blockholders; this raises an important question about the role - and determinants - of 
foreign ownership in enhancing corporate governance within Jordanian companies. 
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and Performance of Jordanian Listed Companies 
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3.1. Introduction 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm value is the subject of an 
important and continuous debate in the corporate finance literature. There is a large 
body of finance and law literature that explores the interactions between corporate 
governance and firm performance in a number of countries, using either multi-country 
studies or country case studies (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Florackis, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ghosh, 2006; and Black et al., 
2006 among others). However, these studies have focused largely on either the Anglo-
American context or the Asian experience. Considering that differences in legal and 
institutional environment, as well as firm-specific factors, induce cross-country 
differences in corporate governance
1
, a more thorough understanding of the relationship 
between corporate governance, as well as firm specific-characteristics, and corporate 
performance is needed in other contexts. This is especially so as, despite the substantial 
research evidence on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate 
performance, these studies provide inconsistent findings. Consequently, confusion still 
exists as to whether specific governance mechanisms can adequately protect investors' 
wealth. The inconsistency of findings as to the governance role of several firm specific 
characteristics is evident in a number of survey papers on corporate governance (see, for 
example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis, 2001; Denis and McConnel, 2003; and 
Gillan, 2006). There is no consensus, for example, on the type of relationship between 
managerial ownership, founding family ownership, board structure, large institutional 
                                                 
1
 See for example, La Porta et al., 1999; and Shleifer and Vishny 1997. 
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investors and large foreign investors and firm value
1
. Furthermore, prior studies also 
ignore important aspects of the board structure, such as CEO board membership, which 
could have an important effect on the effectiveness of governance. Finally, recent 
studies investigating the interaction between governance and value suggest that 
corporate governance can influence market values. If this is so, this should give firms an 
incentive to improve their governance. In practice, however, similar firms often have 
very different governance choices. For these reasons, there is an urgent need for greater 
understanding of corporate governance, particularly in the Arab region (Saidi, 2004; 
2005; Omet, 2005 and Najib, 2007), where particular conditions apply, that may have 
an impact on corporate governance. In most Arab countries, most of the firms are 
family firms, and it is common for the founder and/or family members to hold 
significant influence in management, whether through chairmanship or membership of 
the board, and through the control of senior management positions (OECD, 2003)
2
. 
Such concentrated ownership in the hands of families is likely to lead to conflicts of 
interest between the controlling family and other (minority) shareholders.  
In this chapter, we aim to address these issues in the literature by providing a detailed 
investigation of the impact of ownership and board structure on corporate performance 
using firm-level data from Jordanian companies.  
                                                 
1
 It has been argued, for example, that there is a positive relationship between family ownership 
and performance (e.g. Morck et al, 1988; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; 
Choi et al., 2007). On the other hand, another strand of literature shows contrary empirical 
findings (e.g. Morck et al, 2000; Faccio et al, 2001; Claessens et al. 2002; Barth et al., 2005; 
Bertrand et al., 2008). Furthermore, it may be suggested that, for example, managerial 
ownership can help ensure the interests of managers are aligned with those of shareholders, by 
constraining the consumption of perquisites and the pursuit of sub-optimal investment polices 
(incentive-alignment effect). On the other hand, managers may tend to be dilatory, accumulate 
private benefits and entrench themselves at higher levels of managerial ownership, in which 
case a negative relationship between managerial ownership and performance (entrenchment 
effect) would be expected (Florackis et al., 2009).  
2
 Corporate Governance in the Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan countries of the MENA 
region: MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group (2003) 
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There are several important features of our analysis, which, we believe, contribute to the 
literature on agency theory and corporate governance in several ways. First, it will 
contribute to the understanding of the role of agency issues in a developing country 
context in line with Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) call for more international studies on 
corporate finance. In particular, the research contributes to filling a gap identified in 
relation to corporate governance in the Arab region. Recent surveys and reports of 
corporate governance literature in the Arab World (Saidi, 2004; 2005; and Najib, 2007) 
has suggested shortcomings in the implementation of the Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) principles and standards, compared to 
industrialized countries. Any attempts to initiate corporate governance action plans and 
corporate sector reforms in these countries, require information and detailed assessment 
in order to set priorities and inform government. In this respect, there is need to embark 
on a substantial analysis of corporate governance in the Arab region. Whilst this study 
focuses on Jordan, it will be valuable to other Arab economies in the Middle East, all of 
which share a common heritage, culture, language and religion and where there are 
strong similarities in regulatory and institutional environments and in the corporate 
ownership structure of firms.   
Second, this study extends previous research on corporate governance (see, among 
others, Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; and Ghosh, 
2006) by considering the impact of an important board characteristic (i.e. when the 
CEO is a member of the board) on firm performance which can potentially work as an 
important governance devices. 
The main issues we address in this chapter are as follows. First, we consider whether 
the classical agency theory of conflict between managers and shareholders holds for 
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Jordanian firms. In the existing performance-governance literature, the main corporate 
governance/agency issue is the one between managers and shareholders. Consequently, 
prior research on the subject puts more emphasis on the interactions between 
managerial ownership, incentives, entrenchment and performance. There is relatively 
little work addressing agency issues that may be dominant in different countries, so our 
study is important to fill this gap. Second, we examine the impact of various corporate 
governance mechanisms (board size, composition, duality, CEO board membership, 
ownership concentration, large domestic institutional investors and large foreign 
ownership) on firm performance in Jordan. Furthermore, we suggest several policy 
implications from the findings of this study. 
To conduct our investigation, we use a unique and reliable hand-collected firm-level 
data set that includes, among others, detailed information on the ownership structure, 
board structure and founding family ownership for a sample of 360 firm-year 
observations for Jordanian non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
during 2004-2006. To conduct our empirical investigation, we employ pooled-OLS that 
help us to control for the endogeneity problem, which can arise in this context for 
several reasons (e.g. reserve causality, unobserved heterogeneity). In particular, we use 
pooled-OLS with one year lagged explanatory variables in an attempt to reduce the 
potential problem of endogeneity.  
Our results present some important findings, especially with respect to the effect of 
founding family ownership on firm performance. We find a negative relationship 
between founding family ownership and corporate performance. The findings provide 
strong support for the view that the type of agency problem prevalent in the Jordanian 
context seems to be between founding family and other shareholders. The finding as to 
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the effect of founding family ownership on corporate performance is robust and does 
not change significantly with either board attributes or the presence of other lager 
shareholders. Managerial ownership does not play any role in the corporate governance 
of Jordanian firms, whereas family ownership aims to protect and preserve family 
wealth. This seems to be replacing managerial agency arguments. In other words, the 
traditional managerial agency explanations do not seem to hold. Instead, there is another 
agency issue, namely, conflict between founding family shareholders and other 
shareholders seems to hold in the Jordanian context.  
Our analysis fails to detect any significant impact of board size or non-executive 
directors on firm performance. The fact that board size shows no impact on firm 
performance suggests that boards in Jordan do not seem to be important / significant in 
determining performance. Although we find Jordanian boards to be dominated by non-
executive directors, the fact that they appear to have no impact on firm performance 
suggests that they may have been appointed less for their experience and knowledge 
than for other reasons such as political or because of connections with controlling 
shareholders such as families, who have the power to choose all the board members.  
With regard to the role of the CEOs, the findings support the view that CEO duality has 
an adverse effect on firm performance.  However, CEO membership in the board tends 
to have a positive effect on company performance. This suggests that the CEO can 
additionally exert a positive effect on firm performance by holding board membership. 
These findings suggest that if the CEO is a board member, he or she may facilitate and 
participate in the decision making process rather than dominate the decisions of the 
board, as may be the case when he/she is CEO and COB together. 
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With regard to ownership, the results show that ownership concentration is significant 
and positively related to the performance of Jordanian firms. The inverse relationship 
found between performance and large domestic institutional investors, however, 
suggests that domestic institutional investors are insufficiently oriented toward, or 
equipped for, the task of monitoring management and are thus unlikely to exercise 
effective governance. However, the empirical results show that large foreign investors 
have a significant and positive effect on firm performance. They imply that the 
monitoring function of foreign investors enhances firm performance and complements 
the relatively weak monitoring by domestic institutional investors. Our results suggest 
that foreign investors are a source of not only financing but also scarce monitoring skills 
in an emerging market such as Jordan. Finally, we find that corporate performance is 
positively associated with dividends; and negatively associated with size. Also, leverage 
has no significant impact on performance.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we review the related 
literature and establish our empirical hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data, 
variables and the methodology used in our analysis. Section 3.4 presents our empirical 
results. Section 3.5 contains policy implications from the findings of the study. Finally, 
section 3.6 offers our conclusions.  
3.2. Related Literature and Hypotheses   
The following discussion examines the potential relationships between internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance with specific focus on 
executive ownership (managerial ownership), founding family ownership, board size 
and composition, duality, CEO board membership, ownership concentration, large local 
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institutional investors and large foreign ownership.  In this section, we discuss several 
corporate governance measures and other explanatory variables that may be related to 
corporate performance.  
3.2.1. Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership has been suggested as a potential incentive mechanism that 
serves to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, since it provides 
directors with incentives towards firm value maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). As their managerial ownership increases, managers are less likely to divert 
resources away from value maximization as they bear a large proportion of the cost of 
their actions. Accordingly, there is a positive relationship between the level of 
managerial ownership and performance (see for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Mehran, 1995; Florackis et al., 2009 among others). Their findings report a positive 
association between managerial shareholding and firm value at very low levels of 
shareholding, suggesting that managers are more likely to perform well as their share 
ownership increases, reflecting their incentive to maximize firm value when they have a 
large stake in the firm. 
However, another strand of literature offers evidence that the relationship between 
managerial ownership and performance (the alignment effect) may not be linear (see for 
example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999; 
Florackis, 2005 and Davies et al, 2005 among others). In particular, the positive 
relationship between extent of executive shareholding and firm performance applies 
only up to a point; thereafter, company performance declines. According to this so-
called entrenchment hypothesis, at low or high levels of ownership, alignment is greater 
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and so ownership is positively related with firm value, whereas at intermediate levels of 
ownership there is a tendency towards entrenchment. The result is expected to be a 
negative relation with firm value, since this could give managers more controlling 
power, enabling them to allocate firm resources for their own interests, regardless of the 
effects on other shareholders.  
Given the mixed theoretical and empirical evidence, the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance for Jordanian firms becomes an empirical 
matter. Of relevance here is that, in Jordan, most of the firms are family firms where the 
founder and/or family members play a crucial role in the day-to-day business of the 
firm. There is evidence from a number of sources
1
 of the prevalence in Jordanian 
companies of appointment to management positions on the basis of kinship or 
friendship, rather than on the basis of ability or education, given the control exercised 
by many founding families. In such a situation, the implementation of corporate 
governance principles is impeded by managers' limited autonomy, flexibility, and 
objectivity to monitor company activities and to achieve its objectives. Furthermore, the 
lack of professionalism in the management of public shareholding companies in Jordan 
is said to be a widespread problem
2
.  
In order to analyse the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance in the Jordanian context, we include a variable that refers to the percentage 
of equity ownership held by executive directors and their relatives
3
.  
                                                 
1
 See for example: World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): 
Corporate Governance Country Assessment (Jordan) (June, 2004) and Corporate Governance in 
the Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan countries of the MENA region: MENA Regional 
Corporate Governance Working Group (2003). 
2
 Khaled Wazani, Economic Advisor. The Economic Policy Dialogue. Issued by the Jordanian 
Forum for Economic Development (JFED), First issue, September 2003, Amman – Jordan.  
3
 Relatives are Husband, Wife and Minor Children.  
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3.2.2. Founding Family Ownership 
In Jordan, as in other Arab countries, a large number of corporations are owned by 
families
1‟2
. However, little is known about how family ownership affects firm 
performance. Family ownership may be a source of comparative advantage through 
potential for reduction in managerial agency costs and maximization of firm value 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Founding families also tend to be a stable presence in their 
firms and their long tenure may incline them to take a long-term view. Moreover, they 
maintain longer relationships with external bodies such as suppliers (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). On the other hand, founding families may have the potential incentives 
and power to act for their own benefits at the expense of firm performance. As a result, 
suboptimal investment decisions, excessive compensation and continued employment 
of incompetent owner-managers could increase agency costs (Fama and Jenson, 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Family owners have also been found to be risk-averse and 
therefore destroy firm value (Thomson and Pederson 2000). 
Several studies find a significant relationship between family firms and firm 
performance. Anderson and Reeb (2003), in a study of the relationship between family 
firms and firm performance in the US, find that family firms perform better than 
nonfamily firms. Maury (2006) shows that in Western Europe, family firms managed by 
the founding family are more profitable than nonfamily firms. Another strand of the 
literature, however, shows contrary empirical findings. For example, Claessens et al. 
(2002) show that in East Asian countries, family firms underperform relative to 
                                                 
1
 For example Jordan Chemical Industries by the Al Taher family, Ready Mix Concrete and 
Construction Supplies by Al Alammy family, Specialized Investment Compounds by the Al 
Salfiti family, Printing and Packaging by the Al Fakori family, Darwish Al-Khalili & Sons by 
Al Khalili family, Jordan Industrial Resources by the Al Muasher family and Arab International 
Food Factories by the Abu Khadijeh family etc. 
2
 Worldwide, the majority of businesses are family owned (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et 
al., 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006). 
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nonfamily firms. Faccio et al. (2001) add that family control may harm minority 
shareholders in East Asian firms where transparency is low. Barth et al. (2005) show 
that, in Norway, family firms owned and managed by the founding family are less 
productive than nonfamily firms. 
More recent studies indicate the importance of the founding family management and 
family structure in family firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006), in the US, find that 
founder-CEO firms outperform nonfamily firms; however, when descendants serve as 
CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Similarly, in Canada, Morck et al. (2000) find weak 
financial performance in firms controlled by an heir. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) 
find that in the US, France, Germany, and the UK, poor management practices are more 
prevalent in family firms managed by a founder‟s descendant. Bertrand et al., (2008), in 
Thailand, find that greater involvement by founders‟ sons is associated with lower firm-
level performance, especially when the founder is dead. Contrary to this trend, the 
research in France by Sraer and Thesmar (2007), find family firms to perform well, 
even if they are managed by descendants of founders. 
In Jordan, family business ownership is prevalent. Moreover, even in listed companies, 
due to limitations of prevailing regulations, majority owners continue to exercise a large 
measure of control. The implication of these factors is that ownership rights and 
management control are concentrated in the hands of a small circle of family members. 
Therefore, in contrast to the agency conflict between managers and their widely 
dispersed shareholders which is prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon countries, agency 
problems in Jordan are more likely to be between founding family shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Given the incentives and opportunity for the former to pursue 
their own interests at the firm‟s expense, and the possibility of incompetent managers 
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holding office by virtue of membership of a close connection with the founding family, 
it may be predicted, therefore, that founding family ownership has a negative 
relationship with performance. Founding family ownership is defined as the percentage 
of shares held by founding family and their relatives. 
3.2.3. Board Variables 
The board, as the agent of the shareholders, is an internal governance body established 
to monitor management behaviour on behalf of shareholders and to protect them from 
managers who may pursue their personal interests or otherwise act in a manner contrary 
to the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
Board size is widely believed to be an important factor in determining the effectiveness 
of corporate governance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Jensen, 1993). However, existing 
studies disagree as to the effect of board size. Some researchers claim that large boards 
reduce value because, as board size increases, difficulties of coordination, 
communication and process outweigh the advantages of having more people to draw on 
(Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; and Florackis et al., 2009). Raheja (2005), also, 
claims that larger board size results in a less effective monitoring role, because of free-
riding problems. Others argue that larger boards are more effective because they can 
offer a wider perspective and better guidance as the strategic options of the firm (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1991). 
In addition to board size, the effectiveness of a board may also depend on its 
composition. Boards dominated by non-executive directors are said to provide more 
independent monitoring and to be more likely to be independent of the CEO (Jensen, 
1993; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Non-executive directors may also contribute 
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positively to the quality of directors' deliberations and decisions and provide strategic 
direction leading to enhanced performance (Pearce and Zahra 1992). Non-executive 
directors may bring additional knowledge, incentives, and skills needed for monitoring, 
discipline, and guidance of managers, thereby assisting to alleviating conflicts of 
interest between insiders and shareholders (Harris and Raviv, 2008). Conversely, some 
researchers argue that non-executive directors often lack information about the firm, are 
too busy to contribute effectively, do not bring the requisite skills to the job, and may 
owe their position to management, giving them an incentive to accept management 
decisions to safeguard their positions in future (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Franks 
et al., 2001; Hart, 1995).  
Corporate governance literature offers no conclusive evidence on the effect of 
appointing outside directors. Yermack (1996) finds a positive association between the 
proportion of outside directors and Tobin's q, while Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) find 
that US firms with a higher proportion of active independent board members performed 
much better than those with passive, non-independent boards. Choi et al. (2007) find a 
strong positive relationship between independent directors and firm performance in 
Korea. In contrast, a negative or no relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors and firm performance is reported by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996); Mehran (1995); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Florackis et al., 
(2009). 
Another issue debated in the literature is the influence on the board's effectiveness of 
the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) duality. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the 
positions of board chairman (COB) and CEO should be separated, to mitigate the 
agency problem. Similarly, the Cadbury (1992) report on corporate governance of UK 
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firms warns of the high probability of opportunistic behaviour on the part of insiders in 
the absence of a separation of the two positions. 
However, there is no consensus in the literature, as to whether the separation of the two 
positions increases efficiency or not. Fosberg and Nelson (1999), studying a change of  
leadership structure in an effort to control agency problems, use data from Compustat to 
find that corporate performance improved significantly in the three years following the 
change to a separate leadership structure. On the other hand, there are studies which 
find a negative relationship. For example, Rahman and Haniffa (2005) in a study on 
Malaysian corporations find that accounting performance of companies with CEO‟s role 
duality is lower than in companies with separate roles. This result is similar to the 
finding of Dahya et al. (1996) from a study in the UK, that accounting performance of 
companies is reduced in a context of duality. Moreover, some studies find no 
relationship between duality and corporate performance (Brickley et al. 1997; Hudaib 
and Haniffa, 2006). To our knowledge, only one study has been conducted in an Arab 
country, by Elsayed, (2007) in Egypt. He finds no evidence of an impact of CEO duality 
on corporate performance. However, inclusion in the model of an interaction term 
between industry type and CEO duality results in a finding of impact of CEO duality on 
corporate performance that varies across industries. In addition, when firms are 
categorized according to their financial performance, Elsayed (2007) finds a positive 
and significant impact of CEO duality only when corporate performance is low. 
These variables of board characteristics merit investigation in Jordan, where a range of 
board characteristics and structures are possible in law. Jordanian boards of directors 
are organized in accordance with Company Law (1997). The Company law (CL) sets 
the basic requirements for the board structure, liabilities and responsibilities.  Boards in 
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Jordanian companies have a one-tier board structure in which both executive and non-
executive directors sit on the same board. The board size ranges in number from three to 
thirteen. At least three members must be non-executive, to comply with audit committee 
requirements. However, the company law makes no stipulations as to board members‟ 
skills, independence, possible committee functions, and board performance evaluation. 
Furthermore, company law does not require the separation of the Chief Executive 
Officer and the Chairman of the Board positions, nor does it require that the CEO must 
be a member of the board. A person may be a voting member of a board of 
directors and also serve as the company's CEO.  
In the Jordanian context, there is no available empirical evidence on the impact of board 
structure on firm performance. However, recent reports
1
 indicate that both boards and 
management are frequently dominated by the controlling family. There is a widespread 
tendency for boards of Jordanian companies to lack independence from controlling 
shareholders and from management. Attention is drawn to an absence of rules 
governing the composition of the board of directors, inadequate guidelines governing 
the balance of power between executive and non-executive directors, and the lack of 
awareness of the concept of independent directors.  
Therefore, and in order to test the effectiveness of board variables in mitigating agency 
problems and, thus, generating better performance, we include four variables in our 
empirical model: a) the total number of directors (Board size), b) the ratio of the number 
of non-executive directors to the total number of directors (Non-executive directors), 
and c) a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the roles of the Chief Executive 
                                                 
1
 See for example: World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): 
Corporate Governance Country Assessment (Jordan) (June, 2004); Corporate Governance in 
Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan countries of the MENA region: MENA Regional 
Corporate Governance Working Group (2003). 
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Officer and the Chairman of the Board (COB) are not separated and 0 otherwise 
(Duality), and d) a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the CEO is also 
member of the board and 0 otherwise (CEO board member). 
3.2.4. Concentration of Ownership 
The presence of concentrated of ownership may contribute to mitigating or exacerbating 
some of the firm‟s agency problems. When ownership is dispersed, individual 
shareholders have no incentive to monitor the behaviour of managers. They can be 
'free-riders', relying on others to govern the management (La Porta et al., 1999). By 
contrast, when ownership is concentrated among controlling shareholders, they have the 
incentives and resources to monitor management decisions, possibly resulting in better 
corporate performance (Stiglizt, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, such 
concentration may also bring costs, such as potential agency problems between large 
and small shareholders, as the controlling owner may have incentives and power to 
expropriate minority shareholders and to divert corporate resources (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997 and La Porta et al., 1999).  
The empirical evidence on the impact of concentration ownership on firm value is 
mixed. McConnel and Servaes (1990) find a positive correlation between shareholdings 
of large investors and corporate performance based on Tobin's q. Leech and Leahy 
(1991) find a positive relationship between external shareholders and performance for 
UK companies. In contrast, Davies et al. (2005) and Mura (2007) indicate a strong 
negative correlation between blockholders and corporate value for UK companies; and 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a negative relationship between the five largest 
shareholders and corporate performance of Malaysian listed companies. 
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Listed companies in Jordan are required by law to disclose the names of the company's 
large shareholders and the number of shares owned by each of them, where such 
constitute 5 per cent or more
1
. In order to analyse the impact of ownership 
concentration on corporate performance, therefore, we include a variable that refers to 
the sum of the stakes of shareholders with an equity stake greater than 5 per cent, as a 
percentage of the outstanding shares equity, that is, equity other than founding family if 
they own 5 per cent or more. 
3.2.5. Local Institutional Investors 
The presence of institutional investors as equity owners is one of the most important 
external control mechanisms affecting governance. Institutional investors may also have 
both the incentives and the power to monitor management performance and enhance 
firm value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mitton, 2002 and Lins, 2003); have greater 
expertise and more power, are more likely to act rationally (Dong and Ozkan, 2008) and 
are capable of influencing management decisions directly through their ownership or 
indirectly by trading their shares (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Therefore, they are well 
placed to monitor, discipline, and impose controls on corporate managers.  However, 
institutional investors may prefer to focus on information gathering and trading rather 
than exerting themselves to influence management (Chen et al., 2007).  
Empirical evidence on whether institutional investors do indeed perform an effective 
monitoring rule is mixed. Whereas McConnel and Servaes (1990) report a positive 
relationship between institutional investors and firm value, Seifert et al. (2005) find the 
                                                 
1
 JSC Instructions of Issuing Companies Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards 2004, 
Article 4b4. 
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relationship to be negative. Short and Keasey (1999) find that institutional investors 
play no role in determining firm value.  
In many emerging countries, however, institutional investors are inefficient in 
monitoring, because of the underdevelopment of local capital markets and institutions, 
inadequate regulatory systems, and political constraints (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). It is 
also possible that institutional investors may be induced to cooperate with managers, 
rather than challenge their decisions, in order to protect other existing or potential 
business relationships with the firm (Pound, 1998; Cornett et al., 2007). Thus, they are 
loyal to corporate management and so tend to hold shares without reacting to 
management actions that are not in line with the interests of shareholders (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008).  
In Jordanian listed companies, there is a high level of shareholding by the large 
domestic institutional investors (including banks, insurance companies, and pension 
funds such as the Social Security Corporation Investment Unit
1
). For example, we find 
an average shareholding by the large domestic financial institutions of 19.45 per cent 
during the study period (2004-2006). However, Jordan is a small country, where there 
are relatively few local institutions that could effectively exercise oversight over 
management and offer an external safeguard against inefficient performance. Mutual 
funds are not common in Jordan and most of the local institutional investors are banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds such as the Social Security Corporation 
                                                 
1
 The Social Security Corporation is a government-owned and managed entity whose main 
objective is to provide pensions to all insured persons after retirement or in case of disability or 
to their heirs after death and to insure them against Work Injuries and Occupational Diseases.  
The Social Security Corporation has an investment unit called "The Investment Unit", which 
was established in 2003 for investing the funds of the Social Security Corporation. 
The stock portfolio of the Social Security Corporation is considered as the biggest portfolio in 
the ASE, it is considered also a well diversified portfolio of 3 billion JD (Al Fanik, 2006). 
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Investment Unit. In principle, such institutions, given the size of their holdings, should 
act as external governance agents for other shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. However, it is assumed that such investors are unable to play an effective 
monitoring role, and that consequently there are negative effects on performance, for at 
least three reasons. First, banks and other institutional investors in Jordan commonly 
have significant business relationships with companies, since most banks are family-
controlled
1
, individually or through family related group companies. This weakens their 
monitoring ability. Secondly, whilst the Social Security Investment Unit is represented 
on the board of many Jordanian firms, the nominees of these positions are essentially 
civil servants who lack expertise in corporate matters. Thirdly, even if such members 
possess the relevant knowledge and skills to exercise oversight in corporate matters, 
there is no great incentive for them to so, as their tenure and career prospects are 
divorced from the performance of the companies in which they are appointed to the 
board.   
In such a context, we would expect institutional shareholders in Jordan to adopt a 
passive stance towards monitoring and disciplining firms' management and, thus, we 
expect a negative relationship between local institutional investors and performance of 
the Jordanian companies. Local institutional ownership is defined as ownership of five 
per cent or more of the outstanding shares.  
 
                                                 
1
 For example Jordan Bank owned by the Al Kori family, Union Bank owned by the Salfiti 
family, Jordan Arab Investment Bank by the Al-Qadi family, Jordan National Bank by the Al-
Muasher family, and Jordan Commercial Bank by the Al-Sayegh family.  
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3.2.6. Foreign Ownership 
There is a body of evidence that the presence of foreign investors is more likely to result 
in enhanced performance of local firms compared to domestic institutions, especially in 
emerging market economies. For example, Hanousek et al. (2004) show that foreign 
ownership has a positive effect on corporate performance, which they attribute to a 
better monitoring ability. Mitton (2002) and Lins (2003) both find that firm 
performance is positively related to outside ownership in emerging markets. This 
supports the view that foreign investors complement domestic institutions as external 
governance agents. In a recent study, Ferreira and Matos (2008), based on extensive 
data of financial institution equity holdings from 27 countries around the world, find a 
significantly positive impact of foreign ownership on firm valuation. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) suggest that such outside ownership can motivate shareholders to 
monitor managerial performance and act in a manner conducive to increased firm value. 
In an Indian context, Khanna and Palepu (1999) demonstrate the valuable monitoring 
role performed by foreign investors as emerging markets integrate with the global 
economy. It is suggested that foreign institutional investors are often more instrumental 
in prompting changes in corporate governance practices than domestic money managers 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003). 
One important and unique feature of the Jordanian equity market is the high level of 
involvement of foreign investors. The market liberalization of Amman Stock Exchange 
in 1995 opened the gateway to foreign investment in Jordanian listed firms. In fact, 
Jordan has one of the highest levels of foreign investment of market capital in the world 
(OECD, 2006). Ownership by foreigners has been on the rise since the beginning of the 
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2000's in all sectors. Table 3.1 shows the percentage of foreign ownership in 
shareholding companies by sector for the period 2001-2007.  
Table 3.1: Non-Jordanian ownership in listed companies by sectors as a 
percentage (%) of market capitalisation during the period 2001-2007 
 
Year Financial Sector Services Industry All Market 
2001 47.43 19.67 27.87 38.51 
2002 47.56 26.79 26.09 37.43 
2003 46.28 24.29 30.1 38.84 
2004 47.44 25.59 36.79 41.26 
2005 49.77 26.19 38.09 45.04 
2006 47.73 36.55 43.71 45.53 
2007 50.73 36.15 51.88 48.95 
 
This table reports foreign investor ownership in companies listed at the ASE as of year-end 
from 2001-2007 as a percentage of total market value. The Financial sector includes Banks, 
Insurance, Diversified Financial Services and Real Estate. The Services sector includes Health 
Care Services, Educational Services, Hotels & Tourism, Transportation, Technology & 
Communication, Media, Utilities & Energy, and Commercial Services. The Industry sector 
includes Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, Chemical Industries, Paper & Carton, Printing & 
Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & Extracting, Tobacco & Cigarettes, Engineering & 
Construction., Electrical Industries, Textile, Leather & Clothing, and Glass & Ceramics.  
Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports.  
 
The percentage of foreign ownership increased from 38.51 per cent of total market 
capitalisation in 2001 to 48.95 per cent in 2007, the investors coming from 102 
countries around the world
1
. This increase suggests a preference for long-term gains 
                                                 
1
 There are around one million investors registered with the Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
at the end of 2007, of them 947.6 thousand Jordanian investors, 41.2 thousand Arab investors, 
3.8 thousand non-Arab investors, according to Samir Jaradat, CEO of Securities Depository 
Centre. Source:  Al-Raai Newspaper, Saturday, January 12, 2008, Issue 13612, Vol. 37.   
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from improved corporate governance, as opposed to short-term investment return. In the 
case of the ASE, foreign investments are long-term investments, predominantly in 
international mutual and pension funds, together with foreign government contributions 
and strategic partnerships with Jordanian public shareholding companies
1
.  
Equity ownership by large foreign investors across the total sample (2004-2006) 
averages 10.92 per cent of total shares. This ratio shows a marked increasing pattern. 
The average ordinary shareholding by foreign investors increases by about 4 percentage 
points over the three years, from 8.71 per cent in 2004 to 12.16 per cent in 2006. There 
are also significant differences across firms. For the overall sample, the level of large 
foreign ownership ranges from 0 to 97.51 per cent. 
In this chapter, we analyse the association between large foreign investors and firm 
value, on the assumption that such investors have the potential to enhance firm value 
through monitoring. We therefore anticipate a positive relationship between firm value 
and direct equity ownership by large foreign investors. Foreign ownership is defined as 
the percentage of outstanding equity held by foreign shareholders (that is, with 
shareholdings of 5 per cent or more). 
3.2.7. The Role of Other Control Variables 
In order to understand firm performance fully, we include a number of control variables 
that are likely to influence firm performance. The selection of control variables is 
dictated by the literature and data availability.  In our equation for firm performance, we 
include size, leverage and dividends as control variables.  
                                                 
1
 Jalil Tarif, the CEO of the ASE. Meeting with the World Bank Mission,  available on line: 
http://www.exchange.jo/pages.php?menu_id=-1&local_type=1&local_id=123&local_details=1 
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We control for the effect of firm size, since it is generally easier for larger firms to 
generate funds internally, they have better access to external finance and could benefit 
from economies of scale (Short and Keasey, 1999; Ozkan, 2002). Moreover, large firms 
tend to possess larger assets which can be used as collateral and they can borrow on 
better conditions (Ferri and Jones, 1979), all of which are conducive to better 
performance. However, smaller firms are presumably more closely held or family-
owned, and this could create scope for greater family ownership. Moreover, according 
to Rajan and Zingales (1995), size may be inversely related to the level of information 
asymmetries between insiders and outside investors. Therefore, small firms may be 
more prone to agency problems, due to information asymmetries between inside and 
outside investors. Finally, the design of an efficient package of governance mechanisms 
may vary systematically by industry or size of the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  In our 
work, size (SIZE) is equal to the natural log of total sales in the Jordanian Dinar in 
constant prices.  
The ratio of total debt (i.e. long term debt plus short term debt) to total assets is a 
measure of a firm's leverage. A positive effect on firm performance may be expected as 
a result of monitoring preformed by the lender; as argued by Stiglitz (1985) and 
provides tax shields as predicted by Modigliani and Miller (1963). Ross (1977) adds 
that increased leverage may convey positive news to the market concerning the firm's 
ability to service a larger amount of debt. However, too much debt increases the risk of 
bankruptcy, limits the firm's ability to raise new debt and subsequently may force firms 
to pass up valuable investment opportunities (Myers, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1990). 
Tong and Ning (2004) add that high leveraged firms provide a negative signal that the 
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firm faces future financial problems. Under these arguments, one would expect a 
negative relationship between leverage and firm performance. 
 Finally, dividend is also controlled in the analysis. It is defined as the ratio of total 
dividends to total assets. Higher dividends may suggest the lack of sufficient growth 
opportunities for the firm. Firms with low profitable investment opportunities may 
return capital to shareholders in the form of dividends. On the other hand, some 
researchers contend that dividends may reduce the free resources in the firm and 
mitigate governance conflicts (Jensen, 1986). In addition dividend announcements 
provide a positive signal of future earnings (e.g., John and Williams, 1985). La Porta et 
al. (2000) suggest that high growth firms may pay more dividends in order to create a 
reputation for being moderate in expropriating wealth. They argue that this is more 
likely to happen in countries with relatively poor corporate governance structures. In 
this case, one would expect a positive relationship between dividend payout ratio and 
firm performance. 
3.3. Sample and Methodology  
3.3.1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
In our investigation, we begin with all the firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
form 2004-2006, subject to the following restrictions: First, as has been the practice in 
previous studies, we exclude firms operating in the financial industry (e.g., banks, 
insurance companies, and diversified financial services) due to the differences in the 
applicable regulatory requirements. Second, a firm should have been listed for at least 
one full year as of the end of 2006. Finally, suspended or floated price companies are 
excluded due to illiquidity and incomplete data (i.e. missing data). This yields a usable 
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sample of 360 firm-year observations across three years (representing 80 per cent of the 
total non-financial listed companies). Table 3.2 presents the number of listed 
companies, the number of non-financial companies and the number of companies in the 
sample. 
 Table 3.2: The number of the sample during the period 2004-2006  
 2004 2005 2006 Full Period 
No. of  listed companies 192 201 227 620 
No. of  non-financial companies* 138 146 165 449 
No. of firms in the samples 109 117 134 360 
Proportion of sample to non-
financial companies  
78.99% 80.14% 81.21% 80.18% 
This table presents the number of listed companies, the number of non-financial companies, and 
the number of companies in the sample.  
* Non-financial firms include the following sectors: Real Estate, Health Care Services, 
Educational Services, Hotels & Tourism, Transportation, Technology & Communication, 
Media, Utilities & Energy, and Commercial Services, Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, 
Chemical Industries, Paper & Carton, Printing & Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & 
Extracting, Tobacco & Cigarettes, Engineering & Construction, Electrical Industries, Textiles, 
Leather & Clothing, and Glass & Ceramics. Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual 
Reports. 
 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, data on firm's ownership, board and firm-specific accounting 
data are hand-collected from secondary sources, primarily the mandatory disclosure 
reports of these firms to the Jordan Securities Commission. The frequency of all 
variables is annual, and the values are measured as at the end of December for each 
year.  
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The annual reports of Jordanian public trading companies are prepared in accordance 
with, and are considered consistent with, international accounting standards. The annual 
reports supplied by management are also subject to external auditing, to certify that they 
are prepared in accordance with statutory and professional principles (international 
auditing standards). Finally, listed companies have been required, since 1997, to form 
auditing committees from the board of directors which exercise oversight over the 
preparation of annual reports. As a further check data pertaining to Jordanian public 
trading companies are also obtained from other sources, such as the Amman Stock 
Exchange annual company guide, Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE), the Securities Depository Centre (SDC), and the companies' 
websites. These sources are used to verify the figures and statistics collected from 
annual reports.  
The name(s) of company founding family is derived from the Memorandum of 
Association of each company under investigation, obtained via the archive held by the 
Companies Control Department, a unit at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. As a 
further robustness check, three experts from the financial sector, stock market and 
Companies Control Department gave assistance in correctly identifying the founding 
families. However, it is uncommon in Jordan for two or more families to have the same 
family name. Furthermore, it is easy to check whether the founding family is still in the 
firm or not, because the average age of Jordanian firms, on our sample, is low (i.e. 20 
years).  
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3.3.2. Dependent Variable - Performance Measure  
Previous empirical studies utilize two types of performance measures: accounting profit 
ratio (ROA); and market-price performance (Tobin‟s q), to observe the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance. It can be argued that accounting-based 
measures are both stable and less subject to speculative and exogenous shocks than 
market-based measures. It could, however, be suggested that the former can, therefore, 
be manipulated by managers. Furthermore, they are different in the time perspective, 
accounting profit is a backward-looking, while Tobin‟s q is a forward-looking measure 
of performance. Accounting based measures, as historical reports, are not directly 
affected by change in the equity market but by accounting practice in valuing assets and 
revenue recognition and emphasize accomplishment. Tobin‟s q, on the other hand, 
reflects the value investors assigned to a firm‟s intangible assets based on predicted 
future revenue stream. Nevertheless, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) assert that the 
investors community who developed Tobin‟s q measurement do not “ignore the past in 
their attempts to determine reasonable expectations for the future profitability of firms” 
(p.213). The reason is that “high accounting profits are usually accompanied by high 
stock prices” (p.214). The use of the market value of the firm as numerator of Tobin‟s q 
to some significant degree reflects accounting profit rates.  
In this chapter we use Tobin‟s q to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm value, calculated as the ratio of book value of total 
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of assets.  
Tobin‟s q is the most common measure in empirical corporate governance research. 
Many other studies use this measure as the dependent variable in research on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (see among others, Ozkan and 
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Ozkan, 2004; Datta et al., 2005; and Florackis et al., 2009). Furthermore, we use ROA, 
defined as earning before interest and taxes to total assets, as a robustness check.   
3.3.3. Independent Variables  
In addition to size, leverage and dividends, we consider a wide set of potential 
governance mechanisms - as predictors of performance. These are the following: the 
percentage of shares held by executive directors and their relatives (Executive 
ownership), the percentage of shares held by founding family and their relatives 
(Founding family ownership), the number of directors in the board (Board size), the 
ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the 
board (Non-executive directors)
1
, a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the 
roles of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the Board (COB) are 
not separated and 0 otherwise (Duality), a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
when the CEO is also member of the board and 0 otherwise (CEO board member), the 
percentage of sum of stakes of  all shareholders with equity ownership greater than 5 
per cent other than founding family ownership if they own 5 per cent and above 
(Concentration), the percentage of shares held by large local institutional investors (i.e. 
banks, insurance, financial and pension funds) with equity ownership equal or more 
than 5 per cent (Institutional investors), and the percentage of shares held by large 
foreign investors with equity ownership greater than 5 per cent (Foreign ownership).  
Time dummies and industry dummies are also incorporated to capture industry specific 
effects. Table 3.3 provides list of the variables used in this study. 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this study we will refer to the definition of the Jordan Securities 
Commission to determine the non-executive directors. This specifies that "Any member of the 
Board of Directors shall be considered as non-executive, if the member is neither an employee 
of the Company nor receiving a salary there from”. 
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Table 3.3: Definition of Variables 
Variable   Definition   
Dependent Variable 
Tobin's q The ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value 
of equity, plus the market value of equity to the book value of 
assets. 
Independent Variables: 
Executive ownership The percentage of equity ownership held by executive directors 
and their relatives. 
Founding family 
ownership 
The percentage of equity ownership held by founding family 
and their relatives. 
Board size The total number of directors on the board. 
Non-executive directors  The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. 
Duality A dummy variable: one indicates that the positions of CEO and 
chairman of board are held by one person; zero otherwise. 
CEO board member A dummy variable: one indicates that the CEO is also a member 
of the board; zero otherwise. 
Concentration The percentage of sum of stakes of all shareholders with equity 
ownership greater than 5 per cent less than founding family 
ownership if they own 5 per cent or above. 
Institutional investors  The percentage of outstanding equity held by local banks, 
insurance and, financial firms and pension funds (that is, with 
shareholdings of 5 per cent or more). 
Foreign ownership The percentage of outstanding equity held by all foreign 
shareholders (that is, with shareholdings of 5 per cent or more). 
Size The natural log of the total sales in 2004 prices. 
Leverage  The ratio of book value of short-term plus long-term debt 
divided by the book value of  total assets 
Dividends The ratio of dividend payments to total assets. 
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3.3.4. Methodology  
We examine the determinants of corporate performance by utilizing pooled-OLS 
regression with lagged independent variables, using the following equations:  
Tobin‟s q it = αi + β1 Executive ownership it-1 + β2 Founding family ownership it-1 + β3 
Board size it-1 + β4 Non-executive directors it-1 + β5 Duality it-1 + β6 CEO board member 
it-1 + β7 Concentration it-1 + β8 Institutional investors it-1 + β9 Foreign ownership it-1 + β10 
Size it-1 + β11 Leverage it-1 + β12 Dividends it-1 + ε it 
 
The dependent variable (Tobin‟s q) is measured for years 2006 and 2005 while the 
independent variables are measured for years 2005 and 2004 respectively. Specifically, 
firm performance (Tobin‟s q) is regressed on year lagged of executive ownership, 
founding family ownership, board size, non-executive directors‟ proportion, CEO 
duality, CEO board member, concentration of ownership, large local institutional 
ownership, large foreign ownership, size, leverage, and dividends. Using a lagged 
measure of the independent variables can reduce the problem of endogeneity (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; and Arslan et al., 2008). Also, we incorporate both time dummies and 
industry dummies in the analysis.  
3.3.5. Sample Characteristics   
Table 3.4 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. 
The performance variable measured by Tobin‟s q is 1.62. The average equity held by 
executive directors and their relatives is 5.07 per cent. Holdings of founding family 
owners and their relatives reach 22.09 per cent, on average, in our sample. This result 
suggests that many of the public companies in Jordan still have large founding family 
shareholdings. Ownership concentration averages 40.28 per cent and this value is 
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relatively constant over time, suggesting that Jordanian companies are relatively 
undiffused.  
The average total equity ownership by large domestic institutional investors accounts 
for about 19.42 per cent of total shares.  This ratio shows a marked decreasing pattern. 
The average ordinary shareholding by large institutional investors decreases by 4 
percentage points over the three years, from 22.42 to 17.17 per cent. Equity ownership 
by large foreign investors across the total sample averages 10.92 per cent of total shares. 
This ratio shows a marked increasing pattern. The average ordinary shareholding by 
large foreign investors increases by about 4 percentage points throughout the sample 
period, from 8.71 per cent to 12.16 per cent. 
The average board size is 8.32 directors. In terms of board composition, the average 
proportion of non-executive directors is 86.90 per cent and this value appears relatively 
constant over time, suggesting that non-executive directors continue to be in the 
majority in Jordanian boards. On average, firms tend to have at least seven non-
executive directors. 
With regard to the separation of the two leading roles of COB and CEO, there are 80 
firms out of the final 360 observations (22.22 per cent) in which the positions are not 
separated. There is a decrease in the number of companies with role duality from 26 per 
cent in 2004 to 19 per cent in 2006; nevertheless, these results indicate that it is still 
common in Jordan for the chairman of the board to be also the CEO of the company. 
Finally, out of 360 observations, there are 247 CEOs who are also members of the 
board. Finally, the average market sale is 23.09 million Jordanian Dinar (i.e. about US$ 
32.56 million), the leverage ratio is 13.29 per cent and the average dividend ratio is 3.28 
per cent. 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics  
                     Full Sample      2004     2005    2006 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Tobin's q 1.62 1.48 1.75 1.61 
Executive ownership  5.07 5.55 5.37 4.42 
Founding family ownership 22.09 22.86 21.57 20.94 
Board size  8.32 8.46 8.35 8.17 
Non-executive directors  86.9 85.25 87.17 87.73 
Duality 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.19 
CEO board member 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.69 
Concentration 40.28 39.32 40.34 41.01 
Institutional investors 19.42 22.42 19.20 17.17 
Foreign ownership 10.92 8.71 11.56 12.16 
Size 6.68 6.65 6.72 6.67 
Leverage  13.29 12.96 13.03 13.78 
Dividends  3.28 3.68 3.6 2.69 
No. of observations 360 109 117 134 
This table provides summary statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. All variables 
are measured at the end of each year. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 3.3. 
 
We compute the Pearson Correlation coefficient between corporate performance and the 
corporate governance variables and present the correlation matrix in Table 3.5. The 
results suggest that founding family ownership has a significant and negative 
correlation with Tobin‟s q. This coefficient suggests that if the founding family 
continues to keep its ownership in the firm, this will affect firm performance negatively, 
perhaps because market participants perceive families as using their holdings to obtain 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Institutional investors are 
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negatively correlated with firm performance, suggesting that their monitoring ability 
and their contribution to improving corporate governance does not exist.  
Table 3.5 also shows that CEO duality has an adverse effect on firm performance. 
However, CEO membership in the board is positively correlated with performance, 
suggesting that firms with CEO board members are likely to facilitate and participate in 
the decision making process rather than dominate the decisions of the board, as may be 
the case when the same individual is CEO and COB together.  
Firm size and leverage are negatively correlated with firm performance, suggesting that 
smaller firms are performing better than larger firms and, perhaps because agency 
problems increase with firm size, may contribute to this negative correlation. The 
negative correlation between leverage and performance suggests that too much debt 
increases the risk of bankruptcy, limits the firm‟s ability to raise new debt and 
subsequently may force firms to pass up valuable investment opportunities. Finally, 
dividend has a positive correlation with firm performance, suggesting that dividends can 
help reduce agency costs within the firm by reducing the cash available for 
managements to invest in projects that benefit management at shareholder expense 
(Jensen, 1986).  
To test for possible multicollinearity (Table 3.5), we compute the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each independent variable and the largest one is 1.73, well below the 
rule of thumb cutoff of 10.0 for multiple regression models (Gujarati, 2003). Thus, we 
conclude that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem in this study. 
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Table 3.5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the Variables Used in the Study. 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) VIF 
(1) Tobin‟s q 1.00              
(2) Executive ownership 0.07 1.00            1.30 
(3) Founding family ownership -0.14* -0.14* 1.00           1.06 
(4) Board size -0.07 -0.17** 0.02 1.00          1.36 
(5) Non-executive directors 0.06 -0.16** 0.08 0.25** 1.00         1.44 
(6) Duality   -0.14* 0.13* -0.06 -0.11 -0.34** 1.00        1.32 
(7) CEO board member  0.14* -0.007 0.15* -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 1.00       1.05 
(8) Concentration  0.07 0.13* 0.03 -0.03 0.12* -0.31** 0.02 1.00      1.73 
(9) Institutional investors  -0.02 0.13* -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.15* 0.002 0.27** 1.00     1.58 
(10) Foreign ownership 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 1.00    1.06 
(11) Size -0.13* 0.15* 0.01 0.39** -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.11 0.08 0.02 1.00   1.61 
(12) Leverage -0.14* 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.01 -0.001 -0.11 0.01 0.30** 1.00  1.32 
(13) Dividends 0.23** 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.12 0.29** -0.18** 1.00 1.24 
This table displays the Pearson Correlation Coefficient and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the main variables used in the study. ** and * indicate the 
correlation is significant at the 1% and 5%  levels respectively. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 3.3. 
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3.4. Empirical Results  
3.4.1. Univariate Analysis  
Table 3.6 reports univariate mean-comparison test results of the sample firm subgroups 
categorized on the basis of above and below median values for executive ownership, 
founding family ownership, board size, non-executive directors, duality, CEO board 
member, ownership concentration, large local institutional investors, large foreign 
ownership, size, leverage and dividends. 
In panel A of Table 3.6 we test the hypothesis that firms with above median values of 
these characteristics differ from firms with below median values with respect to 
corporate performance (Tobin‟s q). The results are in line with our expectations and 
strongly support our hypothesis that founding family ownership exerts a significant 
influence on corporate performance. More specifically, we find evidence that firms with 
high performance have low founding family ownership, which possibly suggests that 
the main agency concern for Jordanian firms seems to be the one between founding 
family ownership and minority shareholders. This result is statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level.  
There is also evidence that firms in which the roles of CEO and COB are separated have 
higher corporate performance relative to those in which these roles are held by the same 
person. Furthermore, the results suggest that firms with CEO board members have 
higher firm performance compared with those where the CEO is not a board member. 
The results reveal that firms with above median ownership concentration and large 
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foreign inventors have higher firm performance. Finally, we find that firms with above 
median value of dividend have higher corporate performance.  
Table 3.6: Univariate results 
          Panel A           Panel B 
 
Average 
Tobin‟s q 
for above 
median 
Average 
Tobin‟s q 
for below 
median 
t-test 
 
1
st
 quartile 
Tobin‟s q 
4
th
 quartile 
Tobin‟s q 
t-test 
Executive ownership 5.96 5.39 -0.34  5.28 4.17    0.61 
Founding family 
ownership 
19.30 24.13 -2.69***  25.68 16.10 2.83*** 
Board size 8.38 8.24 -0.44  8.02 8.17 0.36 
Non-executive  86.59 86.04 0.33  86.78 87.31 -0.28 
Duality 0.22 0.26 -1.93*  0.29 0.13 2.09** 
CEO board member 0.76 0.65 2.20**  0.62 0.80 -2.23** 
Concentration 40.59 37.73 1.94*  35.05 41.54 -2.65** 
Institutional investors  22.32 21.52 0.28  19.53 23.07 -1.96* 
Foreign ownership 10.61 8.69 2.11**  6.67 11.53 -2.52** 
Size 6.59 6.65 0.46  6.49 6.58 -0.48 
Leverage  11.09 13.91 -1.52  12.19 10.84 0.53 
Dividends 4.66 2.84 2.78***  2.37 5.31 -2.91*** 
Panel A reports mean comparison of corporate performance, analysing high (above median) versus low 
(below median) executive ownership, founding family ownership, board size, non-executive directors, 
duality, CEO board  member, concentration ownership, large local institutional ownership, large foreign 
ownership, size, leverage and dividends. Panel B provides univariate mean comparisons of firm specific 
characteristics by Tobin‟s q quartile (1st vs. 4th quartile). In both panels a t-test statistic is used to compare 
the mean difference. Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 3.3. ***, ** and * indicate that the 
mean difference is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3.6 presents univariate mean comparisons of several firm characteristics by 
corporate performance (Tobin‟s q) quartiles. We are interested in whether the 
characteristics of companies differ across low-performing firms (first quartile) and high-
performing firms (fourth quartile). Specifically, we find evidence that, on average, firms 
with low corporate performance have high founding family ownership, high percentage 
of duality, low CEO board membership, low ownership concentration, low large local 
institutional investors, low large foreign investors and pay low dividends, compared to 
firms with high corporate performance (fourth quartile).  
3.4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
In this section, we present the results from pooled-regression analysis with lagged 
independent variables. We start by estimating our baseline model (Model 1) Table 3.7, 
in which we include only the (non-governance) firm-specific characteristics. In general, 
the estimated coefficients are in line with the hypothesized signs and with findings 
reported in the literature. Specifically, our first result is a negative relationship between 
size and firm performance, supporting the view that the market perceives smaller firms 
as performing better than larger firms and may also have more growth opportunities. 
The positive relationship between dividend and corporate performance supports the 
argument that dividends are a means to mitigate agency conflicts within the firm, which 
results in an improvement in its market valuation (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). In 
addition, it might be suggested that such firms are less likely to face bankruptcy, and so 
they are more able to pay dividends. However, our estimation shows that leverage is 
positively related to, but does not have any significant impact on corporate 
performance. 
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3.4.2.1. Executive Ownership, Founding Family Ownership and Corporate 
Performance.   
In models 2 and 3 (Table 3.7), we construct several regression models to examine the 
relationship between executive ownership and founding family ownership with 
corporate performance. We include all the control variables which we used in Model 1 
Table 3.7 in all our specifications.   
Model 2 Table 3.7 shows that the signs of our control variables are not different than 
those reported in the previous model. In particular, we find that corporate performance 
is positively associated with dividends; and negatively associated with size. Also, 
leverage has no significant impact on performance.  
Furthermore, we find that executive ownership is not associated with corporate 
performance. Furthermore, we test the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
executive ownership and performance. However, we find no evidence (not reported) for 
such a relationship in our sample. Our findings clearly contradict claims found in the 
literature, that executive ownership helps align the interests of executive directors with 
those of shareholders (among others, see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is most 
probably due to the fact that this is not the agency problem that we would expect in 
Jordan.  
In Model 3 Table 3.7, we add founding family ownership among explanatory variables. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find the coefficient of family ownership is 
significant, but negative (i.e. as founding family ownership increases the performance 
of the average Jordanian firm decreases). This result may suggest that if the founding 
family continues to keep its ownership in the firm, market participants perceive families 
as using their holdings to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority 
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shareholders. Our findings so far suggest that, in Jordan, in contrast to the agency 
conflict between managers and their widely dispersed shareholders characteristic of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, the main agency concern for Jordanian firms seems to be the 
one between founding families and minority shareholders.  
 Table 3.7: Pooled-OLS regressions prediction of corporate performance 
Independent variables Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Executive ownership -/+ - 0.001             
(0.57) 
0.0003            
(0.14) 
Founding family 
Ownership 
- - - -0.005**         
(-2.22) 
Size -/+ -0.224**        
(-2.03) 
-0.226**        
(-2.01) 
-0.218*           
(-1.96) 
Leverage -/+ 0.003              
(1.04) 
0.003             
(1.00) 
0.004              
(1.07) 
Dividends  -/+ 0.046*** 
(4.00) 
0.045*** 
(3.91) 
0.044*** 
(3.90) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
R²  0.19 0.19 0.21 
No. of observations   243 243 243 
This table presents pooled-OLS regressions of predicted firm performance using Tobin‟s q as a 
proxy for performance with one-year lagged variables. Model 1 includes control variables. 
Model 2 includes executive ownership. Model 3 has both executive ownership and founding 
family ownership.  All explanatory and control variables are lagged one year.  t-statistic values 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. For the estimation, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used. 
See Table 3.3 for exact definitions of variables. 
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Furthermore, we also test the possibility of a non-linear relationship between founding 
family ownership and performance, on the basis that a higher share of founding family 
ownership can increase the potential for family members to expropriate minority 
shareholders but may, conversely, be conducive to better alignment of the family 
incentives with those of minority shareholders. However, our findings provide no 
evidence (not reported) for such a relationship.  
3.4.2.2. Board Structure and Corporate Performance 
In this sub-section, we construct several regression models to examine the relations 
between board attributes and corporate performance and present the results in Models 4 
and 5 in Table 3.8. We include all the control variables which we used in the previous 
models. 
In Model 4, we regress corporate performance against board size and non-executive 
directors. In Model 5, we add duality and CEO board membership. 
Models 4 and 5 in Table 3.8 show that the signs of our control variables are not 
different than those reported in the previous models. In particular, we find that 
corporate performance is positively associated with dividends; and negatively 
associated with size. Furthermore, similar to our earlier findings, executive ownership is 
not associated with corporate performance and founding family ownership still has a 
negative impact on corporate performance, confirming our earlier finding that founding 
family ownership seems to be the source of the main agency concern among Jordanian 
companies. 
In Model 4, the findings show that neither board size nor proportion of non-executive 
directors play a significant role in the governance of Jordanian firms (i.e. the 
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coefficients of board size and non-executive are not statistically different from zero). 
Hence, they have no significant impact on corporate performance. However, the sign of 
the coefficient for board size is negative, suggesting that large boards may be inefficient 
monitors of firm performance. This may be because larger boards seem to dilute the 
coordination, communication and decision making compared to small boards (Florackis 
et al., 2009) or the market perceives larger boards as inefficient as they tend to be 
symbolic rather than being part of the actual management process (Yermack, 1996; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  
The result for non-executive ratio is insignificant, suggesting that the role of non-
executive directors is limited. This result may reflect the tendency of the boards of most 
companies in Jordan to lack independence from controlling shareholders and from 
management. The Company Law contains no stipulation regarding the composition of 
the board of directors, nor any clear guidelines governing the balance of power between 
executive and non-executive directors. Another possible explanation may be that 
appointees may lack relevant experience or may be dependent on or in other ways 
closely linked with controlling shareholders such as families, therefore, feeling 
obligated to act in their interest.   
Furthermore, Model 5 in Table 3.8 shows that firms in which the CEO and COB roles 
are separated, display higher Tobin‟s q ratio. This result is consistent with the view that 
the board's monitoring is unlikely to be as effective if the same person holds the two top 
positions. Furthermore, the results suggest that the CEO can additionally exert a 
positive effect on firm performance by holding board membership. Firms with CEO 
board members are likely to have better or more efficient governance mechanisms, 
which should contribute to enhance performance. This result suggests that if the CEO is 
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a board member, he or she may facilitate and participate in the decision making process 
rather than dominate the decisions of the board, as may be the case when he/she is CEO 
and COB together.  
We further interact Founding family ownership with board characteristics (i.e. board 
size, non-executive directors, CEO-Chairman duality dummy and CEO board 
membership) to test if the effect of founding family ownership on corporate 
performance changes with these characteristics. We do this because the main variable 
which seems to be significant in determining performance is founding family 
ownership, so we want to check if its impact also depends on board characteristics. In 
our unreported results we find no significant effect. Thus, we may conclude that board 
characteristics do not significantly influence Jordanian firms' corporate performance, 
either directly or indirectly through interactions with founding family ownership. As 
discussed earlier, most Jordanian companies lack independence from controlling 
shareholders and from management. Furthermore, in Jordan as in many other Arab and 
developing countries, management and the board of directors are frequently dominated 
by members of the founding families. Therefore, Jordanian company board 
characteristics are not expected to have an important impact on corporate performance. 
3.4.2.3. Ownership Concentration, Large Shareholders and Corporate 
Performance 
We next turn our attention to ownership variables and examine their effect on corporate 
performance. We regress corporate performance (i.e. Tobin‟s q) against ownership 
concentration, large domestic institutional ownership, and large foreign investors and 
other control variables and present the results in model 6 of Table 3.8.  
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Table 3.8: Pooled-OLS regressions prediction corporate performance 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Executive ownership -/+ 0.002         
(0.99) 
0.003         
(1.18) 
0.002              
(0.90) 
Founding family 
Ownership 
- -0.005**         
(-2.26) 
-0.006***       
(-2.94) 
-0.006***           
(-2.96) 
Board size -/+ -0.014             
(-0.48) 
-0.018             
(-0.65) 
-0.007            
(-0.26) 
Non-executive directors -/+ 0.008         
(1.65) 
-0.007             
(-1.33) 
-0.005             
(-0.97) 
Duality   -/+ - -0.297***       
(-3.42) 
-0.265**         
(-2.22) 
CEO board member -/+ - 0.351***   
(3.42) 
0.283***        
(2.97) 
Concentration  -/+ - - 0.006**        
(2.48) 
Institutional investors  - - - -0.008***       
(-2.63) 
Foreign ownership + - - 0.011**        
(2.39) 
Size -/+ -0.206*           
(-1.92) 
-0.203*           
(-1.92) 
-0.217**          
(-2.13) 
Leverage -/+ 0.002         
(0.71) 
0.004       
(1.20) 
0.005              
(1.27) 
Dividends  -/+ 0.043***      
(3.93) 
0.045***      
(4.16) 
0.052***      
(4.47) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
R²  0.22 0.27 0.34 
No. of observations  243 243 243  
This table presents pooled-OLS regressions of predicted firm performance using Tobin‟s q as a 
proxy for performance with one-year lagged variables. In Model 4 and 5 we add board 
variables. In model 6 we add ownership variables.  All explanatory and control variables are 
one year lagged. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the estimation, heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are used. See Table 3.3 for exact definitions of variables.  
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We find that ownership concentration plays a significant role in the governance of the 
Jordanian firms. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance. This suggests that external 
monitoring of firm management by large shareholders improves corporate performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gillan and Starks, 2003).  
Furthermore, model 6 in Table 3.8 also shows that institutional investors have a 
statistically significant at 1 per cent and negative relationship with firm value. Our 
results provide no evidence of an effective role of the local financial institutions in 
Jordan, a finding consistent with the proposition of Khanna and Palepu (1999) 
concerning the weakness of domestic institutional monitoring in emerging markets 
This finding is consistent with our expectation and in support of our earlier prediction 
that institutional investors in Jordan are relatively inefficient and/or passive in 
disciplining management.  The lack of monitoring by domestic institutions is, moreover, 
consistent with the decline in institutional ownership over the period (the mean value 
declines from 22.42 per cent in 2004 to 17.17 per cent in 2006), since where holdings 
are smaller, the incentive to monitor decreases. In a small country like Jordan, 
institutional investors such as banks and directors of companies are likely to have a 
close relationship. Therefore, this finding could also be explained in the light of the 
strategic alignment hypothesis, which indicates that institutional investors might be 
reluctant to challenge management decisions, as they wish to protect existing or 
potential business relationships with firms (Pound, 1998). This would be consistent with 
Ferreira and Matos‟ (2008) finding from a comprehensive data set from 27 countries 
where grey institutional owners (i.e. banks, insurance companies, and pension funds) 
are more loyal to corporate management and thus tend to hold shares without reacting to 
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management actions that are not in line with the interests of shareholders. Therefore, 
any intervention by the banks is only likely if their own short-term interests are at stake, 
while those of the firm's shareholders are of less interest to them (Morck and Nakamura, 
1999).  
Another possible explanation of the result is the relatively small number, as discussed 
earlier, of local institutions that could effectively serve as external governance agents 
against poorly performing management. Since mutual funds are not widespread in 
Jordan, domestic local institutional investors are predominantly banks, insurance and 
pension funds such as the Social Security Corporation. Theoretically, these institutions 
are in a position to act as primary monitoring agents for other shareholders, especially 
minority shareholders. However, in practice their efficiency in this respect is reduced by 
their significant business relationships with companies since most banks in Jordan are 
family-controlled, individually or through family related group companies; the lack of 
corporate expertise of nominees of the Social Security Investment Unit on the board of 
many Jordanian firms, and the absence of a strong incentive to exercise effective 
oversight, given that their tenure and career prospects are not related to the performance 
of the companies to which they are appointed.  
Model 6 in Table 3.8 shows that, in contrast to their domestic counterparts, large 
foreign investors have a significant and positive effect on firm performance
1
 . This 
result suggests that foreign investors have incentives and the ability to participate in the 
corporate governance process through monitoring and control and, thus, are able to 
complement the inadequate or inefficient monitoring of domestic institutional investors. 
                                                 
1
 We re-estimated our regression by including a dummy variable to make the distinction 
between foreign financial institutions and foreign industrial corporations. However, the results 
do not reveal any significant effect and hence they are not reported. 
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Our finding confirms the commonly-held view that foreign investors play a greater role 
in prompting changes in corporate governance practices than domestic institutional 
investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003). The results for other explanatory variables and 
firm-specific characteristic are not different than those reported in previous models. 
Notably, model 6 has a substantially higher the R-square than in the previous models, 
indicating that model 6 explains variation in firm performance much better.  
The findings from the models specified above indicate that the main agency concern for 
Jordanian firms seems to be the one between founding family ownership and minority 
shareholders. This seems to be replacing managerial agency arguments. The traditional 
managerial agency explanations do not seem to hold. Instead, the main agency concern 
in the Jordanian context seems to between founding family shareholders and other 
shareholders.  
Our findings show that separation of the roles of CEO and COB, and CEO membership 
in the board may have positive impact on corporate performance. External governance 
by concentration ownership and large foreign investors may also be effective. However, 
large local institutional investors seem to play little role in corporate governance of 
Jordanian firms. Our results imply that the monitoring function of foreign investors 
enhances firm performance and complements the relatively weak monitoring by 
domestic institutional investors.  
3.4.3. Further Checks   
In this section, two sub-samples are drawn by the size of the firms. We repeat our 
pooled-OLS regression with lagged values for independent variables (model 6, Table 
3.8) after splitting the sample into large firms and small firms according to their average 
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size in 2004 and 2005. Firms with a size that lie above the median of the natural 
logarithm of total sales are called "large firms". On the other hand, firms with a size that 
lie below the median of the natural logarithm of total sales are called "small firms". The 
rationale for doing so is to make it possible to check whether the earlier findings hold 
across different sub-samples of the data and the extent to which firm-specific 
characteristics, such as firm size, affect the governance mechanisms-performance 
relationship (see, for a similar approach, Cheung and Wei, 2006 and Florackis et al., 
2009).  
The corresponding columns (7 and 8) in Table 3.9 report the results from this task. The 
results strongly support the previous findings. Specifically, founding family ownerships 
are negatively related to firm performance and significant only in small firms, 
confirming our expectations that family ownership seems to be the main source of 
agency problems in Jordanian firms but only in small firms.  
Executive ownership, on the other hand, is not related to firm performance. This finding 
confirms our earlier findings that the classical view of the separation of ownership and 
control, and the potential conflicts associated with it, might not be valid in Jordanian 
firms.  
In line with the earlier findings, board size and composition are not related to firm value 
in small and large firms. CEO duality in both small and large firms still has a negative 
relationship with firm value but is significant in small firms only. On the other hand, 
CEO board members are positively related to firm performance for both large and small 
firms, confirming our earlier results that CEO can additionally exert a positive effect on 
firm performance by holding board membership.  
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    Table 3.9: Pooled-OLS regression prediction corporate performance 
Independent variables Predicted sign 
Model 6    
All firms  
Model 7 
Small firms  
Model 8 
Large firms  
Executive ownership -/+ 0.002              
(0.90) 
0.004         
(0.72) 
-0.001              
(-0.40) 
Founding family 
Ownership 
- -0.006***           
(-2.96) 
-0.008**         
(-2.22) 
-0.003           
(-1.42) 
Board size -/+ -0.007            
(-0.26) 
-0.017             
(-0.36) 
-0.015            
(-0.56) 
Non-executive 
directors   
-/+ 0.005             
(-0.97) 
0.003             
(0.28) 
0.00005            
(0.01) 
Duality   -/+ -0.265**         
(-2.22) 
-0.588**         
(-2.57) 
-0.139           
(-1.04) 
CEO board member -/+ 0.283***        
(2.97) 
0.339*    
(1.96) 
0.82***        
(2.74) 
Concentration -/+ 0.006**        
(2.48) 
0.002        
(0.41) 
0.006**        
(2.34) 
Institutional investors - -0.008***       
(-2.63) 
-0.011**         
(-2.03) 
-0.003           
(-0.98) 
Foreign ownership + 0.011**        
(2.39) 
0.021**        
(1.98) 
0.002**        
(2.38) 
Size -/+ -0.217**          
(-2.13) 
-0.276            
(-1.55) 
0.348**          
(2.24) 
Leverage -/+ 0.005              
(1.27) 
0.001       
(0.21) 
0.004              
(1.12) 
Dividends  -/+ 0.052***      
(4.47) 
0.066***      
(2.64) 
0.041***      
(4.04) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
R²  0.34 0.42 0.51 
No. of observations   243 114 129 
This table presents pooled-regression predictions of firm performance using Tobin‟s q as a 
proxy for performance for small and large firms with one-year lagged variables. t-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. All explanatory and control variables are one year lagged.  
***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For 
the estimation, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used.  SeeTable 3.3 for exact 
definitions of variables. 
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The results show that ownership concentration plays a significant role in the governance 
of large firms. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance for large firms. This suggests that 
external monitoring of firm management by large shareholders improves corporate 
performance.  
Large local institutional investors are still affecting corporate performance negatively in 
all firms, but significantly in small firms. This result confirms our earlier finding that 
local institutional investors in Jordan seem to be limited in their monitoring ability and 
their contribution to improving corporate governance is limited. On the other hand, 
large foreign investors are positively related to firm performance for both large and 
small firms, confirming our earlier result that large foreign investors have incentives 
and the ability to participate in the corporate governance process through monitoring 
and control and, thus, are able to complement the inadequate or inefficient monitoring 
of domestic institutional investors. 
Unlike our previous findings, we find that firm size is still negatively related to 
performance in small firms, but insignificant. However, in large firms the relationship is 
positive and significant. The positive relationship with large firms may be because 
larger firms are less exposed to asymmetric information, face less risk of bankruptcy 
and are likely to have better access to external capital markets. This finding is in line 
with the majority of capital structure literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004).  
Moreover, in line with our previous findings, we find a positive but insignificant 
relationship between leverage and performance for small and larger firms. Finally, 
dividends are still positively and significantly related to small and large firms. 
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3.4.4. Robustness of Results   
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate a number of different specifications 
that we do not report for the sake of brevity
1
. First, we re-estimate model 6 in table 3.8 
by utilizing cross-sectional average methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995). In particular, the dependent variable is measured in 2006, while for the 
independent variables, average values for two years (i.e. 2004 and 2005) are used to 
control for potential endogeneity.  
The results strongly support the previous findings. That is, we find significant 
relationships between duality, ownership concentration, local institutional inventors, 
size, and dividends, and firm value. Executive ownership, family ownership, board size, 
non-executive directors, foreign ownership and leverage are not related to corporate 
performance. 
Second, we re-estimated our pooled-regressions with lagged values for independent 
variables (model 6 of table 3.8) by using a second proxy for firm performance, return on 
assets (ROA), as an alternative performance measure. Accounting measures such as 
ROA has been widely used in previous research (see Demsetz, & Lehn, 1985; Ang et 
al., 2000).  
The results show that executive ownership, founding family, board size and 
composition, CEO board member, concentration ownership, local institutional 
ownership, foreign ownership and leverage are not significantly related to accounting 
performance.   
On the other hand, CEO duality is found to be significant and negatively related to 
accounting performance measure. Both the control variables, size and dividend, are 
                                                 
1
 The results are available upon request. 
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positively and significantly related to accounting performance, which tends to support 
the notion that higher dividend payment is associated with better financial performance.  
Finally, we re-estimated our pooled-regressions with lagged values for independent 
variables (model 6 of table 3.8) by using an alternative definition for size by using the 
natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. The results strongly support the 
previous findings, that is, we find founding family ownership, duality, local institutions 
ownership, and size are negatively and significantly related to firm performance.  On 
the other hand, our findings show that, CEO board members, concentration ownership, 
foreign ownership, and dividends are positively and significantly related to firm 
performance.  
3.5. Policy Implications from the Findings of the Study  
The empirical findings of this study have several policy and management implications. 
First, any efforts to improve corporate governance in Jordan should consider the local 
culture and environment. For instance, the agency problem that exists in Jordan is 
different from the one suggested by the standard agency literature. In the Jordanian 
context, the significant agency problem is related to the "strong" large family 
shareholders versus "weak" minority shareholders. Because of this, there is a need for 
legal protection to cover the interests of all a company's stakeholders, especially 
minority shareholders. The authorities should continue to call for more separation 
between ownership and management. Controlling family owners should separate 
themselves from the management of the institution, whether as the chairman of the 
boards or in senior management positions.   
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Second, the authorities should undertake a series of regulatory changes to improve 
corporate governance practices in the Jordanian firms. Particular attention should be 
given to the independence of board members and a separation of the positions of the 
chairman of the board and the CEO. Independent directors should not have important or 
any business ties with the company, and should have the necessary skills and experience 
to enable them to take an objective stance in board deliberation. Increased availability 
of external, more objective inputs and the strengthening of governance skills and 
perspectives will promote boards‟ willingness and ability to act in the interests of all 
stakeholders, bring a fresh perspective to strategic directions and market approach, and 
help to support the long-term, prudent operations of the firm.  What is also needed in 
the Jordanian experience is the separation of the often combined positions of chairman 
of the board and the chief executive officer (CEO). The regulatory agencies in Jordan 
should take this into account in setting codes for corporate governance which firms 
must comply with, as this will limit the power of one individual in managing the 
company. 
Third, the authorities should require more detailed disclosure, especially of ownership 
structure, focusing on the ultimate owners. This disclosure will enhance the 
transparency of who actually controls a company and this will benefit all investors, 
especially minority shareholders. 
Fourth, to enhance corporate governance practices in Jordan, private and public sector 
leaders need to put this issue on the agenda, raising awareness of the importance of 
good corporate governance by publicizing evidence of how it has resulted in increased 
investment. The media could also contribute in this endeavor by building an 
understanding of corporate governance concepts and calling the public and private 
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sectors to account for their actions. Lastly, efforts should be made to prepare the 
business leaders of the future teaching the values and concepts of corporate governance 
in universities. 
Finally, the findings of this study have implications for business communities who may 
be concerned regarding corporate governance practice in Jordan, in addition to 
academic researchers who are engaged in the ongoing debate concerning proper roles 
for corporate governance frameworks.  
3.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the impact of several internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and devices, including managerial ownership, founding family ownership, 
board variables (i.e. board size, non-executive directors, CEO duality and CEO 
membership in the board), concentration ownership and large domestic institutional 
investors and large foreign ownership, on corporate performance. We present an 
analysis of a unique and reliable hand-collected firm-level data set on 360 firm-year 
observations of Jordanian non-financial firms listed at the Amman Stock Exchange 
during 2004-2006. We use pooled-OLS with one year lagged explanatory variables and 
average cross-sectional regression approaches in an attempt to reduce the potential 
problem of endogeneity.  
Our findings contribute to agency theory and corporate governance literature in a 
number of ways. First, they enhance understanding of agency theory in a developing 
country context, an area which has been comparatively neglected, especially, in the 
Arab region. Second, this study goes beyond previous studies (among others, Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; and Ghosh, 2006) by 
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incorporating a new board characteristic, a membership of the CEO on the board, and 
analysing its impact on firm performance. Specifically, our results suggest that this 
factor constitutes an additional potential corporate governance mechanism available to 
firms, which significantly predicts company performance.  
The findings provide strong support for the view that the type of agency problem 
prevalent in the Jordanian context seems to be between founding family and other 
shareholders. This result is unaltered when different corporate governance mechanisms 
are added to the model. Managerial ownership does not play any role in the corporate 
governance of the Jordanian firms, whereas family ownership aims to protect and 
preserve family wealth. This seems to be replacing the managerial agency arguments.  
Our analysis fails to detect any significant impact of board size or non-executive 
directors on firm performance. Our findings show that CEO duality affects firm 
performance negatively. However, our results support the value of having a CEO who is 
a member of the board, as a potential corporate governance mechanism available to 
firms, as this is found to be positively related to company performance.  
The significant relationship found between concentration ownership and the governance 
of the Jordanian firms suggests that external monitoring of firm management by large 
shareholders improves corporate performance. In contrast, we detect a negative link 
between performance and local institutional investors, implying that, in the Jordanian 
context, this group is relatively inefficient and/or passive in disciplining management. 
In contrast to local institutional investors, our findings show the importance of foreign 
investors in terms of firm performance. This implies that the monitoring role performed 
by foreign investors is more important for the Jordanian market, because monitoring by 
domestic institutional investors is found to be ineffective or relatively limited. The 
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process of globalization of Jordanian capital markets may lead to good governance 
practices being imported by domestic firms, and future research on this issue may have 
very important to explore the determines of foreign investors in the Jordanian equity 
market in order to attract more foreign investors. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Effects of Corporate Governance Characteristics 
on Foreign Ownership 
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4.1. Introduction 
In many countries worldwide, there are comparatively few domestic sources of outside 
finance (Leuz et al., 2008), a situation that has prompted liberalization of many stock 
markets enabling foreign investors to invest in domestic equity securities (Bekaert et al., 
2007). The result has been increasing importance of foreign capital as a source of 
finance. Jordan, like other Middle Eastern and Arab countries has, since the mid 1990s, 
made great strides towards making necessary legislative reforms and establishing a 
legal environment conducive to economic activity, in an attempt to attract much needed 
foreign investments. 
Previous research suggests that foreign investors are disadvantaged compared to 
domestic investors, regarding knowledge of local firms‟ operations and performance, as 
well as the country‟s economic environment (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Dvorak, 
2005; Stulz, 2005). Consequently, foreign investors often display a so-called "home 
bias", preferring to invest in their own countries despite the globalization of financial 
markets (see among others, French and Poterba, 1991; Lewis, 1999; Dahlquist and 
Robertsson, 2001; Chan et al., 2005). Reasons for such bias include information 
asymmetry, differences in corporate governance, and legal and institutional restrictions 
(see among others, Dahlquist et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; and Giannetti and 
Koskinen, 2008). 
Previous studies also indicate that foreign investors reveal preferences for certain firm-
specific characteristics (see, Stulz, 1999 and Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001 among 
others). For example, Kang and Stulz (1997), based on a sample in the Japanese stock 
market, find that foreign investors tend to invest in large firms, those with low leverage, 
and firms with a high export ratio. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) analyse the 
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determinants of aggregated foreign ownership in Swedish firms, and find that foreigners 
prefer large firms, firms paying low dividends, and firms with large cash holdings. 
However, in the Swedish case foreigners tend to undervalue firms with a large 
ownership. In terms of developing countries, Lin and Shiu (2003) find that foreign 
investors in Korea prefer large firms and firms with a high export ratio. Mangena and 
Tauringana (2007) provide the first evidence from Africa. They find foreign investment 
in Zimbabwe is associated with, inter alia, firm size, profitability, liquidity, disclosure, 
proportion of non-executive directors, institutional ownership, and audit committee.  
In addition to the above, poor corporate governance is frequently identified as an 
important factor in foreign investors' avoidance of foreign firms. There is strong 
evidence to support the existence of a link between good corporate governance and 
greater foreign investment in emerging markets. For example, Lang et al., (2004) based 
on data from 27 countries, find that US investment analysts are less likely to follow 
firms with poor internal governance, such as firms with a concentrated 
family/management ownership. Consequently, less attention is paid to these firms and 
they attract lower valuations. Aggarwal et al. (2005), studying the portfolio holdings of 
U.S. mutual funds in emerging market, find that U.S. mutual funds invest more in 
emerging markets that have stronger accounting standards, shareholder rights, and legal 
frameworks. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show that foreign portfolio investors are 
less likely to invest in Swedish companies with weak corporate governance. More 
recently, Leuz et al. (2008), in a large-scale multinational study, confirm that U.S. 
investors invest less in poorly governed firms located in countries with weak legal 
institutions. They conclude that higher standards of disclosure and corporate practice 
are potential levers to attract more foreign investment.  
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There is also anecdotal evidence indicating that corporate governance is important in 
foreign investors' decisions. For example, McKinsey & Company (2000) conducted 
three separate surveys to discover how shareholders perceive and value corporate 
governance in developed and emerging markets. Their findings indicate that three-
quarters of investors believe that board practices, particularly independent directors, are 
at least as important as performance when they evaluate companies for investment. 
They reveal that investors would not buy a company with poor corporate governance 
and are prepared to pay an additional premium of up to 28 per cent of the share price for 
well-governed companies in emerging economies
1
. 
In sum, there is both academic and anecdotal evidence to indicate that the quality of 
corporate governance and other firm-specific characteristics affect foreign investors' 
investment decisions in certain companies. However, the existing studies have mainly 
looked at the stock preferences of U.S. investors, or those of foreign investors in single 
high-income countries with uniformly high investor protection laws and accounting 
standards. In the case of the latter, none of the previous studies have looked at the 
relationship between corporate governance and foreign ownership in different regional 
areas such as the Arab and MENA countries. Furthermore, the majority of the previous 
studies mentioned above have investigated the total insider ownership or controlling 
shareholders (i.e. families and management) in a global sense, without taking into 
consideration the identity of insider or controlling shareholders such as founding family 
ownership. In this respect, none of the empirical papers on foreign ownership, that we 
are aware of, has attempted to combine founding-family ownership and control (i.e. 
                                                 
1
 They defined a well-governed company as “one that has a majority of outside directors with no 
management ties on its board (truly independent), undertakes formal evaluations of directors, 
and is very responsive to investors requests for information on governance issues”. 
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founding family involvement in the board of directors) in investigating the impact on 
foreign ownership in the emerging markets setting. Finally, very few studies have 
investigated the impact of board structure on foreign ownership; an exception is 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007). 
In this chapter, we aim to addresses these issues by examining whether differences in 
foreign ownership across listed companies in the Jordanian market are related to 
company differences in corporate governance mechanisms and other firm 
characteristics. Specifically, our analysis will focus on two important questions. First, 
how do founding family ownership and control affect the investment decisions of 
foreign investors in the Jordanian market? Second, how do other potential corporate 
governance mechanisms (i.e. institutional investors and board characteristics) and firm-
specific characteristics (i.e. market-to-book-ratio, size, leverage and dividends) affect 
investment foreign investors in the Jordanian market?  
Our investigation is unique because of the high level of involvement of foreign 
investors in the Jordanian stock market. In fact, foreign investment of market capital is 
one of the highest in the world (OECD, 2006)
1
. For example, foreign investors account 
for almost half of the market capitalization of all sectors in 2007. There are also 
significant differences across firms, in the sample; where the level of large foreign 
ownership ranges from 0 to 97.51 per cent. Nevertheless, despite the crucial role foreign 
investors play in the Jordanian stock market, the existing empirical evidence on the 
                                                 
1 See for example: MENA-OECD Investment Programme National Investment Reform Agenda 
Workshop for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Monday 19th June, 2006. Available on line:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/29/38148879.pdf. 
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major determinants of foreign investment in Jordanian companies, especially at the firm 
level, is very limited, at best, only under preliminary discussion
1
.  
Second, many public companies in Jordan, as is typical of most Arab countries and 
emerging markets, still have large family shareholders, family representatives among 
their senior management and strong family representation on the board. Such conditions 
are highly likely to give rise to conflicts of interest between the controlling family and 
other shareholders. Therefore, this study offers an ideal setting to examine how family 
ownership and control affect foreign investment decisions. 
Third, the Jordanian capital market is one of the most transparent (Saadi-Sedik and 
Petri, 2006), developed, sophisticated and efficient stock markets in the region (Smith, 
2007)
2
. In 2005 the ratio of market capitalization to GDP was high by international 
standards at 292 per cent (Saadi-Sedik and Petri, 2006). This is particularly so for other 
countries of the Arab World and the Middle East. Such countries have an acknowledged 
need of informative meaningful analysis of corporate governance and detailed data and 
assessment. This would provide a basis for setting priorities and informing the 
formulation of corporate governance action plans and corporate sector reforms in these 
countries (Saidi, 2004; 2005 and Najib, 2007). Therefore, the empirical findings of the 
present study could have value to other Arab economies in the Middle East, all of which 
share a common heritage, culture, language and religion and where there are strong 
similarities in regulatory and institutional environments and in the corporate ownership 
structure of firms (Saidi, 2004; 2005 and Najib, 2007).  
                                                 
1
 MENA-OECD Investment Programme National Investment Reform Agenda Workshop for the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Monday 19th June, 2006. Available on line:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/29/38148879.pdf. 
2
 Smith, G. (2007) finds that the Israeli, Jordanian and Lebanese markets, composite stock price 
indices follow a random walk and so these markets are weak-from efficient. 
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Finally, prior empirical work on this topic has been hampered by a shortage of data, due 
to the difficulties of accessing firm-level data on governance and foreign holdings (Leuz 
et al., 2008). However, an improvement in reporting and disclosure standards in Jordan 
presents an opportunity for a relatively rigorous empirical study using firm-level data
1
.  
Accordingly, in this chapter, we use a unique and reliable hand-collected firm-level 
dataset that includes, among others, detailed information on foreign ownership, board 
structure and founding family ownership for a sample of 360 firm-year observations for 
Jordanian non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during 2004-2006. 
We employ both cross-sectional regression analysis and probit regression. The 
empirical analysis is conducted for two alternative definitions of foreign ownership, 
namely, large foreign ownership and total foreign ownership, to confirm the reliability 
of our findings.  
There are several important features of our analysis which, we believe, extend the 
literature on foreign ownership and corporate governance.  
Our first contribution in this chapter is concerned with the empirical investigation of the 
impact of founding family ownership and control on foreign investment decisions. The 
majority of previous studies in this field have looked at insider ownership or controlling 
shareholders (i.e. families and management)
2
 in a global sense, irrespective of the 
identity of the insider or controlling shareholder. They also overlook the possibility that 
some foreigners become insiders or controlling shareholders. Furthermore, there has 
                                                 
1
 Omar (2007) reports a significant improvement in disclosure in Jordan after important changes 
in the economic and accounting regulations. 
2
 See for example, Dahlquist  et al., (2003) for U.S. investors holding in 51 countries and for 
Swedish firms, Kho et al., (2007) for U.S. investors holding in 46 equity markets in emerging 
countries after a period of liberalization,  and Leuz et al., (2008) for US investors. 
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been little previous investigation of board structure and its effect on foreign ownership
1
. 
This study adds to existing knowledge on the issue by analysing ownership by the 
founding family and local institutional investors and their effect on foreign ownership.  
Second, unlike previous studies that used aggregate foreign ownership (i.e. the total 
equity shares held by foreign investors)
2
, we use two alternative definitions of foreign 
ownership, namely, large foreign ownership (defined as the percentage of outstanding 
equity held by foreign shareholders, that is, with shareholdings of 5 per cent or more) 
and total foreign ownership (defined as the percentage of market value of foreign 
investors' equity divided by total market capitalization for each firm). Specifically, 
besides using large foreign shareholders (that is, those with shareholdings of 5 per cent 
or more) as our dependent variable, we also use the total equity held by foreign 
investors, regardless of percentage, to assess the sensitivity of our results to the choice 
of threshold of foreign equity shares. 
Third, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to analyse investment 
by foreign investors in relation to corporate governance, including both a variety of 
corporate governance mechanisms (such as founding family ownership and control, 
institutional ownership, and board characteristics) and firm specific characteristics (i.e. 
market-to-book ratio, size, leverage and dividends) in an emerging equity market and, 
more specifically, one of the Arab and MENA countries. 
Finally, this study, by examining empirically the determinants of foreign investment in 
the Jordanian stock market, will not only shed light on the reasons for Jordan's apparent 
attractiveness to foreign investors, but may also allow inferences to be drawn that would 
                                                 
1
 One reason for this may be the difficulty involved in collecting board data. 
2
 See for example, Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001 in Sweden; Lin and Shiu, 2003 in Taiwan; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007 in Zimbabwe; Kho et al., (2007) and Lutz et al., 2008 for U.S. 
investors.  
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benefit other emerging markets, particularly other countries of the Arab World and the 
Middle East.  
Our analysis provides important findings regarding the determinants of foreign 
ownership in Jordan. Our results reveal that founding family ownership and founding 
family control exerts a significant influence on foreign investors‟ decisions. More 
specifically, our finding suggests foreign ownership is likely to be lower in firms in 
which founding family ownership is high and in family controlled firms (i.e. when 
founding family members are in the board of directors). This result may suggest that 
foreign investors are not keen on investing in firms in which founding family 
shareholders are the major shareholders/controllers. Alternatively, although it is not one 
of the objectives of our empirical analysis, it may also show that founding family 
owners may discourage foreign investors from taking a major role in firms they (i.e. the 
founding owners) control. 
Domestic institutional investors also appear to deter foreign investors. The findings 
suggest that firms with large domestic intuitional ownership are related to lower foreign 
holdings. This finding supports the view that institutional investors in emerging markets 
are ineffective in monitoring because they have either existing or potential business 
relations with firms, and, in order to protect those relations, might be less willing to 
challenge management decisions. 
Board characteristics (i.e. board size and the proportion of non-executive directors) also 
have a negative effect on foreign investors, although the impact is significant only for 
board size. This result suggests that foreign investors perceive large boards as likely to 
encounter problems of coordination, control, and decision-making. These results are in 
line with our earlier findings regarding family ownership and its negative effect on 
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foreign investors, because most boards in Jordan, as in many other developing 
countries, are controlled by large shareholders, which in most cases are families. 
Regarding firm-specific characteristics, we find that firms with higher growth potential 
(high market-to-book equity ratios) tend to attract more foreign investment. Moreover, 
foreign investors have a strong preference for large firms. Foreign investors prefer 
holding shares in large firms because information asymmetries between local and 
foreign investors may be relatively less in large firms. Foreign investors seem to avoid 
firms that pay high dividends and, finally, leverage is not related to the level of foreign 
investment.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses foreign 
equity investment in the Jordanian market. Section 4.3 sets out the theoretical 
background and hypotheses of the study. Section 4.4 presents data, variables and 
methodology. Section 4.5 presents results and Section 4.6 is the conclusion. 
4.2. Foreign Equity Investment in the Jordanian Capital Market  
Jordan possesses a number of characteristics which enhance its attractiveness to 
investors and contributes to creating a stable investment environment. These include 
political stability, favourable demographics, an established financial structure, tight 
monetary and fiscal policies, favourable foreign and domestic investment laws. 
Moreover, Jordan is rapidly integrating into the world economy, as evident by accession 
to the World Trade Organization in 2000, an Association Agreement with the European 
Union effective in 2002, conclusion of a free trade agreement with the United States, 
and signature of investment agreements with many countries around the world
1
. The 
                                                 
1
 See, for more details, Jordan Investment Board, http://www.jordaninvestment.com/. 
137 
 
country's privatization programme and special-status industrial zones are also essential 
assets which enhance the country‟s attractiveness as an investment location1.  
To attract more foreign capital flow, Jordan has reformed its law to suit the international 
capital markets. The three investment laws of 2003 (replacing 1995 legislation) provide 
for equal treatment of Jordanian and foreign investors. Restrictions related to the 
percentage of ownership by foreigners have been removed. Foreign investors can invest 
in different economic sectors with no restrictions on ownership percentage, and they 
enjoy complete freedom of capital movement and no taxes on capital gains or cash 
dividends, in an attractive investment structure and open economy. 
Jordan also offers a good regulatory environment as we discussed earlier in Chapter 2. 
The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) supervises the disclosure of information 
related to securities, issuers, insider trading and major shareholders. It is mandated to 
protect investors, as well as ensure fairness, efficiency and transparency. In addition, 
JSC has issued a comprehensive guide for foreign investors in order to assist their 
understanding of the investment climate in Jordan. Listed companies on the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) are legally
 
required to institute an audit committee and to 
disclose their financial, non-financial and operational performance on a continuous and 
regular quarterly, semi-annual and annual basis. In addition to regular disclosure, 
companies are required to make immediate disclosure of all material events
 
that may 
affect the business and/or its earnings. The ASE‟s automated order-driven Electronic 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1
 According to the 2008 World Investment Report issued by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Jordan ranked 6th out of 142 countries in 2007 in the 
world in attracting FDI; a large increase in ranking position from the previous years. Jordan has 
kept the upward trend in this ranking since the early 1990s. Jordan ranked 75 in 1990, 37 in 
2000, 13 in 2005 and 7 in 2006.   
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Trading System is another feature that contributes to its attractiveness to foreign 
investors.  
Ownership by foreigners has been on the rise since the beginning of the 2000s, as a 
result of regulatory and supervisory changes in the Jordanian Capital Market and 
creation of many incentives to invest in Jordan. Figure 4.1 shows the market value of 
outstanding shares held by foreign investors relative to the total market capitalization 
from 2001-2007.  
Figure 4.1: Foreign Investors Ownership* 
 
    This figure shows foreign investor ownership as of year-end from 2001-2007. 
    * As a percentage of market capitalization.  
    Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports 
 
The percentage of foreign ownership increased from 38.51 per cent of total market 
capitalisation in 2001 to 48.95 per cent in 2007. Furthermore, foreign ownership 
between sectors displays significant changes during the same period, as shown in Table 
4.1. This table shows the percentage of foreign ownership in shareholding companies by 
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sector for the period 2001-2007. For example, it is clear from the table that foreign 
ownership almost doubled in the services and industry sectors between 2001 and 2007, 
from 19.67 to 36.15 per cent in the services sector and from 27.87 to 51.88 per cent in 
the industry sector. In contrast, the foreign share in the financial sector remained 
relatively stable, increasing only slightly from 47.43 to 50.73 per cent in the same 
period.  
Table 4.1: Non-Jordanian ownership in listed companies by sectors as a 
percentage (%) of market capitalisation during the period 2001-2007 
 
Year Financial Sector Services Industry All Market 
2001 47.43 19.67 27.87 38.51 
2002 47.56 26.79 26.09 37.43 
2003 46.28 24.29 30.1 38.84 
2004 47.44 25.59 36.79 41.26 
2005 49.77 26.19 38.09 45.04 
2006 47.73 36.55 43.71 45.53 
2007 50.73 36.15 51.88 48.95 
 
This table reports foreign investor ownership in companies listed at the ASE as of year-end 
from 2001-2007 as a percentage of total market value. The Financial sector includes Banks, 
Insurance, Diversified Financial Services and Real Estate. The Services sector includes Health 
Care Services, Educational Services, Hotels & Tourism, Transportation, Technology & 
Communication, Media, Utilities & Energy, and Commercial Services. The Industry sector 
includes Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, Chemical Industries, Paper & Carton, Printing & 
Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & Extracting, Tobacco & Cigarettes, Engineering & 
Construction., Electrical Industries, Textiles, Leather & Clothing, and Glass & Ceramics.  
Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports.  
 
All three sectors have witnessed significant increases in foreign ownership in some 
years, although these have been more notable in services and industry; for instance, in 
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services, an increase from 19.67 to 26.79 per cent in 2001 to 2002, and another increase, 
from 26.19 to 36.55 per cent in 2005 to 2006. Meanwhile, industry experienced 
substantial growth of foreign ownership in 2004 (from 30.1 to 36.79 per cent), 2006 
(from 38.09 to 43.71 per cent) and in 2007 (from 43.71 to 51.88 per cent). 
Today, the Jordanian capital market is considered one of the most transparent (Saadi-
Sedik and Petri, 2006), developed, sophisticated and efficient stock markets in the 
region (Smith, 2007). Furthermore, a recent study conducted by the IMF (Saadi-Sedik 
and Petri, 2006) rates the ASE favourably in comparison with many other regional 
markets, in terms of the relative lack of investment restrictions, good transparency, and 
the regulatory environment. The study concludes that investment in the ASE may be an 
attractive option for investors seeking to diversify their portfolio. Foreign investment at 
the ASE tends to be long-term investment, predominantly international mutual and 
pension funds in addition to foreign government contributions and strategic partnerships 
with Jordanian public shareholding companies
1
, the investors coming from 102 
countries around the world
2
. 
4.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 In this section, several corporate governance measures and other explanatory variables 
that may be related to foreign investment are discussed, beginning with the relationship 
between foreign ownership and founding family ownership and control (i.e. when 
founding family members are in the board of directors), and moving to the relationship 
                                                 
1
 Jalil Tarif, the CEO of the ASE. Meeting with the World Bank Mission - available on line: 
http://www.exchange.jo/pages.php?menu_id=-1&local_type=1&local_id=123&local_details=1.  
2
 There are around one million investors registered with the Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
at the end of 2007, of them 947.6 thousand Jordanian investors, 41.2 thousand Arab investors, 
3.8 thousand non-Arab investors, according to Samir Jaradat, CEO of Securities Depository 
Centre. Source:  Al-Raai Newspaper, Saturday, January 12, 2008, Issue 13612, Vol. 37   
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between domestic institutional investors.  Board variables are also discussed. Finally, 
drawing on foreign investment literature, the possible relationship between differences 
in firm-specific characteristics and differences in foreign ownership in Jordanian listed 
companies is considered. 
4.3.1. Founding Family Ownership  
Founding family ownership is an important form of ownership structure. Worldwide, 
the majority of businesses are family owned (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006). Such a pattern of 
ownership may be a source of comparative advantage through potential for reduction in 
agency costs and maximization of firm value (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), suggesting that family owners might monitor firms more effectively. 
Moreover, founding families tend to be a sustained long-term presence in firms, and this 
long-term commitment may incline them to invest in long-term projects rather than 
shorter horizons. It also offers a degree of stability which may allow them to enjoy a 
lower cost of debt financing and maintain longer relationships with external bodies such 
as suppliers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). From another perspective, however, founding 
family ownership may be considered as conducting inefficient corporate governance, as 
family owners are in a position, and have motives, to expropriate wealth from outside 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
This may result in suboptimal investment decisions, excessive compensation and 
substantial influence in selecting managers and directors, which can impede the efforts 
of more capable third parties in managing firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
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For these reasons, family ownership may be a deterrent to foreign investors. Evidence 
that this may be so is provided by Doidge et al. (2007) and Leuz et al. (2008 ) whose 
findings reveal that U.S. investors hold fewer shares in foreign firms where large blocks 
of shares are held by insiders (e.g., managers and families), increasing the vulnerability 
to expropriation by controlling insiders. Kho et al. (2007) report a similar result from a 
study of a large sample of equity markets in 46 emerging countries after a period of 
liberalization
1
. They find least home bias of U.S. investors towards countries in which 
ownership by corporate insiders is low and countries in which ownership by corporate 
insiders has fallen. The same study also contains firm-level data for Korea, which show 
that foreign investors invest more in firms with lower insider ownership. Lang et al. 
(2004), across 27 countries, find that US investment analysts tend not to follow firms 
with concentrated family ownership, resulting in less attention to these firms and lower 
valuation. 
From the above, it appears that foreign investors consider family ownership as a 
negative signal when they consider investing in foreign firms. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that firms with founding family ownership are less likely to attract foreign 
investment.  
Concerns about founding family ownership are greatest when family members are also 
in executive positions, as indicated by the findings of the 2001 McKinsey's "Emerging 
Markets Investors' Opinion Surveys". Respondents indicate that the most influential 
corporate level factor in their decision whether or not to invest in emerging markets is 
the "distinction between company and family interests" where family ownership and 
control tendency are associated with poor corporate governance (Coombes and Watson, 
                                                 
1
 Jordan is not included in this study.  
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2001; and Mobius, 2001). Such a view may be supported by the theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence offered by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Morck et al. (1988), to 
the effect that agency conflicts are increased where ownership and control are 
combined.   
In Jordan, as in many other developing countries, many firms are owned and controlled 
by the founding family
1
. For family firms, board control is to be maintained and 
frequently dominated by the controlling family. Family members play a crucial role in 
the day to day business of the firm. These members have a strong power to interfere in 
the affairs of the company. They can hire and fire managers at their discretion. Hence, 
the managers are likely to focus on controlling owners‟ interest rather than on 
maximizing value for all shareholders. They feel a responsibility to sustain ownership 
control and play a role in management to ensure that the operation of the company, 
(which is a family asset) is aligned with family interests (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2006).  
Therefore, our second hypothesis is that firms with family ownership are even less 
likely to attract investment from foreign investors when the founding family members 
participate in the boards. No study, that we are aware of, has attempted to combine 
founding-family ownership and control (i.e. founding family involvement in the board 
of directors) in investigating the impact on foreign ownership. By doing so, this study 
provides a new contribution to the literature.  
                                                 
1
 For example Jordan Chemical Industries by the Al Taher family, Ready Mix Concrete and 
Construction Supplies by Al Alaammy family, Specialized Investment Compounds by the Al 
Salfiti family, Printing and Packaging by the Al Fakori family, Darwish Al-Khalili & Sons by 
Al Khalili family, Jordan Industrial Resources by the Al Muasher family and Arab International 
Food Factories by the Abu Khadijeh family etc. 
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4.3.2. Local Institutional investors 
The role of large institutional investors in monitoring corporate management has been 
well recognized in the literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mitton, 2002; and Lins, 
2003). It is assumed that large investors such as institutional investors have greater 
incentives to be involved in monitoring than small ones, because they can bear the high 
fixed costs of collecting information on management behaviour. They are said to have 
greater expertise and more power to act rationally (Dong and Ozkan, 2008), and to be 
capable of influencing management decisions directly through their ownership or 
indirectly by trading their shares (Gillan and Starks, 2003). They are therefore in a 
position to influence the performance of the company by contributing to, monitoring or 
ratifying the board's decisions, and pursuing an agenda of safeguarding shareholders' 
interests by focusing on projects that add value for them.  
In many emerging countries, however, this view may not hold, due to 
underdevelopment of local capital markets and institutions, deficiencies in the 
regulatory system, and political constraints (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). It is also 
possible that institutional investors (e.g. bank, insurance companies, and pension funds) 
may be induced to cooperate with managers, rather than challenge their decisions, in 
order to protect existing or potential business relationships with the firm (Pound, 1998; 
Cornett et al., 2007). Thus, their loyalty to corporate management may be greater than 
to shareholders, their own holding notwithstanding, preventing them from reacting to 
management actions that are not in line with the interests of shareholders (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008).  
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In light of the above, it can therefore be reasonably assumed that local financial 
institutions have a detrimental effect on foreign investment, leading to the hypothesis 
that: local financial institutional ownership negatively affects foreign ownership. 
4.3.3. Board Characteristics 
Board characteristics are, especially, an important signal for good value of the firm 
when foreign investors invest into emerging markets, where the regulatory environment, 
such as reporting requirements and market intermediaries, may be deficient (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1999). Board characteristics are taken into account by foreign investors 
when making investment decisions; three quarters of the 200 institutional investors 
(mostly from the US) who responded to corporate governance market surveys by 
McKinsey & Company (2000) rated board practices, particularly independent directors, 
at least as important as financial performance in the evaluation of potential investments, 
especially in emerging markets.   
Board effectiveness depends on board size and the proportion of outsiders in the board. 
The board, as the agent of the shareholders, is an internal governance body established 
to monitor management behaviour on behalf of shareholders and to protect them from 
managers who may pursue their personal interests or otherwise act in a manner 
detrimental to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There is evidence that the 
overall size of the board affects the quality of monitoring (Yermack, 1996). However, 
existing studies provide mixed evidence as to the effect of board size. Some researchers 
claim that large boards reduce value because, as board size increases, difficulties of 
coordination, communication and process outweigh the advantages of having more 
people to draw on (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; and Florackis et al. 2009). 
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However, in Jordan, board size was found not to vary significantly. It is possible, also, 
that in boards run by funding family shareholders, the size of the board is not related to 
its efficiency, since the negotiation and decision making is done in a much more 
informal way. Others argue that larger boards are more effective because they can offer 
a wider perspective and better guidance of the strategic options of the firm (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1991).  
Some researchers link the supervisory activity of the board to the weight of outsiders 
(non-executives), on the basis that board independence is necessary for effective 
monitoring of management. Non-executive directors are said to provide more 
independent monitoring and to be more likely to be independent of the CEO (Jensen, 
1993; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). In addition, non-executive directors may also 
contribute positively to the quality of directors' deliberations and decisions and provide 
strategic direction leading to enhanced performance (Pearce and Zahra 1992). However, 
there are studies that find exactly the opposite results. For example, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Franks et al. (2001), and Florackis et 
al. (2009) suggest that non-executive directors are less knowledgeable about the firm, 
are too busy to contribute effectively, and do not have the necessary skills for the job. 
Moreover, they may owe their appointment to management, making them reluctant to 
challenge management decisions, in order to safeguard their positions in the future.  
In the Jordanian context, there is no available empirical evidence on the impact on 
corporate governance of board size and non-executive directors. However, recent 
reports
1
 indicate a widespread tendency for boards of Jordanian companies to lack 
                                                 
1
 See for example: World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): 
Corporate Governance Country Assessment (Jordan) (June, 2004); and Corporate Governance 
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independence from controlling shareholders and from management. Attention is drawn 
to an absence of rules governing the composition of the board of directors and, 
inadequate guidelines governing the balance of power between executive and non-
executive directors, and the lack of awareness of the concept of independent directors. 
Furthermore, Jordan shares with many other developing countries a tendency for 
management and the board of directors to be dominated by members of the founding 
families. 
Given the mixed theoretical and empirical evidence, in this Chapter, we test the exact 
relationship between board characteristics (i.e. board size and non-executive directors 
ratio) and foreign ownership for Jordanian firms. However, no predication is made as to 
the direction of any relationship, given the prevalence, discussed above and as 
explained in the following parts of this chapter, of domination by the controlling family, 
whether as chairman of board, board members or in senior management positions.  
4.3.4. The Role of Other Control Variables 
In order to understand whether differences in foreign ownership across listed companies 
are related to firm-specific differences in corporate governance mechanisms, it is 
necessary to examine other determinants and organizational characteristics as well. The 
selection of control variables is determined by literature and data availability.  
 In our analysis, we include a number of control variables that are suggested in the 
literature (i.e. Kang and Stulz, 1997 and Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001), such as 
market-to-book-ratio, size, leverage and dividends. 
                                                                                                                                               
in the Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan countries of the MENA region: MENA Regional 
Corporate Governance Working Group (2003). 
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To control for possible influence of a firm‟s growth potential, the model includes 
market-to-book-ratio, as a proxy for future growth potential. High market-to-book-ratio 
firms have a high potential for growth opportunity in future while low market-to-book-
ratio firms have low growth potential in the future. If a high potential growth firm is an 
important factor for foreign investors, the coefficient of the market-to-book-ratio will be 
significant, with a positive sign.  
As for firm size, this can be significant in several ways. Foreign investors may favour 
large firms because they are less subjected to information asymmetries and because 
more information is generally available regarding large firms, and thus foreign investors 
are likely to have more knowledge about large rather than small firms (Kang and Stulz, 
1997; Lin and Shiu, 2003). It is usually easier for larger firms to access external finance 
and they can borrow on better terms (Ferri and Jones, 1979), as larger firms are 
generally more established than smaller firms. They also tend to have substantial assets 
that can be used as collateral. For all these reasons, it is likely that large firms will be 
more attractive to foreign investors. Therefore, a positive relationship between size and 
foreigners' holdings is expected. 
Leverage may encourage lenders to monitor, as argued by Stiglitz (1985), and provide 
tax shields as predicted by Modigliani and Miller (1963). Ross (1977) adds that higher 
leverage may be construed as a positive indicator of the firm's ability to service a large 
amount of debt. However, too much debt increases the risk of bankruptcy, limits the 
firms' ability to raise new debt and subsequently may prevent firms from seizing 
valuable investment opportunities (Myers, 1977 and Harris and Raviv, 1990). Hence, 
the influence of leverage on foreign ownership is ambiguous.   
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Finally, dividend payment may reduce free resources in the firm and mitigate 
governance conflicts (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, a positive link between dividend payout 
and foreign investment is expected. However, higher dividends may be related to 
absence of growth opportunities for the firm. Firms with few profitable investment 
opportunities may pay higher dividends (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001). Lin and Shiu 
(2003) propose that foreign investors tend to hold more shares of firms with lower 
dividend yields to mitigate the negative impact of disharmonious taxation. Therefore, a 
negative relationship between dividend and foreigners' holdings is expected. 
4.4. Data and Methodology  
4.4.1. Data  
For our empirical analysis, we use a sample of publicly listed companies over the period 
2004-2006.  Information on firm's ownership, board and firm-specific accounting data 
are hand-collected from secondary sources, primarily the mandatory disclosure reports 
of these firms to the Jordan Securities Commission. The frequency of all variables is 
annual, and the values are measured as of the end of December for each year.  
The annual reports of Jordanian public trading companies are prepared in accordance 
with and are considered consistent with international accounting standards, and are 
subject to external auditing, to certify that they are prepared in accordance with 
statutory and professional principles (international auditing standards). Finally, listed 
companies have been required since 1997 to form auditing committees from the board 
of directors, which exercise oversight over the preparation of annual reports. As a 
further check on reliability, data pertaining to  Jordanian public trading companies are 
also obtained from other sources,  such as the Amman Stock Exchange annual company 
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guide, Jordan Securities Commission, the Amman Stock Exchange, the Securities 
Depository Centre, and the companies' websites. These sources are used to verify the 
figures and statistics collected from companies' annual reports.  
The name(s) of the company founding family is derived from the Memorandum of 
Association of each company under investigation, obtained via the archive held by the 
Companies Control Department, a unit at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. As a 
further robustness check, three experts from the financial sector, stock market and 
Companies Control Department gave their insight in order to correctly identify the 
founding families. However, it is uncommon in Jordan for two or more families to have 
the same family name. Furthermore, it is easy to check whether the founding family is 
still in the firm or not, because the average age of Jordanian firms, in our sample, is low 
(i.e. 20 years).  
Our initial sample is the set of all companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange from 
2004 to 2006. The final sample has been constructed as follows. First: we exclude 
financial firms (e.g., banks, insurance companies, and diversified financial services) due 
to the differences in the applicable regulatory requirements. Second, a firm should have 
been listed for at least one full year as of the end of 2006.  Finally, suspended or floated 
price companies are excluded due to illiquidity and incomplete data (i.e. missing data). 
These criteria provide us with a total of 360 firm-year observations across three years 
(representing 80 per cent of the total non-financial listed companies).  
Table 4.2 presents the number of listed companies, the number of non-financial 
companies, and the number of companies in the sample. 
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Table 4.2: The number of the sample during the 2004-2006 periods 
 2004 2005 2006 Full Period 
No. of listed companies 192 201 227 620 
No. of non-financial companies* 138 146 165 449 
No. of firms in the sample 109 117 134 360 
Proportion of sample to non-
financial companies  
78.99% 80.14% 81.21% 80.18% 
This table presents the number of listed companies, the number of non-financial companies, and 
the number of companies in the sample.  
* Non-financial firms include the following sectors: Health Care Services, Educational 
Services, Hotels & Tourism, Transportation, Technology & Communication, Media, Utilities & 
Energy, and Commercial Services, Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, Chemical Industries, 
Paper & Carton, Printing & Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & Extracting, Tobacco & 
Cigarettes, Engineering & Construction., Electrical Industries, Textiles, Leather & Clothing, 
Glass & Ceramics and Real Estate. Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports. 
 
4.4.2. Dependent Variable - Foreign Ownership   
The dependent variable is foreign ownership. Two different definitions are used. First, 
we measure it by the percentage of ownership held by all foreign investors (that is, with 
shareholding of 5 per cent or more); and secondly the percentage ownership held by 
foreign investors at the end of the financial year, regardless of percentage, is used as a 
measure to see if the explanatory variables results depend much on the threshold of 
foreign shares (i.e. that is, shareholding of 5 per cent or more). Data for foreign 
ownership obtained from the annual reports for all listed non-financial firms during the 
period 2004 to 2006 are compared with data in the Amman Stock Exchange annual 
company guide for verification purposes.  
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4.4.3. Independent Variables  
We also include in our analysis a set of corporate governance mechanisms and control 
variables as follows: the percentage of shares held by founding family and their 
relatives (Founding family ownership); the ratio of the number of founding family 
directors to the number of total directors on the board (Founding family board 
directors); the percentage of shares held by local institutional investors with equity 
ownership greater than 5 per cent (Institutional investors); the number of directors on 
the board (Board size), and the ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the 
total number of directors on the board (Non-executive directors).  
The empirical specification also controls for firm specific-characteristics. Market-to-
book-ratio is the growth potential measure. Market-to-book-ratio is defined as the ratio 
of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to 
book value of assets.   
Size is a firm's size proxied by the sales of the company in constant prices (in 
logarithm); Leverage is the ratio of total debt (short and long debt) to total assets. 
Dividend is the ratio of dividend payments to total assets. Finally, industry dummies are 
also incorporated to capture industry-specific effects. Table 4.3 provides a list of the 
variables used in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
Table 4.3: Definition of Variables 
Variable   Definition   
Dependent Variable 
Large foreign ownership The percentage of outstanding equity held by all foreign 
shareholders (that is, with shareholdings of 5 per cent or more). 
Total foreign ownership The percentage of market value of foreign investors' equity 
divided by total market capitalization for each firm.  
Independent Variables: 
Founding family 
ownership  
The percentage of equity ownership held by founding family 
and their relatives. 
Founding family board 
directors ratio 
The ratio of the number of founding family directors to the 
number of total directors on the board. 
Institutional investors  The percentage of outstanding equity held by local banks, 
insurance and, financial firms and pension funds (that is, with 
shareholdings of 5 per cent or more). 
Board size The total number of directors on the board. 
Non-executive directors The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. 
Control Variables: 
Market-to-book ratio The ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value 
of equity, plus the market value of equity to the book value of 
assets. 
Size The natural log of the total sales in 2004 prices.  
Leverage  The ratio of book value of short-term plus long-term debt 
divided by the book value of  total assets 
Dividend  The ratio of dividend payments to total assets. 
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4.4.4. Methodology  
We examine the determinants of foreign ownership by utilizing the cross sectional 
average methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), using the following 
equation:  
Foreign ownership it = αi + β1 Founding family ownership it + β2 Founding family board 
directors it + β3 Founding family ownership* Founding family board directors it + β4 
Institutional investors it + β5 Board size it + β6 Non-executive directors it + β7 Market-to-
book-ratio it + β8 Size it + β9 Leverage it + β10 Dividends it + ε it 
 
In particular, the dependent variable is measured at some time t, while for the 
independent variables we use average-past values. Specifically, the dependent variable 
(i.e. large foreign ownership and total foreign ownership) is measured in year 2006, 
while for the independent variables (i.e. founding family ownership, founding family 
board directors ratio, large domestic institutional investors, board size, non-executive 
directors, market-to-book-ratio, size, leverage and dividends); we take average values 
for two years (i.e. 2004 and 2005). Using average values for the explanatory variables is 
in an attempt to mitigate problems that might arise due to short-term fluctuations and 
extreme values in our data. Furthermore, using past values reduces the likelihood of 
observed relations reflecting the effects of foreign ownership on firm-specific factors 
(see also, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, for a similar methodology).  
4.4.5. Sample Characteristics   
Table 4.4 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The 
average large foreign ownership ranges from 8.71 per cent in 2004 to 12.16 per cent in 
2006 and the average total foreign ownership ranges from 12.55 per cent in 2004 to 
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18.33 per cent in 2006. These results reflect a significant increase in the foreign 
ownership on ASE during the period of study.  
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for Foreign Ownership, Independent and Control 
Variables Used in the Study. 
                           Full Sample 2004 2005 2006 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Dependent Variables     
Large foreign ownership  10.92 8.71 11.56 12.16 
Total foreign ownership  16.09 12.55 16.83 18.33 
Independent Variables     
Founding family ownership 22.09 22.86 21.57 20.94 
Founding family board directors  24.74 24.97 24.53 24.73 
Institutional investors 19.42 22.42 19.20 17.17 
Board size  8.32 8.46 8.35 8.17 
Non-executive directors 86.90 85.25 87.17 87.73 
Control Variables     
Market-to-book-ratio 1.62 1.48 1.75 1.61 
Size 6.68 6.65 6.72 6.67 
Leverage 13.29 12.96 13.03 13.78 
Dividends 3.28 3.68 3.6 2.69 
No. of observations 360 109 117 134 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. Variables 
are measured at the end of each year.  Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 4.3. 
 
 
The average equity (in the sample period) held by the founding family and their 
relatives averages 22.09 per cent. On average Family board members represent 24.74 
per cent of the total board size of companies for the entire period and this value ranges 
from 0 to 100 per cent of the board size. Institutional investors' ownership accounts for 
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about 19.42 per cent of total shares. This ratio shows a marked decreasing pattern. The 
average ordinary shareholding by local institutional investors decreases by 4 percentage 
points over the three years, falling from 22.42 per cent in 2004 to 17.17 per cent in 
2006.  
The average board size is 8.32 directors. In terms of board composition, the average 
proportion of non-executive directors is 86.90 per cent and this value is relatively 
constant over time, suggesting that non-executive directors continue to be in the 
majority in Jordanian boards. On average, firms tend to have at least seven non-
executive directors. The proportion of non-executive directors in the Jordanian boards is 
higher than has been reported in other emerging countries, for example, 50 per cent in 
Malaysia (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), 67 per cent in India (Ghosh, 2006) and 82 per 
cent in Bahrain (Hussain and Mallin, 2002). Regarding the control variables, the mean 
value for market-to-book-ratio is 1.62, the average market sale is 23.09 million 
Jordanian Dinars (JD)
1
 (i.e. about US$ 32.56 million), the leverage ratio is 13.29 per 
cent and the average dividend ratio is 3.28 per cent. 
Table 4.5 presents the Pearson Correlation for the variables used on the analysis. The 
results are generally in line with our expectations. Foreign ownership is negatively 
related to family ownership and founding family board directors. The negative 
correlations with family ownership and family board directors suggest that foreign 
investors avoid family-controlled firms. Institutional investors, too, are negatively 
correlated with foreign ownership, suggesting that their monitoring effect on 
management is perceived as inefficient. Finally, foreign ownership is positively related 
to market-to-book-ratio, and to size, but negatively related to dividends. 
                                                 
1
 The Jordanian Dinar (JD) is pegged to the U.S. Dollar since 1995 (JD 1 = $ 1.41). 
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Table 4.5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the variables used in the study. 
     (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) VIF 
(1) Large foreign ownership  1.00          - 
(2) Founding family ownership -0.26* 1.00         1.13 
(3) Founding family board directors -0.28* 0.07* 1.00        1.07 
(4) Institutional investors -0.25* 0.35* -0.04 1.00       1.10 
(5) Board size -0.10 -0.28* 0.03 -0.05 1.00      1.50 
(6) Non-executive directors  0.07 -0.23* -0.19** -0.06 0.23* 1.00     1.19 
(7) Market-to-book-ratio 0.11* 0.03 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.06 1.00    1.08 
(8) Size 0.14** -0.07 0.01 -0.08 0.45* -0.04 -0.01 1.00   1.42 
(9) Leverage  0.12 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 0.15 0.12 -0.08 0.30* 1.00  1.24 
(10) Dividends -0.15** -0.16 0.02 -0.11 0.17** -0.11 0.18** 0.05 -0.20** 1.00 1.15 
This table displays the Pearson Correlation Coefficient and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the main variables used in the study. ** and * indicate the 
correlation is significant at the 1% and 5%  levels respectively. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 4.3.  
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To test for possible multicollinearity (Table 4.5), we compute the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each independent variable and the largest one is 1.50, well below the 
rule of thumb cutoff of 10.0 for multiple regression models (Gujarati, 2003). Thus, we 
conclude that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem in our study. 
4.5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we will focus on the empirical tests and discussion of results on the 
relationship between firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms and foreign investment.   
4.5.1. Univariate Analysis  
In Table 4.6, as our first step in examining the relation between firm-level corporate 
governance and foreign ownership, we report univariate mean-comparison test results 
of the sample firm subgroups categorized on the basis of above and below median 
values for several firm-specific characteristics. We use t-test to test the hypothesis that 
firms with above median values of these characteristics differ from firms with below 
median values with respect to foreign ownership. The results are in line with our 
expectations and strongly support our hypothesis that founding family ownership and 
founding family control exert a significant influence on foreign investors‟ decisions. 
More specifically, we find that firms with above median founding family ownership and 
founding family members on the board of directors have significantly lower foreign 
ownership, which possibly suggests that foreign investors underweight Jordanian firms 
with founding family ownership and control. These results are statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level.  
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We also find that firms with above median values of institutional investors and high 
dividend-paying firms have significantly lower foreign ownership. On the other hand, 
we find that firms with above median market-to-book-ratio, size, leverage and non-
executive directors have relatively high foreign ownership. 
Table 4.6: Univariate results 
  
Average foreign 
ownership of 
above variable 
median 
Average foreign 
ownership of 
below variable 
median 
t-test 
     
Founding family ownership 9.46 27.62 -4.40*** 
Founding family board directors 15.97 29.03 -3.39*** 
 Institutional investors 14.04 24.78 -2.77*** 
 Board size 8.09 8.14 -0.118 
 Non-executive directors  89.69 85.04 2.08** 
Market-to-book-ratio 1.86 1.66 1.96* 
Size 3.03 2.53 2.09** 
Leverage  16.42 11.06 2.14** 
Dividends 2.1 3.80 -2.03** 
This table reports mean comparison of large foreign ownership analyzing high (above median) 
versus low (below median) founding family ownership, founding family board directors, 
institutional investors, board size, non-executive directors, market-to-book ratio, size, leverage 
and dividends. t-test statistic is used to compare the mean difference. Definitions for all 
variables are provided in Table 4.3. ***,** and * indicate that the mean difference is 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Taken together, the univariate results suggest that foreign ownership tends to be lower 
for firms with high founding family ownership, high founding family members in the 
board, high institutional investors and high dividend-paying firms. On the other hand, 
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foreign ownership tends to be higher for firms with high market-to-book-ratio, large 
firms and with high non-executive directors ratio. 
4.5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 
In this section, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis to investigate the 
relationship between large foreign ownership and several firm-specific characteristics 
by focusing on the impact of founding family ownership and control on foreign 
investors.  
The results presented in Table 4.7 relate to the level of large foreign ownership and are 
based on a cross-sectional regression approach. We start by estimating our baseline 
model (model 1), in which we include only the control variables. In general, the 
estimated coefficients are consistent with our predictions and with findings reported in 
the literature. Specifically, we find that large foreign investors is positively associated 
with market-to-book-ratio possibly indicating that firms with higher growth potential 
tend to attract more foreign investment. Moreover, we find that foreign investors have a 
strong preference for large firms. Foreign investors prefer holding shares in large firms 
because information asymmetries between local and foreign investors may be relatively 
less in large firms. This finding is consistent with that of Kang and Stulz, (1997) in 
Japan; Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) in Sweden; and Lin and Shiu (2003) in Taiwan. 
Firm size is an influential consideration in foreign investment decisions due to concerns 
about liquidity and transaction costs (Ferreira and Matos, 2008).  
Foreign investors seem to avoid firms that pay high dividends. This may be because 
higher dividends are associated with lack of growth opportunities for the firms or to 
reduce the impact of unfavourable taxation. This is in line with previous studies that 
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find a negative relationship between dividend and foreign ownership (Dahlquist and 
Robertsson, 2001) in Swedish firms. Similarly, Ferreira and Matos (2008) use a 
comprehensive data set of financial institution equity holdings from 27 countries around 
the world and find that foreign institutions tend to avoid high dividend-paying stocks. 
Finally, leverage is not related to the level of foreign investment.  
In model 2, we add our main explanatory variable, founding family ownership. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find a negative and significant relationship (at the 
1 per cent level) between founding family ownership and foreign ownership. This 
finding suggests that foreign ownership is likely to be lower in firms in which founding 
family ownership is high.  
Whilst it is confirmed that founding family ownership indeed affects foreign investors 
negatively, it still remains unclear whether it is crucial for foreign investors how 
families use their control. Specifically, does it make any difference whether founding 
families are represented in the firm (i.e. the presence of founding family members in the 
board of directors) or not? Therefore, to shed some light on this question, in model 3, 
we add also founding family board directors ratio and, in model 4 we add the interaction 
term between founding family ownership and founding family board directors among 
explanatory variables to test our hypothesis that firms with founding family ownership 
are even less likely to attract foreign investors when founding family members are also 
in the board. 
The estimated coefficient of founding family board directors is negative and significant 
(at the 1 per cent) as expected. Furthermore, the interaction term between founding 
family ownership and founding family board members is also significant and negative. 
The results provide support for our earlier prediction that founding family ownership 
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and founding family control exerts a significant influence on foreign investors‟ 
decisions of Jordanian firms. More specifically, this finding suggests that foreign 
investors have lower equity holdings in family controlled firms (i.e. when founding 
family members are in the board of directors)
1
. The results for other firm-specific 
characteristics are no different from those reported in previous models. In particular, we 
find that firms with higher growth potential tend to attract more foreign investment. 
Moreover, foreign investors have a strong preference for large firms. Foreign investors 
seem to avoid firms that pay high dividends and finally, leverage is not related to the 
level of foreign investment.  
We next test the impact of local institutional investors on foreign ownership. The results 
are reported in model 5 Table 4.7. The estimated coefficient of institutional ownership 
is negative and significant at 1 per cent, suggesting that firms with large institutional 
ownership are related to lower foreign holdings. This finding is in line with our earlier 
prediction. Specifically, this finding provides support for our expectation that 
institutional investors in emerging markets are inefficient monitors and are thus unlikely 
to exercise an effective governance role.  
An alternative interpretation of the result is that, in a small country like Jordan, a major 
characteristic is the relative lack of local institutions that could effectively serve as an 
external governance mechanism against poorly performing management. The fact that 
mutual funds are not widespread in Jordan suggests that a large portion of the local 
institutional investors are banks, insurance and pension funds such as the Social 
                                                 
1
 We re-estimated our regressions without founding family ownership with a view that they may 
be substitutes. However, our results remain unchanged and hence the results are not reported.  
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Security Corporation Investment Unit
1
. In principle, banks and the Social Security 
Corporation Investment Unit are in a position to act as primary monitoring agents for 
other shareholders, especially minority shareholders. However, their monitoring ability 
is very low due to at least three reasons. Firstly, banks in Jordan generally have 
significant business relationships with companies, since most banks in Jordan are 
family-controlled
2
, individually or through family related group companies, and thus, 
their monitoring ability is weak. Secondly, the nominees of the Social Security 
Investment Unit on the board of many Jordanian firms are typically bureaucrats with 
minimal expertise in corporate matters. Thirdly, even if these nominees are equipped for 
the task of oversight in corporate matters, they do not have a strong incentive to be 
effective monitors, as their tenure and career prospects are rarely affected by the 
performance of the companies in which they serve on the board as nominees. In such a 
context, this finding can also be regarded as consistent with the view that some 
institutional investors are less inclined to play an effective monitoring role, since they 
desire to protect their existing or potential business relations with firms (Pound, 1998; 
Cornett et al., 2007) and with Ferreira and Matos' (2008) finding that in the case of grey 
Institutional Ownership (i.e. banks, insurance companies, and pension funds), their 
loyalty to corporate management may be greater than to shareholders, their own holding 
                                                 
1
 The Social Security Corporation is a government-owned and managed entity whose main 
objective is to provide pensions to all insured persons after retirement or in case of disability or 
to their heirs after death and to insure them against Work Injuries and Occupational Diseases.  
The Social Security Corporation has an investment unit called "The Investment Unit", which 
was established in 2003 for investing the funds of the Social Security Corporation. 
The stock portfolio of the Social Security Corporation is considered as the biggest portfolio in 
the ASE, it is considered also a well diversified portfolio of 3 billion JD (Al Fanik, 2006). 
2
 For example Jordan Bank owned by the Al Kori family, Union Bank owned by the Salfiti 
family, Jordan Arab Investment Bank by the Al-Qadi family, Jordan National Bank by the Al-
Muasher family, Jordan Commercial Bank by the Al-Sayegh family.  
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notwithstanding, preventing them from reacting to management actions that are not in 
line with the interests of shareholders. 
We next consider the role of board characteristics in determining foreign ownership in 
Jordan. In model 6, we add board variables (i.e. board size and non-executive directors). 
The findings show that board size is significant and negatively related to foreign 
ownership. This result suggests that foreign investors perceive large boards to be 
inefficient monitors of the management. This result is in line with the empirical 
evidence in corporate governance literature: large boards encounter problems of 
coordination, control, and decision-making (see, e.g. Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 
1998; and Florackis et al., 2009 among others). 
The result for non-executive ratio is insignificant. This result may be interpreted in the 
light of the claims, reviewed previously, that in most companies in Jordan, an average 
board lacks independence from controlling shareholders and from management. We 
have also noted the reports of international bodies concerning the absence of rules 
governing the composition of the board of directors. Guidelines governing the balance 
of power between executive and non-executive directors are inadequate and there is no 
established concept of independent directors. 
To summarize our results, we find that foreign ownership tends to be lower for firms 
with a high founding family ownership and control (i.e. high founding family member 
in the board), high institutional investors, large board size and high dividend-paying 
firms. On the hand, foreign ownership tends to be higher for firms with high market-to-
book-ratio and large firms. 
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Table 4.7: Cross sectional regressions prediction of large foreign ownership. 
Dependent Variable : Large Foreign Shareholders 
Independent variables Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Founding family ownership - - -0.331***   
(-3.91) 
-0.321***   
(-4.80) 
-0.171**     
(-2.11) 
-0.092**     
(-2.05) 
-0.159*       
(-1.90) 
Founding family board directors - - - -0.34***     
(-4.26) 
-0.233**     
(-2.02) 
-0.213**     
(-2.39) 
-0.218**       
(-2.29) 
Founding family ownership * 
Founding family board directors 
- - - - -0.011**     
(-2.01) 
-0.013***   
(-2.97) 
-0.011**     
(-2.43) 
Intuitional investors - - 
- - - 
-0.304***    
(-3.60) 
-0.292***    
(-3.36) 
Board size -/+  - - 
- - - -1.902**     
(-2.09) 
Non-executive directors -/+ - - - - - -0.033         
(-0.28) 
Market-to-book-ratio + 5.463** 
(2.37) 
5.643*** 
(2.88) 
4.879*** 
(2.63) 
4.997*** 
(2.74) 
3.863** 
(2.15) 
3.364* 
(1.81) 
Size + 3.667** 
(2.05) 
3.081** 
(2.13) 
3.791** 
(2.40) 
3.768** 
(2.40) 
4.133*** 
(2.98) 
5.202*** 
(3.87) 
Leverage -/+ 0.002   
(0.01) 
0.040   
(0.22) 
-0.011          
(-0.06) 
-0.025         
(-0.15) 
-0.114          
(-0.71) 
-0.094          
(-0.64) 
Dividend -/+ -1.272***   
(-3.21) 
-1.243***   
(-3.31) 
-1.30***     
(-3.80) 
-1.351***    
(-3.82) 
-1.482***       
(-4.28) 
-1.243***       
(-3.59) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R²  0.19 0.30 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.51 
No. of observations  134 134 134 134 134 134 
This table presents cross-sectional regression predicting foreign ownership. The dependent variable is large foreign ownership measured in 2006 and the 
independent variables average values for two years (i.e. 2004-2005). Model 1 is the baseline model while models 2, 3, 4, 5and 6 add different ownership 
and board variables. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. For the estimation, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used.  See Table 4.3 for exact definitions of variables. 
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4.5.3. Foreign Ownership: Alternative Definition 
In order to assess to what extent the findings reported above depend on the threshold of 
foreign equity shares, in Table 4.8 we present new cross sectional regression with 
average values by using an alternative definition for the foreign ownership. Specifically, 
instead of using large foreign shareholders (that is, these with shareholdings of 5 per 
cent or more) as our dependent variable, we use all ownership held by foreign investors, 
regardless of percentage, to see if the previous results still hold. 
Similar to our earlier findings, the results suggest that foreign investors consider 
founding family ownership and control (i.e. the presence of the founding family 
members in the board of directors) undesirable when they invest in the Jordanian stock 
market. Specifically, our finding suggests that foreign ownership is likely to be lower in 
firms in which founding family ownership is high. Moreover, firms with founding 
family ownership are even less likely to attract foreign investors when the founding 
family members are also present in the board of directors. Additionally, firms with more 
institutional ownership are less likely to attract investment from foreign investors.  
The negative relationship between foreign investors and board size may be because 
large boards are thought to dilute the coordination, communication and decision making 
compared to small boards (Florackis et al., 2009).  Finally, the results for firm-specific 
characteristic are no different from those in Table 4.7. Specifically, firms with high 
growth potential are still positively and significantly related to foreign ownership, 
foreign investors have a strong preference for large firms, and they are averse to firms 
that pay high dividends. Leverage shows no association with foreign ownership.  
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Table 4.8: Cross sectional regressions prediction of Total foreign ownership. 
Dependent Variable: Total Foreign Ownership 
Independent variables Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Founding family ownership - - -0.31***     
(-4.49) 
-0.302***   
(-4.51) 
-0.265***     
(-3.01) 
-0.181**     
(-2.01) 
-0.251***       
(-2.73) 
Founding family board directors - - - -0.141***     
(-3.23) 
-0.127**     
(-2.05) 
-0.117**     
(-2.43) 
-0.122**       
(-2.39) 
Founding family ownership * 
Founding family board directors 
- - - - -0.001         
(-0.43) 
-0.003         
(-0.74) 
-0.008         
(-1.06) 
Intuitional investors - - - - - -0.329***    
(-3.76) 
-0.322***    
(-3.56) 
Board size -/+ - - - - - -1.766*       
(-1.89) 
Non-executive directors -/+ - - - - - -0.100         
(-0.75) 
Market-to-book-ratio  + 4.713** 
(2.03) 
4.882** 
(2.51) 
4.244** 
(2.24) 
4.269** 
(2.24) 
3.981*   
(1.95) 
3.035* 
(1.67) 
Size + 4.961*** 
(2.69) 
4.412** 
(2.47) 
5.00*** 
(2.94) 
4.995*** 
(2.93) 
5.381*** 
(3.60) 
5.381*** 
(3.60) 
Leverage -/+ 0.041   
(0.21) 
0.076   
(0.43) 
0.033          
(0.20) 
0.031          
(0.17) 
-0.066          
(-0.41) 
-0.066          
(-0.43) 
Dividend -/+ -1.273***   
(-2.85) 
-1.246***   
(-2.83) 
-1.295***     
(-3.13) 
-1.311***    
(-3.12) 
-1.449***       
(-3.44) 
-1.449***       
(-3.44) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R²  0.20 0.29 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.45 
No. of observations  134 134 134 134 134 134 
This table provides the results from cross sectional regression analysis predicting foreign ownership. The dependent variable is total foreign ownership 
measured in 2006 and the independent variables average values for two years (i.e. 2004-2005). Model 1 is the baseline model while models 2, 3, 4, 5 and 
6 add different ownership and board variables. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. For the estimation, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used. See Table 4.3 for exact definitions of variables. 
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4.5.4. Additional Test: Probit Regression 
In order to provide further insights into the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm-specific characteristic on foreign investment, we present an additional test. For 
this purpose, we use a probit model to investigate the relationship between foreign 
ownership and corporate governance mechanisms. In this model, foreign ownership is a 
dummy variable, which takes value one if the share of equity of foreign investors is 
equal or more than 5 per cent and zero otherwise
1
. We use the following regression 
model: 
Yit* = α 0 + βXit + ε it      
Where Yit* is the dependent variable, which is unobserved; the choices that are 
observed are: 
Yit = 1 if Yit* > = 5% 
Yit = 0 otherwise  
"i" indexes companies and "t" indexes years. α 0: is the intercept. β: is the vector of 
coefficients. Xit: is the vector of k explanatory variables. ε it : is the random error.  A 
positive (negative) coefficient sign indicates that the explanatory variable is positively 
(negatively) associated with the likelihood of foreign investment over 5 per cent. 
Table 4.9 presents the estimation results of the probit regression. Overall, with the 
exception of market-to-book-ratio, all the significant explanatory variables influence 
foreign ownership likelihood in a manner consistent with the predictions. Our findings 
provide further support for our earlier findings. Specifically, the results show that both 
founding family ownership and family control are negatively and significantly related to 
                                                 
1
 It is worth mentioning that information on foreign ownership of less that 5 per cent is not available, 
since Jordanian listed companies are not required by law to disclose this information 
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foreign ownership. Our finding suggests that foreign ownership is likely to be lower in 
firms in which founding family ownership is high and when the founding family 
members are also present in the board of directors.  
Table 4.9: Results of probit regression on foreign ownership   
Dependent variable: Large foreign ownership dummy 
Explanatory variables Predicted sign   
Founding family ownership - -0.011*                              
(-1.71) 
Founding family board directors - -0.017***                          
(-2.77) 
Founding family ownership * 
Founding family board directors 
- -0.0001                              
(-0.80) 
Intuitional investors - -0.018***                          
(-3.75) 
Board size -/+ -0.081**                             
(-2.09) 
Non-executive directors -/+ 0.006                          
(0.90) 
Market-to-book-ratio + 0.091                          
(1.42) 
Size + 0.575***                    
(3.50) 
Leverage -/+ 0.003                          
(0.05) 
Dividend -/+ -0.038**                            
(-2.14) 
Years effects  Yes 
Log-likelihood  -202.937 
Wald test  72.90 
No. of observations  360 
This table presents the results of probit regression of the likelihood of foreign ownership 
estimated over the period 2004-2006. Foreign ownership is a dummy variable, which takes 
value one if the share of equity of foreign investors is equal or more than 5 per cent and zero 
otherwise. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. See Table 4.3 for exact definitions of 
variables.  
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The relationship between institutional ownership and foreign ownership is found to be 
negative and significant at 1 per cent, supporting our hypothesis that institutional 
investors are perceived by foreign investors to be inefficient in monitoring management. 
Consistent with our earlier findings, foreign investors perceive large boards as 
undesirable compared to small boards. We also find that foreign investors have a strong 
preference for large firms and they avoid firms that pay high dividend yields. Finally, 
leverage shows no association with foreign ownership.  
4.5.5. Further Checks 
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate a number of different specifications 
that we do not tabulate for the sake of brevity
1
. First, we present OLS results for the 
pooled regression analysis. In particular, we repeat our regression model (model 6 Table 
4.7). The results strongly support the previous findings. That is, we find significant and 
negative relationships between large foreign ownership and founding family ownership 
and founding family board directors. However, the interaction term between founding 
family ownership and founding family board members is negatively related, but 
insignificant, to foreign ownership. Furthermore, local institutional ownership and 
board size are significant and negatively related to large foreign ownership. With regard 
to control variables, we find that size is positively and significantly related to large 
foreign ownership and dividends are negatively and significantly related to large foreign 
ownership. However, unlike our previous finding, we find that market-to-book-ratio is 
positively related, but insignificant, to foreign ownership. 
 
                                                 
1
 The results are available upon request 
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Second, we repeat our cross sectional regression model (model 6 Table 4.7) and we use 
founding family CEOs instead of founding family board directors to see their effect on 
foreign investment decisions. Furthermore, we interact founding family ownership and 
family CEO to see if the impact of founding family ownership depends on the CEO 
family dummy. This shows us whether the impact of founding family ownership 
increases or decreases in firms where the executive director (CEO) is a founding family 
member. Our results show that founding family ownership and founding family CEOs 
are negatively related to large foreign ownership. However, the interaction term is 
negatively related, but insignificant, with foreign ownership. 
Finally, we repeat our cross sectional regression model (model 6 Table 4.7) after we 
interact founding family ownership with board characteristics (i.e. board size and non-
executive directors) to test if the effect of founding family ownership on foreign 
investment decisions changes with these characteristics. We find no significant effect. 
This result support our earlier findings regarding family ownership and its negative 
effect on foreign investors, because most boards in Jordan, as in many other developing 
countries, are controlled by the large shareholders, which in most cases are families.  
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we utilize firm-level data of Jordanian listed corporations from 2004-
2006 to investigate the relationship between foreign ownership and corporate 
governance. Our analysis attempts to provide insights into two important questions. 
First, how do family ownership and control affect the investment decisions of foreign 
investors in the Jordanian market? Second, how do other potential corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e. institutional investors and board characteristics) and firm-specific 
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characteristics (i.e. market-to-book-ratio, size, leverage and dividends) affect 
investment foreign investors in the Jordanian market? In addition to cross-sectional 
analysis, we also carry out probit regression and two alternative definitions of foreign 
ownership are used, namely, largest foreign ownership and total foreign ownership, to 
confirm the reliability of our findings.  
Our first contribution in this chapter is concerned with the empirical investigation of the 
impact of founding family ownership and control on foreign investment decisions. 
Previous studies in this field have generally investigated the total insider ownership or 
controlling shareholders (i.e. families and management) without taking the identity of 
the insider or controlling shareholder into consideration. Furthermore, very few studies 
have investigated the impact of board structure on foreign ownership. This study, by 
examining the impact of founding and local institutional involvement on foreign 
ownership, advances the knowledge in this field. Second, by using two alternative 
definitions of foreign ownership, namely, large foreign ownership and total foreign 
ownership, we are able to assess to what extent the findings depend on the threshold of 
foreign equity shares. Finally, this is, as far as the researcher is aware, the first attempt 
to analyse investment by foreign investors in relation to corporate governance, 
including both a variety of corporate governance mechanisms and firm specific 
characteristics in an emerging equity market and, more specifically, one of the Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries. 
Our analysis sheds new light on the determinants of foreign investors‟ portfolio choice. 
Our results reveal that founding family ownership and founding family control exert a 
significant influence on foreign investors‟ decisions. Foreign investors equity holdings 
are lower in family controlled firms (i.e. when founding family members are in the 
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board of directors). Institutional investors also appear to make firms less attractive to 
foreign investors. This finding supports the claims by some researchers that some 
institutional investors in emerging markets are ineffective in monitoring because of 
their inclination to protect existing or potential business relations with firms, at the 
expense of their governance role. Board size and proportion of non-executive directors 
also seem to be perceived unfavourably by foreign investors. The findings show that 
both board size and non-executive directors are negatively related to foreign ownership, 
and the relationship is significant for board size. This result suggests that foreign 
investors perceive large boards as encountering problems of coordination, control and 
decision-making. Company specific characteristics are in line with previous literature. 
We find that high growth potential firms and large firms seem to be more attractive to 
foreign investors. Foreign investors seem to avoid firms that pay high dividends. 
Finally, leverage is not related to foreign investors.  
The empirical findings of this study have several policy and management implications. 
First of all, the authorities should seriously consider the possibility of further regulatory 
changes to improve corporate governance practices in Jordanian firms, to enhance the 
attractiveness of the Jordanian stock market relative to other markets in the region. Our 
study could be useful for decision-makers, to gain knowledge of what aspects of 
corporate governance are evaluated by foreign investors, and how they are perceived. 
The factors which are suggested in this study, to influence foreign investors, appear to 
be among those aspects and future researchers may wish to explore others. Second, 
Jordanian companies seeking foreign investment need to enhance their attractiveness by 
demonstrating effective corporate governance, as investors show preference for 
companies that are well managed and transparent in their operations. 
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Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Recent literature on corporate finance emphasizes the importance of the cash holdings 
policy of firms and how firms can manage their cash reserves (see, e.g., Opler et al., 
1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; and Guney et al., 2007). It is 
argued that in perfect capital markets, the optimal level of cash holdings is irrelevant. 
This is because firms can obtain external funds (in both the equity and debt markets) to 
invest in profitable investment opportunities whenever internal funds are insufficient to 
fund projects. Firms are also indifferent to internal and external financing. However, 
capital markets have important imperfections, including asymmetric information, 
transaction costs and other financial restrictions (see, e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
These create a disparity between the cost of internal and external funds. For this reason, 
it is expected that firms subject to greater imperfections will maintain larger cash 
reserves, as cash holdings increase firms' ability to undertake investment when they face 
shortage of internal funds and external finance is too costly. However, it is also 
recognised that there are costs associated with holding cash. For example, it is claimed 
that managers have incentives to retain cash to pursue their own private objectives, 
which may differ from those of outside investors (Jensen, 1986). For example, 
managers may be inclined to increase the amount of funds under their control, because 
this to some extent, affords them an opportunity to spend as they wish, squandering 
funds by consuming perquisites and/or financing projects that equity investors would be 
unwilling to finance. 
Until recently, the literature on corporate finance has paid little attention to the cash 
holdings of firms. Earlier papers by Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) provide 
comprehensive reviews on the determinants of cash holdings for publicly listed firms in 
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the US. They find that the optimal cash is chosen based on a trade off between the costs 
and the benefits of holding cash. More specifically, Kim et al. (1998) find that firms that 
face higher costs of external financing, have more volatile earnings, have lower returns 
on assets and tend to have large cash holdings. Opler et al. (1999), on the other hand, 
finds that smaller firms with better investment opportunities and risky activities possess 
a larger proportion of liquid financial assets. However, empirical investigations of the 
cash holding decision have so far focused mainly on the role of firm-specific 
fundamentals in the determination of cash holdings.  
Very recently, a number of studies highlighted the importance of agency costs and 
corporate governance as an important determinant of corporate cash holdings. For 
example, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), for UK firms, investigate the nature of the 
relationship between cash holdings and managerial ownership among other corporate 
governance characteristics including board structure and ultimate controllers of 
companies. They provide evidence of a non-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and cash holdings. They observe that cash holdings first fall and then rise as 
managerial ownership increases. They also find that firms with ultimate controllers hold 
higher levels of cash than widely held firms. Cross-country studies (e.g. Dittmar et al., 
2003, for more than 11,000 companies from 45 countries; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007, for 
more than 5,000 firms from 31 countries; Guney et al., 2007, for 4,069 firms from 
Japan, France, Germany, the UK, and the US) show that companies in countries with 
poor shareholder protection (poor corporate governance) tend to hold more cash than 
those in countries with good shareholder protection. This implies the inability of  
investors in countries with weak shareholder protection to force managers to disgorge 
executive cash balances (Dittmar et al., 2003). In addition, strong creditor protection 
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may affect the likelihood of bankruptcy in the event of financial distress, which would, 
in turn, imply accumulation of large amounts of cash as a precaution against financial 
distress (Guney et al., 2007). Furthermore, a few recent studies investigate the 
relationship between foreign ownership and cash holdings.  For example, Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2006) extend the work of Dittmar et al. (2003) and investigate the nature 
of the relationship between corporate cash holdings and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) for 46 countries. They find that "Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in 
today‟s highly integrated capital markets act as substitutes for corporate cash holdings" 
(P.302). They add that FDI inflows act as a substitute for cash holdings in G-7 
countries, but as a complement for cash holdings by firms in the non-G-7 countries. 
However, the data on FDI inflows used in their study is at the country level, not at firm 
level. Moreover, Luo and Hachiya (2005) find evidence for a positive relationship 
between foreign ownership and cash holdings. They explain their result by saying that 
foreign stockholders might prefer to select profitable firms to invest, and these firms 
perform well and accumulate more cash. However, they measure foreign ownership as 
either a total or average ratio of foreign stockholdings and not as large shareholders. 
The aforementioned studies provide substantial evidence as to several firm-specific 
factors that are important for firms' cash holding decisions, such as firm size, leverage, 
growth opportunities and cash flow volatility. Further, they show that corporate 
governance (i.e. managerial ownership, ultimate controls, foreign ownership and 
shareholder protection) is important in explaining corporate cash holdings behavior. 
However, little, if any, work examines the relation between founding family ownership, 
large foreign investors and corporate cash holdings. Therefore, in this chapter we 
provide additional empirical evidence on the determinants of cash holding decisions.  
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There are several important features of our analysis that, we believe, extend the 
literature on empirical determinants of cash holdings. 
The first major contribution in this chapter is concerned with the empirical investigation 
of the impact of founding family ownership on corporate cash holdings. Prior 
researches provide support for the significant influence of managerial ownership on 
cash holdings decisions (see, e.g., Opler et al., 1999 and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the 
relationship between founding family equity ownership and cash holdings. We also 
examine the nature of this relationship (See Dittmar et al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007 and Guney et al., 2007 for reference).  Founding family 
ownership is an important type of ownership structure, given the huge number of firms 
around the world that are family-owned (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Burkart et al., 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006).) Even 
among the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 and Fortune 500 companies, where family 
ownership is least to be expected, one third have founding family members actively 
involved in the businesses (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Furthermore, in most of the 
Arab countries, as in many other developing countries, many firms are owned and 
controlled by the founding family
1
. Controlling family owners are involved in the 
management of the organizations, as Chairman of the Board or board members and 
often control senior management positions
2
.   
                                                 
1
 For example Jordan Chemical Industries by the Al Taher family, Ready Mix Concrete and 
Construction Supplies by Al Alaammy family, Specialized Investment Compounds by the Al 
Salfiti family, Printing and Packaging by the Al Fakori family, Darwish Al-Khalili & Sons by 
Al Khalili family, Jordan Industrial Resources by the Al Muasher family and Arab International 
Food Factories by the Abu Khadijeh family etc. 
2
 Corporate Governance in the Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan countries of the MENA 
region: MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group (2003) 
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In this situation we expect that, in Jordan and in most developing markets, founding 
family ownership is more important than managerial discretion. Therefore, in this 
chapter, we argue that there are likely to be two different effects of founding family 
ownership on the cash holding decisions of Jordanian firms, namely, the alignment and 
entrenchment effects. The alignment effect is predicated on the assumption that the 
interests of founding families and other shareholders are better aligned, so that founding 
families have less incentive to expropriate wealth from other shareholders by holding 
more cash. We expect that at relatively lower levels of founding family ownership the 
market perceives increasing founding family ownership favourably, as it may show 
stronger commitment and greater incentive to monitor and discipline the management 
that may be independent of or closely linked to founding family owners. This in turn is 
expected to reduce the expected cost of external finance (both debt and equity) leading 
to a lower cash holding policy. 
However, at higher levels of founding family ownership, it is argued the ability of 
outside shareholders to monitor and influence management decisions is reduced, which 
could result in greater control and entrenchment of founding families. In such a 
situation, firms would be expected to start increasing their cash balances. This may 
occur for two reasons. First, the market may perceive high levels of founding family 
ownership less favourably now, as the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
strong/large controllers becomes more likely and large family owners are more likely to 
control the management and be free from monitoring and disciplining. That is, they 
become entrenched at high levels of ownership. This, in turn, increases the expected 
cost of external finance and firms may choose to increase their cash reserves voluntarily 
as a precautionary motive in an attempt to reduce the costs of foregone investment 
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opportunities due to insufficient resources. Second, it is also possible that founding 
family owners choose to hold larger cash balances as this policy would increase their 
chance of using readily available liquid resources in their own interest. As they are able 
to do so only at high levels of ownership, which allow them to control the decision 
making process and the management, we expect a positive relationship between cash 
holdings and founding family ownership at high levels of ownership. 
Second, to our knowledge, this study is the first to test the effect of large foreign 
investors, which is an issue that is neglected in the existing literature examining the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings (See Dittmar et al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004; Luo and Hachiya, 2005; Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007 
and Guney et al., 2007 for reference). Our investigation is unique because of the high 
level of involvement of foreign investors in the Jordanian stock market. Foreign 
investment of market capital is one of the highest in the world (OECD, 2006)
1
; for 
example, foreign investors account for almost half the market capitalization of all 
sectors in 2007. In this chapter, we argue that the large foreign investors in Jordan, as an 
emerging market, play an external governance role which could lead to more effective 
monitoring and would be expected to encourage more efficient management, and 
behaviour that is better aligned with shareholders' interests. This would make it more 
difficult for owner-managers to hold larger amounts of a firm‟s assets in the form of 
cash to spend on wasteful purposes or on acquiring low-performing investment assets 
with small or even negative NPV. In line with this argument, we would expect lower 
cash holdings in firms with direct equity ownership by large foreign investors. In 
                                                 
1
 MENA-OECD Investment Programme National Investment Reform Agenda Workshop for the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Monday 19th June, 2006. Available on line:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/29/38148879.pdf  
181 
 
addition, we investigate whether board structure and the presence of the large 
shareholders such as domestic institutional investors have any impact on the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings
1
. 
Third, our findings enhance our understanding of corporate cash holdings of firms 
operating in an emerging market which are characterised by less-developed capital 
markets (La Porta et al., 1997). To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to 
analyse corporate cash holdings in an emerging market, namely Jordan, one of the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. One main drawback of the previous 
studies is that they generally focus on single high-income countries with uniformly high 
investor protection laws (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; and Opler et al., 1999 for US firms and 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004 for UK firms). 
Our last contribution lies in the important limitations of cross-country studies. For 
example, previous studies such as Dittmar et al. (2003) are not based on firm-level data 
on shareholder and governance features, but rely on country-wide measures of 
shareholder rights as developed by La Porta et al. (1998). Their findings, in 
consequence, do not enable clear conclusions to be drawn at the firm level for the effect 
of agency costs on cash holdings. To circumvent these limitations, therefore, in this 
chapter, we analyse an extensive range of firm-level attributes which are suggested by 
previous studies to be important proxies for internal corporate governance. These 
governance attributes include executive ownership, founding family ownership, board 
size, CEO-Chairman duality, domestic large institutional investors and large foreign 
investors, to provide additional empirical evidence on the determinants of firms‟ cash 
holdings in Jordan. 
                                                 
1
 Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) also used board and ownership variables in their UK sample. 
However, we use more than one year for board and ownership variables. 
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To conduct our analysis, we use unique and reliable hand-collected firm level data that 
includes, among others, detailed information on the ownership, board structure and 
founding family ownership for a sample of 360 firm-year observations for Jordanian 
non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during 2004-2006. In addition 
to cross-sectional average methodology, we also carry out pooled regression to confirm 
the reliability of our findings.  
As we discussed in the previous chapters, the Jordanian setting is a particularly 
interesting environment to study, for a number of reasons. First, in Jordan as in many 
counties around the world, most of the firms are family firms where the founder and/or 
family members usually hold important positions in management and in the board of 
directors (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Founding family members are involved in the management of the organizations, as 
Chairman of the Board or board members and often control senior management 
positions. Therefore, studying Jordanian firms' cash holding decisions would not only 
be valuable to Jordan but may also benefit other emerging markets.  
Second, the role of foreign investors in the Jordanian capital market is unique. The 
process of globalization of Jordanian capital markets is accompanied by an increase in 
importance of foreign investees. Restrictions on foreign investment and the percentage 
of the foreign ownership have been removed, so that foreigners are now allowed to own 
up to 100 per cent of any investment project in any sector. Foreign investors' 
participation in the of Jordanian capital market is one of the highest in the world 
(OECD, 2006). Therefore, the impact of foreign ownership and corporate cash holdings 
therefore warrants investigation. 
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Finally, an improvement in reporting and disclosure standards in Jordan presents an 
opportunity for a relatively rigorous empirical study using firm-level data (Omar, 2007).  
Our analysis provides important findings. We find strong evidence that founding family 
ownership exerts a significant influence on the cash holding decisions of Jordanian 
firms. These results provide support for a non-linear relationship between founding 
family ownership and cash holdings. More specifically, we find that founding family 
move from alignment to entrenchment as their shareholdings in the firm increase. It is 
demonstrated that the main findings as to the effect of founding family ownership on 
cash holdings are robust, regardless of alternative definitions of cash holdings and do 
not change significantly with either board attributes or the presence of other large 
shareholders. This challenges the managerial agency arguments. In other words, the 
traditional managerial agency explanations do not seem to hold. Instead, another agency 
issue is uncovered, namely, conflict between founding family shareholders and other 
shareholders.   
In addition, we provide evidence that the presence of large foreign investors is 
associated with effective monitoring. This result may suggest that large foreign 
investors play an effective monitoring and governance role, making it more difficult for 
corporate manager-owners to make decisions to serve their own benefits and force them 
to act more as value-enhancing agents on behalf of their shareholders.  This supports the 
view that foreign investors complement domestic institutions as external governance 
agents. Furthermore, our result provides evidence that local institutional investors do 
not have any significant impact on corporate cash holdings. This finding provides 
support for the view that institutional investors in Jordan are relatively passive in 
disciplining management. Jordanian company board characteristics do not have any 
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important impact on corporate cash holdings. Finally, the results suggest that corporate 
cash holding is positively associated with market-to-book value and dividends; and 
negatively associated with cash flow, leverage, size and tangibility.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 sets out the 
theoretical background and hypotheses of the study. Section 5.3 discusses board 
structure and large institutional and foreign investors in Jordan. Section 5.4 presents 
data and variables. Section 5.5 presents results and Section 5.6 is the conclusion. 
5.2. Theory and Empirical Hypotheses 
In this section, we first address the role of firm-specific (non-governance) 
characteristics that influence cash holding decisions. In doing so, we provide detailed 
discussion about the impact of transaction costs and information asymmetries and 
agency cost of debt as a determinant of corporate cash holdings. In the following sub-
section, we provide detailed discussion on the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and cash holding decisions. We focus on the relationship 
between executive directors' ownership, founding family ownership, board variables 
(i.e. board size and CEO-Chairman duality), large local institutional investors and large 
foreign ownership and corporate cash holdings.  
5.2.1. Literature on Cash Holdings (Non-governance) Characteristics 
The literature on corporate cash holdings emphasizes two major reasons for cash 
holdings. The first is the transaction costs motives, which refer, for instance, to the costs 
of selling some assets or of cutting dividends for the sake of having prompt liquidity. 
The second is the precautionary motives, which refer to those conditions in which a 
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firm may experience difficulties in raising external capital (equity or debt) as a result of 
asymmetric information and/or conflicts with debt holders (agency costs of debt).  
Cash accumulation, as the concept of free cash flow could be explained in terms of the 
agency cost of managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986). Entrenched managers would have 
an inclination to hold large amounts of cash to pursue their own projects at the 
shareholders' expense (agency cost of equity), while also avoiding the discipline of 
capital markets.  
In the following sub-sections, we discuss transaction costs, asymmetric information and 
agency costs of debt in more detail. Furthermore, agency cost of equity (managerial 
discretion) will also be discussed, in relation to corporate governance and cash holdings. 
5.2.1.1. Transaction Costs  
The transaction costs motives refer to the cost of converting cash substitutes into cash 
(Keynes, 1936). Companies lacking sufficient internal resources can raise funds in a 
number of ways, for instance, by issuing new debt and/or equity, cutting dividends or 
investment, liquidating existing assets or renegotiating financial contracts. However, 
any of these strategies are costly. For example, there is cost incurred in accessing 
secondary markets to sell some real assets, or time spent in renegotiation with current 
lenders. In consequence, the greater the amount of liquidity (i.e. funds) to be raised, the 
greater are the associated costs. It could be anticipated, therefore, that the higher the 
cost of being short of liquidity, the more cash will be accumulated. 
Cash flow is the first cash substitute that we include in our cash model. Kim et al. 
(1998) claim a negative relationship between cash flow and cash holdings, as they 
consider that cash flows represent an additional source of liquidity for the firm and can 
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therefore substitute for accumulated cash. Accordingly, firms with greater cash flows 
will suffer less from the costs of liquidity shortage. Also, there is less risk of having to 
forego investment opportunities or of facing financial distress, for firms with higher 
cash flows (Guney et al., 2007). On this basis, a negative relationship between cash 
flow and cash holdings would be predicted (substitution effect). Opler et al. (1999) and 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) provide evidence in support of this view, for the US and UK 
markets respectively.  As a proxy of cash flow, we use the ratio of profit before interest 
and tax plus depreciation to total assets. 
Leverage is another proxy for the transaction costs of the demand for liquidity. Firms 
can borrow as an alternative to holding a stock of liquid assets because leverage can act 
as a proxy for the ability of firms to issue debt (John, 1993, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, 
and Guney et al., 2007). Furthermore, according to Baskin (1987), the greater the ratio 
of debt to total assets, the higher the costs of investing in liquid assets. Thus, to the 
extent that leverage of firms acts as a proxy for their ability to issue debt, we would 
expect a negative (substitution effect) relation between leverage and cash holdings. 
Contrary to this assumption, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that a higher level of debt 
increases the probability of financial distress and costly bankruptcy, so that firms with 
heavier debt may therefore hold more cash. Thus, to the extent that those firms are 
likely to accumulate more cash reserves to minimize the risk of financial distress and 
costly bankruptcy, we would expect a positive (precautionary effect) relationship 
between cash holdings and leverage at high levels of leverage. Leverage is equal to the 
ratio of total debt (short and long debt) to total assets.  
To control for the potential impact of the firm's dividends policy on its cash holdings, 
we also include dividend payout ratio as an alternative source of liquid funds. Firms that 
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pay dividends can generate funds easily and at lower costs than those that do not, by 
cutting their dividends. Therefore, we assume a negative relationship between dividends 
and cash holding (Opler et al., 1999). Alternatively, firms that pay dividends may hold 
more cash than non-dividend paying companies, simply to ensure they have the means 
to support their dividend payments (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). It has also been 
suggested that since dividends reduce the free resources in the firm, they may mitigate 
governance conflicts (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). For this reason, cutting 
dividends may have adverse effects, since doing so gives an unfavourable sign of 
increased agency costs of equity, thereby implying additional difficulty in raising funds 
in capital markets. From this perspective, a positive relationship can be expected. We 
define dividends as the ratio of total dividend payout to total assets.  
Finally, firms with more tangible assets can be expected to hold less cash, because when 
liquidity is short, tangible assets can be sold. Furthermore, firms that have substantial 
tangible assets can use them as collateral, experience less difficulty in issuing debt and 
can borrow on better terms (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Such assets also have a greater 
value than intangible assets, should a firm face bankruptcy. Finally, firms with 
sufficient liquid assets may be able to avoid recourse to the capital markets to raise 
funds when they are in need of cash. For all these reasons, we expect a negative 
relationship between cash holdings and a firm's assets tangibility. As a proxy for assets 
tangibility we use the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.  
5.2.1.2. Asymmetric Information, Agency Cost of Debt  
The second set of costs to be considered is information asymmetry and agency cost of 
debt. The existence of information asymmetries between firms and investors increases 
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the cost of raising funds from external markets (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Where such a 
situation prevails, outsiders (both shareholders and creditors) do not have the same 
information about the company as its insiders. They therefore seek assurance that the 
securities they buy are not overpriced, and consequently discount them appropriately 
(Opler et al., 1999).  Firms, on the other hand, may find that outsiders require a large 
discount rate, as a result of which they may prefer not to sell securities and be prevented 
from investing in some profitable projects. From this perspective, it is assumed that the 
more sensitive the information is, and the more important information asymmetries are, 
the higher will be the cost of raising external funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Opler et 
al., 1999). For this reason, firms have a preference for internal over informationally 
sensitive external finance, as indicated above. 
Another important factor that has a derived bearing on cash levels, as attested in various 
empirical studies (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) is 
the existence of growth opportunities. As Myers and Majluf (1984) point out, firms 
whose value is determined by growth options suffer more from asymmetry of 
information. If a firm has investment opportunities, which would increase its value 
when taken, shortage of cash may force it to forgo some of these opportunities. Hence, 
firms with such opportunities would be likely to hold more cash in an attempt to reduce 
the risk of having to give up valuable investment opportunities in some circumstances. 
In addition, it is important to note that firms with greater growth opportunities are 
expected to incur high bankruptcy costs (Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This is because growth opportunities are intangible in 
nature and their value plummets at times of financial distress and in case of bankruptcy. 
This would in turn imply that firms with greater growth opportunities have a greater 
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motivation to avoid financial distress and bankruptcy, and so would be likely to hold 
more cash and marketable assets (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
Agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors also make it more difficult and 
more expensive to obtain external funds. It is argued that companies with high growth 
opportunities are more likely to face greater agency costs of debt (Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004). Firms have an interest in avoiding situations in which the agency costs of debt 
are so high as to prevent their raising funds to finance their activities and invest in 
valuable projects. Opler et al., (1999) argue that firms with valuable investment 
opportunities, for which the costs of raising external funds can be extremely high, are 
likely to hold more cash in order to avoid the even higher cost of being short of funds. 
As a result, it would be predicted that in circumstances of information asymmetry, firms 
with valuable investment opportunities will accumulate more cash, because the costs 
they incur in the event of financial distress (agency cost of debt) are higher. Therefore, a 
positive relationship between cash and investment opportunities is expected.  
It has been suggested that information asymmetry is less likely among large rather than 
small firms (Brennan and Hughes, 1991). Higher information asymmetry may lead to 
small firms facing more borrowing constraints and higher costs of external funds than 
larger firms (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Fazzari et al., 1988; Kim et al., 1998). Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004) also suggest that firm size can also have an impact on expected costs 
of financial distress. They argue that large firms hold less cash because they tend to be 
diversified and so better protected from financial distress (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
Moreover, smaller firms are more likely to be liquidated when they are in financial 
distress (Ozkan, 1996). To the extent that size is an inverse proxy for asymmetric 
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information, a negative relationship with cash would be predicted. Our proxy for size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets in 2004 prices.  
It has been suggested that the level of cash flow may be a proxy for asymmetric 
information faced by a company. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), firms will 
react to information asymmetry and the signalling problems associated with external 
financing, by establishing a hierarchy in their use of funding sources. Hierarchy theory 
assumes a preference to rely on internally-generated sources of finance before looking 
to the capital market. If this is the case, firms with large cash flows will maintain higher 
cash holdings. From this perspective, one might expect a positive influence of cash flow 
on cash holdings, contrary to the transaction costs hypothesis, which predicts a 
substitution relationship between these two variables. 
5.2.2. Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings 
In this section, several firm-level corporate governance measures that may be related to 
cash holdings are discussed, beginning with the relationship between executive 
directors' ownership and cash holdings, and moving on to the relationship between 
founding family ownership and cash holdings. Board variables are also discussed (i.e. 
board size and CEO-Chairman duality). Finally, we discuss how firms' ownership 
structures may affect their choice of cash holdings. We mainly focus on the role of the 
large local institutional investors and large foreign ownership. 
5.2.2.1. Managerial Ownership (Agency Costs of Equity) 
Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders arising mainly from the 
separation of ownership and control have been well documented. Among these conflicts 
is the issue of firms' cash holdings. According to Jensen's (1986) free cash-flow 
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hypothesis, an increase in free cash flow is associated with an increase in agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. In particular, managers may be inclined 
to accumulate large amounts of cash to finance overinvestment, consumption of private 
benefits, or even just inefficient investment decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or to 
make investments that the capital markets would not be willing to finance. Another 
reason for holding excess cash may be managers' risk aversion (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). More entrenched managers would tend to hold more cash as a way to avoid 
market discipline and reduce the likelihood of losing their jobs (Opler et al., 1999; 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Moreover, Harford (1999) reports that cash-rich firms often 
engage in value-destroying activities such as overpaying in acquisitions and not 
returning the excess cash back to the shareholders, which is further evidence in support 
of the view that managers have the tendency to use excess cash as a safety net to ensure 
their long-term survival.  
Managerial ownership has been suggested as a potential incentive mechanism that 
serves to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). As managerial ownership increases, managers are less likely to divert 
resources away from value maximization, as they bear part of the costs of their actions. 
Therefore, lower expected agency costs resulting from the alignment between managers 
and shareholders would facilitate the firm's access to capital markets and decrease the 
cost of capital, making the firm less likely to accumulate cash. Based on this, it would 
be expected that the relationship between cash holdings and managerial ownership will 
be negative (the incentive-alignment effect).  
However, there is another strand of literature which suggests that the relationship 
between managerial ownership and cash holdings may not be linear. For example, 
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Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) provide evidence, for the UK, of a significant cubic 
relationship. Accordingly, at low levels of managerial ownership there is an alignment 
between managers and shareholders and managers can be expected to hold less cash. At 
an intermediate level of managerial ownership, agency costs increase. This is because 
increased voting power and effective control over the firm may lead managers to 
become entrenched, and so they will have an incentive to accumulate excess cash 
holdings in order to retain the flexibility to pursue their own projects (the entrenchment 
effect). However, managers would reduce the amount of accumulated cash again at very 
high levels of ownership, because managers would bear the cost of actions that do not 
maximize value, and so once again would be likely to hold less cash. 
Given the mixed theoretical and empirical evidence, we test the exact relationship 
between managerial ownership and cash holdings for Jordanian firms. However, no 
significant relationship is predicted between executive ownership and cash holdings, 
given the prevalence, discussed earlier and as explained in the following parts of this 
chapter, of domination by the controlling family, whether as chairman of board, board 
members or in senior management positions.  
As a proxy for managerial ownership, we use the percentage of equity ownership held 
by executive directors and their relatives. Jordanian quoted companies are required to 
disclose in their financial statements the names of all the board members and the 
number of securities issued by the Company which are owned by any member of its 
Board of Directors, any member of its Senior Executive Management or any of their 
relatives
1
.  
                                                 
1
 Relatives are: Husband, Wife and Minor Children.  
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5.2.2.2. Founding Family Ownership  
The effect of founding family ownership is an issue that receives little or no attention in 
the existing literature that analyses the determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
Founding family ownership is an important form of ownership structure. Worldwide, 
the majority of businesses are family owned (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The study by Claessens et 
al., (2002) on the ownership structure of East-Asian companies suggests that founding 
families play a dominant role in Asia. Furthermore, the separation in ownership and 
control results in an incentive effect and entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002).  
We argue that there are two different effects of founding family ownership on the cash 
holding decisions of Jordanian firms, namely, the alignment and entrenchment effects. 
The alignment effect is based on the notion that as the ownership of the founding family 
increases the interests of founding families and other shareholders are better aligned 
because family members hold large blocks of stock and constitute a long-term presence 
in the firm. For these reasons, they have less incentive to expropriate wealth from other 
shareholders through accumulating more cash.  The alignment effect theory implies that 
founding family ownership is a source of comparative advantage through potential for 
reduction in agency costs and maximization of firm value (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The wish to preserve the family name is another reason 
why family owners might monitor firms more effectively. For example, their long-term 
commitment may incline them to invest in long-term projects rather than limiting 
themselves to shorter horizons. It also offers a degree of stability which may allow them 
to borrow on more favourable terms and maintain longer relationships with external 
bodies such as suppliers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Accordingly, we expect a negative 
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relationship between cash holdings and founding family ownership at relatively low 
levels of founding family ownership. This is because the market is likely to perceive 
increasing founding family ownership favourably as it may show stronger commitment 
and greater incentives to monitor and discipline the management that may be 
independent of or closely linked to founding family owners. This in turn is expected to 
reduce the cost of external finance (both debt and equity) leading to a lower cash 
holding policy.  
In contrast, the entrenchment effect suggests that concentrated ownership creates 
incentives for controlling shareholders such as founding family members to expropriate 
wealth from other shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; and 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The entrenchment effect implies that founding family 
ownership may be considered as conducive to inefficient corporate governance, as 
family owners are in a position, and have motives, to expropriate wealth from outside 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
This may result in suboptimal investment decisions, excessive compensation and 
substantial influence in selecting managers and directors, which can impede the efforts 
of more capable third parties in managing firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Entrenchment may also be explained by greater information asymmetry between 
founding families and other shareholders. Therefore, at higher levels of ownership, 
firms are expected to start increasing their cash balances and this may occur for two 
reasons. First, the market may perceive high levels of founding family ownership less 
favourably now as the expropriation of minority shareholders by strong/large controllers 
becomes more likely and large family owners are more likely to control the 
management and be free from monitoring and disciplining. That is, they are expected to 
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become entrenched at high levels of ownership. This in turn will increase the expected 
cost of external finance and firms may choose to increase their cash reserves voluntarily 
as a precautionary move in an attempt to reduce the costs of foregone investment 
opportunities due to insufficient resources. Second, it is also suggested that founding 
family owners choose to hold larger cash balances, as by doing so they would increase 
their chance of using readily available liquid resources in their own interest. Since this 
would be possible only at high levels of ownership, which allow them to control the 
decision making process and the management, we expect a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and founding family ownership at high levels of ownership. 
In this chapter, we attempt to fill the gap in the literature by exploring the effect of 
founding family ownership on corporate cash holdings. Therefore, we will provide a 
detailed analysis of the exact nature of the relationship between cash holdings and 
founding family ownership. As a proxy for founding family ownership, we use the 
percentage of shares held by founding family and their relatives.  
5.2.2.3. Board Characteristics 
Decisions as to how much cash the firm should hold, and when or by what means cash 
should be used, are strategic decisions made by the management of the firm, in 
accordance with organizational or private objectives. They have implications for 
shareholders in terms of dividends, ability to benefit from opportunities for investment 
and growth, and so on. It is in the interest of shareholders, therefore, that governance 
mechanisms are in place to reduce the risk that such decisions are made only to serve 
the private purposes of management, at the expense of shareholders.  
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The board of directors is the key internal governance mechanism, and it is responsible 
for monitoring and evaluating the management behaviour on behalf of shareholders and 
to protect them from managers who may pursue their personal interests at the expensive 
of shareholders or otherwise act in a manner detrimental to shareholders' interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). That is why it is important to analyse the role of board 
characteristics in determining cash reserves.  
Board size is widely believed to be an important factor in determining the effectiveness 
of corporate governance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Jensen, 1993) and previous studies 
indicate that the overall size of the board affects the quality of monitoring (Yermack, 
1996). However, existing studies disagree as to the effect of board size. Some 
researchers are of the opinion that large boards are more effective because they can 
offer a wider perspective and better guidance on the strategic options of the firm (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1991). Kiel and Nicholson (2003) find a positive relationship between board 
size and corporate performance, leading to the inference that large boards are effective 
in representing shareholders' interest. Others, however, claim that large boards create 
problems of coordination, communication and process, which outweigh the advantages 
of having more people to draw on (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; and 
Florackis et al, 2009).  
Similarly, there is debate among researchers as to the impact on board's effectiveness of 
the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) duality. As discussed earlier, this may be 
significant for cash holdings, because cash holdings decisions are likely to reflect the 
agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control, i.e. the one 
between managers and shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the positions 
of chairman of the board (COB) and CEO should be separated, to mitigate the agency 
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problem. Similarity, the Cadbury (1992) report on corporate governance of UK firms 
warns that if the two are not separated, there is increased danger of opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of insiders. 
However, analysts offer competing views as to whether the separation of the two 
positions increases efficiency or not. Fosberg and Nelson (1999) report that within three 
years of a change of leadership structure to separate the two positions, in an effort to 
control agency problems, corporate performance improved significantly. In contrast 
Rahman and Haniffa (2005), in a study of Malaysian firms, find accounting 
performance of companies with CEO‟s role duality to be weaker than in companies 
with separate roles. Dahya et al. (1996) reach a similar conclusion based on findings 
from the UK. Other studies find no relationship between duality and corporate 
performance (Brickley et al. 1997; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
One suggestion which may follow from the above argument is that the board of 
directors plays an important role in the firm's strategic decisions, including corporate 
cash holdings. An effective board is conducive to efficient management decisions that 
maximize firm value and are likely to serve shareholders' interests. Moreover, it will 
reduce information asymmetry, thus increasing a firm's capability of raising funds 
externally (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Hence, one would expect these firms to hold 
smaller amounts of cash. However, firms with a dual leadership structure (headed by a 
chairman who is also the CEO) are more inclined to serve the interest of the 
management team, which implies a tendency to hold excessive cash. Also, the cost of 
external capital is expected to be higher where there is a dual leadership structure and 
hence firms are expected to accumulate more cash for precautionary motives.  
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5.2.2.4. Local Institutional Investors 
The presence of large financial institutions as investors plays an important role in 
resolving or exacerbating some of the firm‟s agency problems. In a situation of 
dispersed ownership, there is little incentive for individual shareholders to monitor the 
management. Small shareholders can 'free-ride', relying on others to govern the 
management (La Porta et al., 1999). By contrast, large investors such as institutional 
investors, as they have a large proportion of the firm's cash flow, have great incentive, 
as well as the resources, to monitor management decisions, which could be conducive 
to better corporate performance (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Such 
investors are said to have greater expertise and greater ability to act rationally (Dong 
and Ozkan, 2008). They can exercise influence over management decisions directly 
through their ownership or indirectly by trading their shares (Gillan and Starks, 2003). 
They therefore have the power to influence the performance of the company by 
contributing to, monitoring or ratifying the board's decisions, and pursuing an agenda of 
safeguarding shareholders' interest by promoting behaviour that adds value for them. To 
the extent that the presence of large institutional shareholders results in more effective 
monitoring of management to safeguard the interest of the shareholders, the cost of 
external financing would be expected to be lower for firms with large institutional 
investors; consequently they would have less need to hold higher levels of cash.  
There is, however, a case for suggesting that the presence of large shareholders may 
also generate other agency costs. For example, large shareholders, seeking to maximize 
their wealth, may have incentives and power to expropriate minority shareholders and 
to divert corporate resources (Sheifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). 
Institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds may also 
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have an interest in cooperating with managers, rather than challenging their decisions to 
avoid risk of damage to or loss of potential business relationships with the firm (Pound, 
1998; Cornett et al., 2007). Thus, their interest may be more aligned with corporate 
management than with shareholders, despite their own holdings, preventing them from 
reacting to management actions that are not in line with the interests of shareholders 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008). This may suggest that the cost of capital would be 
increased, because potential external investors would address the risk associated with 
holding shares in a majority-controlled company, by demanding a higher premium. 
From this perspective, it may be expected that Jordanian firms with large local financial 
institution investment are more likely to accumulate more cash. 
5.2.2.5. Large Foreign Ownership  
A number of studies in the international business field suggest that foreign investors 
have a positive impact on performance of local firms, especially in emerging market 
economies. For example, Hanousek et al. (2004) show that foreign ownership has a 
positive effect on corporate performance, attributed to better monitoring ability. Mitton 
(2002) and Lins (2003) both find a positive relationship between firm performance and 
outside ownership in emerging markets. This suggests that foreign investors play an 
external governance role complementary to that of domestic institutions. In a study of 
financial institution equity holdings from 27 countries around the world, Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) find foreign ownership to have a significantly positive impact on firm 
value. Following the market liberalization of the Amman Stock Exchange in 1995, 
Jordanian firms are increasingly attracting foreign investment, and it is suggested by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that such outside ownership increases the incentive for 
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shareholders to monitor managerial performance. Khanna and Palepu (1999) find 
evidence for such a monitoring role of foreign investors in an Indian context. 
The effect of large foreign investors has been neglected in other studies attempting an 
analysis of the determinants of corporate cash holdings. To our knowledge, only Chang 
and Noorbakhsh, (2006) and Luo and Hachiya (2005) provide evidence of an 
association between foreign ownership and cash holdings. However, Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2006) extend the work of Dittmar et al. (2003) and investigate the nature 
of the relationship between corporate cash holdings and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) for 46 countries (including one company from Jordan). They find that "Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in today‟s highly integrated capital markets act as 
substitutes for corporate cash holdings" (p.302). They add that FDI inflows act as a 
substitute for cash holdings in G-7 countries, but as a complement for cash holdings by 
firms in the non-G-7 countries. However, the data on FDI inflows used in their study 
was at the country level, not at firm level. Moreover, Luo and Hachiya (2005) find 
evidence for a positive relationship between foreign ownership and cash holdings. They 
explain their result by saying that foreign stockholders might prefer to select profitable 
firms in which to invest, and these firms perform well and accumulate more cash. 
However, they measure foreign ownership as either a total or average ratio of foreign 
stockholdings and not as large shareholders. 
Generally, the existing literature does not provide evidence about the effects of large 
foreign investors on cash holdings. We suggest that foreign investors with large 
holdings are more likely to monitor firms in which they invest and in turn, such 
behaviour would serve an external governance function, encouraging more efficient 
management, and behaviour that better serves shareholders' interest. It would be much 
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more difficult for owner-managers to hold larger amounts of a firm‟s assets in the form 
of cash, which they might then spend on bad decisions and poorly-performed projects 
with small or even negative NPV. This also suggests that the cost of external financing 
would be lower for firms with large foreign investors, implying less need to hold higher 
levels of cash. 
5.3. Features of Corporate Governance in Jordan 
In this section, we review some features of the Jordanian corporate governance system 
which make the cash holdings analysis of companies listed at the Amman Stock 
Exchange interesting.  In particular, we focus on board characteristics and large 
domestic institutional and foreign investors and their expected impact on cash holding 
decisions of Jordanian firms.   
5.3.1. Board Structure of the Jordanian Companies 
Basic requirements for the board structure, liabilities and responsibilities of Jordanian 
firms are governed by the Company Law (CL).  Boards are single-tier, with both 
executive and non-executive directors sitting on the same board. Board members, 
whose term is four years, are elected by the Company's General Assembly in secret 
ballot. The number of members may vary from three to thirteen. No stipulations are 
made in the CL as to board independence. However, according to the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC), audit committee requirements necessitate at least three non-
executive members. Other regulatory gaps under the CL include the absence of legal 
requirements regarding board members‟ skills, independence, possible committee 
functions, and board performance evaluation, the failure to mandate the separation of 
the positions of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board and the lack of any 
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requirement that the CEO must be a member of the board. As yet, there exists no 
empirical evidence on the impact of board attributes on the corporate governance of 
Jordanian firms, although a number of sources
1
 comment on the widespread tendency 
for boards of Jordanian companies to lack independence from controlling shareholders 
and from management. Such reports point out that there are no rules governing the 
composition of the board of directors; guidelines governing the balance of power 
between executive and non-executive directors are inadequate; and the concept of 
independent directors is not well recognized. Furthermore, Jordan shares with many 
other developing countries a tendency for management and the board of directors to be 
dominated by members of the founding families. Attention is drawn in several sources
2
 
to the prevailing practice of appointing managers on the basis of kinship or friendship 
with the controlling family, irrespective of qualifications and experience. Where such a 
practice prevails, governance may be less effective, as managers do not have the 
required autonomy, flexibility, and objectivity to monitor company activities.  
Strategic decisions are therefore likely to be heavily influenced by the interest of the 
controlling family members which, as agreed previously, may operate for or against 
cash management. To the extent that this is the case, Jordanian company board 
characteristics are not expected to have an important impact on corporate cash holdings.  
5.3.2. Large Institutional Shareholders  
In Jordanian listed companies, there is a high level of shareholdings by large domestic 
institutional investors (including banks, insurance companies, and pension funds such as 
                                                 
1
'
7
 See for example: World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): 
Corporate Governance Country Assessment (Jordan) (June, 2004); and Corporate Governance 
in the Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan countries of the MENA region: MENA Regional 
Corporate Governance Working Group (2003). 
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the Social Security Corporation Investment Unit). For example, we find an average 
shareholding by large domestic financial institutions of 19.42 per cent during 2004-
2006. However, Jordan is a small country, where there are relatively few local 
institutions that could effectively exercise oversight over management and offer an 
external safeguard against inefficient performance. Mutual funds are not common in 
Jordan, and most of the local institutional investors are banks and insurance companies. 
In principle, such institutions, given the size of their holdings, should act as external 
governance agents for other shareholders, especially minority shareholders. However, in 
practice, this ability is weakened due to their significant ties with the companies, 
through family and personal connections
1
.  
In the case of the nominees of the Social Security Investment Unit in the boards of the 
Jordanian companies, their effectiveness is reduced by the lack of business expertise, 
since they are typically bureaucrats. Even where such representatives have the 
knowledge and expertise to exercise governance, there is little incentive for them to do 
so, as their tenure and career prospects are governed by the civil system, and are not 
usually affected by the performance of the firm concerned.  
In such a context, we would expect institutional shareholders in Jordan to adopt a 
passive stance towards monitoring and disciplining firms' management and, thus, to 
have little influence on cash holding decisions of companies. 
5.3.3. Foreign Equity Investment in the Jordanian Capital Market  
One important and unique feature of the Jordanian equity market is the high level of 
involvement of foreign investors in the Jordanian stock market. In fact, foreign 
                                                 
1
 For example Jordan Bank owned by the Al Kori family, Union Bank owned by the Salfiti 
family, Jordan Arab Investment Bank by the Al-Qadi family, Jordan National Bank by the Al-
Muasher family, Jordan Commercial Bank by the Al-Sayegh family.  
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investment of market capital is one of the highest in the world (OECD, 2006). 
Ownership by foreigners has been on the rise since the beginning of the 2000's in all 
sectors. Table 5.1 shows the percentage of foreign ownership in shareholding 
companies by sector for the period 2001-2007.  
Table 5.1: Non-Jordanian ownership in listed companies by sectors as a 
percentage (%) of market capitalisation during the period 2001-2007 
 
Year Financial Sector Services Industry All Market 
2001 47.43 19.67 27.87 38.51 
2002 47.56 26.79 26.09 37.43 
2003 46.28 24.29 30.1 38.84 
2004 47.44 25.59 36.79 41.26 
2005 49.77 26.19 38.09 45.04 
2006 47.73 36.55 43.71 45.53 
2007 50.73 36.15 51.88 48.95 
 
This table reports foreign investor ownership in companies listed at the ASE as of year-end 
from 2001-2007 as a percentage of total market value. The Financial sector includes Banks, 
Insurance, Diversified Financial Services and Real Estate. The Services sector includes Health 
Care Services, Educational Services, Hotels & Tourism, Transportation, Technology & 
Communication, Media, Utilities & Energy, and Commercial Services. The Industry sector 
includes Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, Chemical Industries, Paper & Carton, Printing & 
Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & Extracting, Tobacco & Cigarettes, Engineering & 
Construction., Electrical Industries, Textiles, Leather & Clothing, and Glass & Ceramics.  
Source: Various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports.  
 
The percentage of foreign ownership increased from 38.51 per cent of total market 
capitalisation in 2001 to 48.95 per cent in 2007, the investors coming from 102 
countries around the world. This increase suggests a preference for on long-term gains 
from improved corporate governance, as opposed to short-term investment return. In the 
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case of the ASE, foreign investments are long-term investments, predominantly in 
international mutual and pension funds, together with foreign government contributions 
and strategic partnerships with Jordanian public shareholding companies
1
.  
Equity ownership by large foreign investors across the total sample (2004-2006) 
averages 10.92 per cent of total shares. This ratio shows a marked increasing pattern. 
The average ordinary shareholding by foreign investors increases by about 4 percentage 
points over the three years, from 8.71 per cent in 2004 to 12.16 per cent in 2006. There 
are also significant differences across firms. For the overall sample, the level of large 
foreign ownership ranges from 0 to 97.51 per cent. 
In this chapter, we analyse the association between the presence of large foreign 
investors and cash holdings, on the assumption, noted previously, that such investors 
play an external governance role, reducing owner-managers' opportunities to engage in 
wasteful and inefficient behaviour contrary to the interest of other shareholders. We 
therefore anticipate a negative relationship between cash holding and direct equity 
ownership by large foreign investors. 
5.4. Sample and Variables 
5.4.1. Sample  
The study is based on Jordanian firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange from 2004 
to 2006. These are the most recent years for which data were available at the time of the 
study. At the end of 2004, 2005 and 2006 there were 620 companies, financial and non-
financial, listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. Following prior studies and based on 
                                                 
1
 Jalil Tarif, the CEO of the ASE. Meeting with the World Bank Mission,  available on line: 
http://www.exchange.jo/pages.php?menu_id=-1&local_type=1&local_id=123&local_details=1 
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the availability of annual reports to construct our dependent and independent variables 
in addition to financial data, we excluded all financial institutions companies (i.e. banks, 
insurance companies and diversified financial services) from the sample. Furthermore, 
we exclude any suspended or floated price companies, due to incomplete data. Thus, the 
final sample consisted of 360 firm-year observations across three years (80 per cent of 
the total non-financial listed firms). Table 5.2 shows the number of listed companies, 
the number of non-financial companies and the number of companies in the sample. 
Table 5.2: The number of the sample during the period 2004-2006 
 2004 2005 2006 Full Period 
No. of listed companies 192 201 227 620 
No. of non-financial companies* 138 146 165 449 
No. of firms in the samples 109 117 134 360 
Proportion of sample to non-
financial companies  
78.99% 80.14% 81.21% 80.18% 
This table presents the number of listed companies, the number of non-financial companies, and 
the number of companies in the sample.  
* Non-financial firms include the following sectors: Health Care Services, Educational 
Services, Hotels & Tourism, Transportation, Technology & Communication, Media, Utilities & 
Energy, and Commercial Services, Pharmaceutical & Medical Industries, Chemical Industries, 
Paper & Carton, Printing & Packing, Food & Beverage, Mining & Extracting, Tobacco & 
Cigarettes, Engineering & Construction., Electrical Industries, Textile, Leather & Clothing, 
Glass & Ceramics and Real Estate. Source: various Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports. 
 
Data on firms‟ ownership, board structure and firm-specific accounting data are hand-
collected from secondary sources, primarily the mandatory disclosure reports of these 
firms to the Jordan Securities Commission. The frequency of all variables is annual, and 
the values are measured as of the end of December for each year.  
207 
 
The annual reports of Jordanian public trading companies are prepared in accordance 
with and are considered consistent with international accounting standards. The annual 
reports supplied by management are also subject to external auditing, to certify that they 
are prepared in accordance with statutory and professional principles (international 
auditing standards). Finally, listed companies have been required since 1997 to form 
auditing committees from the board of directors, which exercise oversight over the 
preparation of annual reports. As a further check on reliability, data pertaining to 
Jordanian public trading companies are also obtained from other sources, such as the 
Amman Stock Exchange annual company guide, Jordan Securities Commission, the 
Amman Stock Exchange, the Securities Depository Centre, and the companies' 
websites. These sources are used to verify the figures and statistics collected from 
companies' annual reports.  
The names of company founding families are derived from the Memorandum of 
Association of each company under investigation, obtained via the archive held by the 
Companies Control Department, a unit of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. As a 
further robustness check, three experts from the financial sector, stock market and 
Companies Control Department gave their insight in order to correctly identify the 
founding families. However, it is uncommon in Jordan for two or more families to have 
the same family name. Furthermore, it is easy to check whether the founding family is 
still in the firm or not, because the average age of Jordanian firms in our sample is low 
(i.e. 20 years).  
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5.4.2. Variables  
The dependent variable used in this study is cash holdings, which is the ratio of total 
cash and equivalent (short term investment, i.e. any investment held for less than one 
year, such as securities and bonds) to total assets.  
With regard to the explanatory factors of cash holdings, we include in our analysis a set 
of firm-specific variables and corporate governance mechanisms as follows: the ratio of 
profit before interest and tax plus depreciation to total assets is taken as a proxy of cash 
flow (Cash flow), the ratio of total debt (short and long debt) to total assets (Leverage), 
the market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for growth opportunities of firms defined as 
the ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
equity to book value of assets (Market-to-book-ratio). The logarithms of assets (the 
book value of total assets in million of Jordanian Dinars) is taken as a proxy for size 
(Size). Dividend is the ratio of dividend payments to total assets (Dividends). We use 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as a proxy for assets tangibility (Tangibility). 
Finally, industry dummies are also incorporated to capture industry-specific effects on 
cash holdings.  
We also include in our model the following corporate governance variables: the 
percentage of equity ownership by executive directors and their relatives (Executive 
ownership), the percentage of shares held by founding family and their relatives 
(Founding family ownership); the number of directors on the board (Board size); a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one if the chief executive officer (CEO) and the 
chairman of the board (COB) are the same person and 0 otherwise (Duality); the 
percentage of shares held by local institutional investors with equity ownership of 5 per 
cent or more (Institutional investors); the percentage of shares held by all foreign 
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shareholders with equity ownership of 5 per cent or more (Large foreign ownership). 
Table 5.3 provides a list of the variables used in this study.  
Table 5.3: Definition of Variables 
Variable   Definition   
Dependent Variable 
Cash holdings The ratio of total cash and equivalent (short term investment, 
i.e. any investment held for less than one year, such as securities 
and bonds) to total assets. 
Independent Variables: 
Cash flow The ratio of profit before interest and tax plus depreciation to 
total assets. 
Leverage The ratio of book value of short-term plus long-term debt 
divided by  total assets 
Market-to-book ratio The ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value 
of equity, plus the market value of equity to the book value of 
assets. 
Size The natural log of total assets in 2004 prices. 
Dividend The ratio of dividend payments to total assets. 
Tangibility The ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
Executive ownership The percentage of equity ownership by executive directors and 
their relatives 
Founding family ownership  The percentage of equity ownership held by founding family 
and their relatives. 
Board size The total number of directors on the board. 
Duality A dummy variable: one indicates that the position of CEO and 
chairman of board are held by one person; zero otherwise. 
Institutional investors  The percentage of outstanding equity held by local banks, 
insurance, financial firms and, pension funds (that is, with 
shareholdings of 5 per cent or more). 
Large foreign ownership The percentage of outstanding equity held by all foreign 
shareholders (that is, with shareholdings of 5 per cent or more). 
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5.4.3. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.4 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Our 
results reveal that the mean cash and equivalent to total assets is about 12 per cent and 
the median for the whole sample is 5.05 per cent (not reported), of total assets in cash 
reserves, higher than what is reported in UK and US firms. For example, Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), for UK, report means and median values of the cash ratio of 9.9 per cent 
and 5.9 per cent respectively. Kim et al. (1998), for US, report mean and median values 
of the cash ratio of 8.1 per cent and 4.7 per cent respectively. Furthermore, Dittmar et 
al. (2003), based on analysis of data for 1998 for more than 11,000 firms from 45 
countries, document a wide cross-country dispersion, with median cash ratios ranging 
from 0.3 per cent in Kenya to 29.6 per cent in Egypt.  They report a median cash ratio 
of 2.8 per cent for Jordan, but this is based on only one firm. Kalcheva and Lins (2007), 
based on data for over 5000 firms from 31 countries, find an overall mean cash holding 
of 12 per cent, with a range from 4 per cent for firms in Argentina to 16 per cent for 
Norwegian and Japanese firms. 
Our data shows also that the average cash holdings range from 10.01 per cent in 2004 to 
12.41 per cent in 2006. These results reflect a significant increase in cash holdings on 
ASE during the period of study. For the overall sample, the level of cash holdings range 
from 0.0006 per cent to 98.79 per cent.  
As reported in Table 5.4, the average cash flow for our sample of firms is 9.03 per cent. 
The table also reveals that the average leverage is 13.29 per cent and the average 
market-to-book ratio is 1.62. Our average firm has a book value of total assets of JD 42 
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million (i.e. about US$ 59 million)
1
, average dividends of 3.28 per cent, and an average 
tangibility of 33.68 per cent. 
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics for Cash Holdings and Independent Variables 
Used on the Study.  
                           Full Sample 2004 2005 2006 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Dependent Variables     
Cash holdings 11.69 10.01 12.42 12.41 
Independent Variables     
Cash flow 9.03 6.64 10.26 9.89 
Leverage 13.29 12.96 13.03 13.78 
Market-to-book  1.62 1.50 1.71 1.64 
Size 7.21 7.16 7.23 7.24 
Dividend 3.28 3.68 3.6 2.69 
Tangibility 33.68 33.16 33.87 33.93 
Executive ownership 5.07 5.55 5.37 4.42 
Founding family ownership  22.09 22.86 21.57 20.94 
Board size 8.32 8.46 8.35 8.17 
Duality 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.19 
Institutional investors  19.42 22.42 19.20 17.17 
Large foreign ownership 10.92 8.71 11.56 12.16 
No. of observations 360 109 117 134 
This table provides summary statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. All variables 
are measured at the end of each year. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 5.3. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Jordanian Dinar (JD) has been  pegged to the U.S. Dollar since 1995  (JD  1 = $ 1.41) 
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As far as the corporate governance variables are concerned, Table 5.4 also shows that 
the average executive ownership for our sample of firms is 5.07 per cent.  Holdings of 
founding family owners and their relatives average 22.09 per cent in our sample. This 
result suggests that many of the public companies in Jordan still have large founding 
family shareholdings.  
The average total equity ownership by large domestic institutional investors accounts 
for about 19.42 per cent of total shares.  This ratio shows a marked decreasing pattern. 
The average ordinary shareholding by institutional investors decreases by 4 percentage 
points over the three years, from 22.42 per cent per cent to 17.17 per cent. Equity 
ownership by large foreign investors across the total sample averages 10.92 per cent of 
total shares. This ratio shows a marked increasing pattern. The average ordinary 
shareholding by foreign investors increases by about 4 percentage points over the three 
years, from 8.71 per cent to 12.16 per cent. 
The average board size is 8.32 directors. With regard to the separation of the two 
leading roles of COB and CEO, there are 80 firms out of the final 360 observations 
(22.22 per cent) in which the positions are not separated. The number of companies 
with role duality shows a decrease from 26 per cent in 2004 to 19 per cent in 2006; 
these results indicate that it is still common in Jordan for the chairman of the board to 
also be the CEO of the company. Finally, in terms of industry variation in cash 
holdings, firms in Technology & Communications have the highest mean cash holdings 
(i.e. 37.29 per cent). In contrast, Paper & Carton Industries and Engineering & 
Construction report the lowest ratios (i.e. 0.84 per cent and 0.99 per cent respectively). 
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5.5. Empirical Results and Discussions 
In this section, we will focus on the empirical tests and discussion of results on the 
relationship between firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate cash holdings.  
5.5.1. Univariate Analysis  
We compute the Pearson Correlation coefficient between cash holdings and the 
corporate governance variables and present the correlation matrix in Table 5.5.  
We observe that cash holdings are positively correlated to market-to-book ratio and 
dividends ratio. On the other hand, cash flow size and tangibility are found to be 
negatively correlated with cash holdings. Finally, as expected, cash holdings are 
negatively correlated to founding family ownership. Our results show that our 
independent variables are not highly correlated with each other. To test for possible 
multicollinearity (Table 5.5), we compute the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each 
independent variable and the large one is 1.38, well below the rule of thumb cutoff of 
10.0 for multiple regression models (Gujarati, 2003). Thus, we conclude that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem in our study. 
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Table 5.5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the variables used in the study. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) VIF 
(1) Cash holdings 1.00             - 
(2) Cash flow -0.22** 1.00            1.06 
(3) Leverage -0.13 0.02 1.00           1.11 
(4) Market-to-book 0.26** -0.06 0.05 1.00          1.14 
(5) Size -0.24** 0.16 0.03 -0.17* 1.00         1.21 
(6) Dividends 0.21* 0.13 0.02 0.21* 0.09 1.00        1.15 
(7) Tangibility -0.30** 0.04 0.04 -0.15 0.07 -0.16 1.00       1.09 
(8) Executive ownership -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.14 1.00      1.22 
(9) Founding family ownership -0.15** -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.24* 1.00     1.38 
(10) Board size 0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.04 -0.28** 0.004 0.03 -0.14 -0.15 1.00    1.22 
(11) Duality -0.08 0.01 0.17* 0.03 -0.07 0.13 -0.002 0.16 0.17* -0.08 1.00   1.14 
(12) Institutional investors -0.03 0.07 -0.16 -0.11 0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.25** -0.05 -0.15 1.00  1.30 
(13) Large foreign ownership -0.007 0.06 0.14 0.13 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.21* -0.21* -0.10 -0.02 -0.25** 1.00 1.35 
 
This table displays the Pearson Correlation Coefficient and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the main variables used in the study. ** and * indicate the correlation 
is significant at the 1% and 5%  levels respectively. Definitions for all the variables are provided in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.6 presents univariate mean comparisons of several firm characteristics by cash 
quartiles. We are interested in whether the characteristics of companies differ across 
low-cash firms (first quartile) and high-cash firms (fourth quartile). In general, the 
results support the view that firms in the first quartile differ from firms in the fourth 
quartile. Specifically, we find evidence that, on average, firms with low cash holdings 
have lower cash flow, have relatively low growth opportunities, pay lower dividends, 
have a high proportion of tangible assets and have higher levels of leverage than firms 
with higher cash holdings (fourth quartile). We also observe that low-cash firms show 
relatively higher levels of founding family ownership and lower foreign ownership. 
However, the level of executive ownership, local institutional investors, board size, 
duality and firm size do not seem to differ significantly across the first and the fourth 
cash quartiles. 
Overall, the univariate analysis provides some evidence for our earlier expectation and 
supports our prediction that it is founding family ownership and not managerial 
ownership that exerts influence on cash holdings decisions of Jordanian firms. Also, the 
findings are consistent with our expectations and support our prediction that the 
presence of large foreign investors leads to lower cash holdings. 
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Table 5.6: Univariate Analysis 
  
1
st
 
quartile 
cash 
holdings 
2
nd
 
quartile 
cash 
holdings 
3
rd
 
quartile 
cash 
holdings 
4
th
 
quartile 
cash 
holdings  
t-test 
Cash flow 8.12 7.80 11.04 13.00 -1.97* 
Leverage  16.82 15.17 11.46 7.25 3.08*** 
Market-to-book ratio 1.43 1.51 1.55 2.40 -4.61*** 
Size 7.18 7.11 7.21 7.17 0.052 
Dividends 2.61 2.11 3.47 4.97 -2.40** 
Tangibility 40.94 40.24 33.46 17.47 3.77*** 
Executive ownership 6.05 5.44 3.45 6.76 -0.21 
Founding family ownership 21.74 30.38 21.26 18.90 3.49*** 
Board size 8.44 8.26 7.84 7.99 0.82 
Duality 30.30 18.18 32.35 23.53 0.62 
Institutional investors 19.63 23.43 24.13 19.41 0.04 
Large foreign ownership 9.87 8.23 16.51 14.04 -2.22** 
This table provides univariate mean comparisons of firm specific characteristics by cash holdings 
quartile (1
st
 vs. 4
th
 quartile). The t-test statistic is used to compare the mean difference. ***, ** and * 
indicate that the mean difference is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 5.3. 
 
 
5.5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
In this section, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis to investigate the 
relationship between cash holdings and several firm-specific characteristics by focusing 
on the impact of founding family ownership on cash holdings. In conducting our 
analysis we carefully consider the issue of endogeneity. We estimate our model by 
utilizing the cross-sectional average methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995). In particular, we measure cash holdings (the dependent variable) in 2006 and 
we take average values for two years (i.e. 2004 and 2005) for the independent variables. 
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Using average values for the explanatory variables is an attempt to mitigate problems 
that might arise due to short-term fluctuations and extreme values in our data. 
Furthermore, using past values reduces the likelihood of observed relations reflecting 
the effects of cash holdings on firm-specific factors (see also, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, 
and Guney et al., 2007, for a similar methodology in the cash context).  
5.5.2.1 Firm-Specific (Non-governance) Characteristics and Cash Holdings 
5.5.2.1.1. Cash Holding and Transaction Costs  
We start by estimating our baseline model (model 1) Table 5.7, in which we include 
only the (non-governance) firm-specific characteristics described in section 5.2.1. In 
general, the estimated coefficients are in line with the hypothesized signs and with 
findings reported in the literature. Specifically, our first result is a negative relationship 
between cash flow and cash holdings. This would be in line with the argument that cash 
flow is substitute to cash holding. A similar negative result is provided by Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004).  
As the theory predicts the relationship between cash holdings and leverage is also 
negative and significant (substitution effect), in line with the view that borrowing can be 
seen as a substitute for holding cash, because it may represent a firm's increased ability 
to raise external funds. The same negative result is also provided by Opler et al. (1999) 
and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). 
However, Guney et al. (2007) show that the relationship between cash holdings and 
leverage is non-linear. Their contention is that to the extent that leverage of firms 
reflects their ability to issue debt, there would be a negative (substitution effect) relation 
between leverage and cash holdings.  However, with greater levels of leverage firms are 
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more likely to experience financial distress and consequently risk of bankruptcy. In 
such a situation, they would have incentives to accumulate larger cash reserves to 
minimize these risks, and the associated costs. A positive relationship (precautionary 
effect) between cash holdings and leverage would therefore be anticipated at high levels 
of leverage. Accordingly, in line with Guney et al. (2007) we test the possibility of a 
non-linear relationship between leverage and cash holdings. However, we find no 
evidence (not reported) for such a relationship in our sample. 
As far as dividends are concerned, the positive and significant results seems to be 
consistent with the argument that dividend payers accumulate larger cash holdings to 
ensure their ability to meet pay-out (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).  
The significant inverse relationship between cash holding and tangibility is in line with 
the suggestion that firms with more tangible assets will tend to hold less cash because 
tangible assets can be sold if it becomes necessary to raise cash. More importantly, 
firms that have substantial assets (i.e. tangible assets) that can be used as collateral can 
more easily issue debt and can borrow on more favourable terms (Titman and Wessels, 
1988). Such assets, moreover, are valued higher than intangible assets in the case of 
bankruptcy.  
5.5.2.1.2. Cash Holdings and Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs of Debt  
Table 5.7 also shows a positive relationship between cash holding and market-to-book 
ratio, which is in line with both the asymmetric information and agency costs of debt 
explanations of cash holdings. In particular, our results provide strong evidence that 
firms with better investment opportunities increase their level of cash in order not to be 
obliged to pass up valuable investment projects in the future. This finding is also 
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consistent with the suggestion that these firms may find raising external finance more 
costly, due to problems of information asymmetry. This result is similar to that found by 
Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) for US firms, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) for UK 
firms and Arslan et al. (2006) for Turkey.   
The negative and significant relationship between cash holding and size is in line with 
the argument that large firms, being more likely to be diversified and, hence, less likely 
to experience financial distress (Titman and Wessels, 1988), have less need to 
accumulate cash. In addition, they face fewer borrowing constraints and lower cost of 
external financing than smaller companies (Fazzari et al., 1988). This result is in line 
with US evidence provided by Opler et al. (1999), UK evidence provided by Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), evidence from Turkey provided by Arslan et al. (2006), and the cross-
country evidence provided by Kalcheva and Lins (2007). 
To summarize, our first set of results is as follows: a negative relationship between cash 
flow and cash holdings indicates that cash flow is a substitute for cash holdings. The 
observed negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings would be in line 
with the view that borrowing can be seen as a substitute for holding cash, because it 
may represent a firm's increased ability to raise external funds. The negative 
relationship between tangibility and cash holdings indicates that firms with more 
tangible assets will tend to hold less cash because tangible assets can be sold if it 
becomes necessary to raise cash.   
Our results also support the precautionary motive in the literature. The positive 
relationship between growth firms and cash holdings indicates that firms with better 
investment opportunities increase their level of cash in order not to be obliged to pass 
up valuable investment projects in the future. Also, these firms may find raising finance 
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costly, due to problems of information asymmetry. The negative and significant 
relationship between cash holding and size indicates that large firms are less likely to 
accumulate larger cash holdings because they are more diversified, less likely to 
experience financial distress, and they face fewer borrowing constraints and lower cost 
of external financing than smaller companies. Finally, we document a positive 
relationship between dividends and cash holdings. This could reflect firms' reluctance to 
cut dividend payments which may prove costly, by creating a negative signal of 
increased agency costs of equity and consequently implying further difficulties in 
raising funds in capital markets. It is also possible that firms may want to support their 
high dividend payout policy by holding large cash balances.   
5.5.2.2. Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings  
In this section we analyse the influence of firm-level corporate governance structure on 
cash holdings. We start our analysis by looking first at executive and founding family 
ownership. In the following we test the influence of board characteristics (i.e. board size 
and duality) on cash holdings and finally the effects of local institutional investors and 
large foreign investors on cash are tested.  
5.5.2.2.1. Executive Ownership, Founding Family Ownership and Cash Holdings  
In this sub-section, we construct several regression models to examine the cross-
sectional relationship between executive ownership and founding family ownership 
with corporate cash holdings and present the results in models (2) to (4) in Table 5.7. 
We include all the control variables which we used in model (1) Table 5.7 in all our 
specifications.   
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Table 5.7: Cross sectional regressions prediction of cash holdings. 
Independent 
variables 
Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cash flow -/+ -0.344**   
(-2.35) 
-0.346**   
(-2.36) 
-0.343**   
(-2.29) 
-0.308*        
(-1.91) 
Leverage -/+ -0.002*     
(-1.80) 
-0.001*      
(-1.79) 
-0.002*     
(-1.85) 
-0.002**        
(-2.19) 
Market-to-book 
ratio 
+ 0.099*** 
(4.82) 
0.099*** 
(4.83) 
0.098*** 
(4.79) 
0.097*** 
(4.94) 
Size -/+ -0.037*     
(-1.75) 
-0.036*     
(-1.72) 
-0.037*     
(-1.78) 
-0.041**     
(-2.01) 
Dividend -/+ 0.539* 
(1.85) 
0.548* 
(1.91) 
0.520* 
(1.79) 
0.545*       
(1.81) 
Tangibility - -0.107**   
(-2.44) 
-0.103**   
(-2.41) 
-0.105**   
(-2.50) 
-0.092**     
(-2.06) 
Executive 
ownership 
-/+ - -0.001       
(-0.92) 
-0.0003     
(-0.40) 
-0.0004       
(-0.56) 
Founding family 
ownership 
- - - -0.001*     
(-1.92) 
-0.004**     
(-2.16) 
Founding family 
squared 
+ - - - 0.0001** 
(2.03) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R²  0.47 0.48 0.49 0.51 
No. of observations 134 134 134 134 
This table presents cross-sectional regression predicting cash holdings. The dependent variable is 
Cash holdings, measured in 2006, as the ratio of total cash and equivalent items to total assets 
and the independent variables average values for two years (i.e. 2004-2005). Definitions of 
variables are provided in Table 5.3. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the estimation, 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used.  
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In model (2) Table 5.7, we regress cash holdings against executive ownership and other 
control variables. In model (3), we add founding family ownership. In model (4), we 
add founding family ownership squared to test if there is a non-linear relation between 
founding family ownership and cash holdings, and retain all other variables. 
Model (2) Table 5.7 shows that the signs of our control variables are consistent with our 
predictions, and all are significant. In particular, we find that cash holdings is positively 
associated with market-to-book ratio and dividends; and negatively associated with cash 
flow, leverage, size and tangibility.  
Consistent with our expectations, we find that executive ownership is not associated 
with cash holdings. Furthermore, we test the possibility of a non-linear relationship 
between executive ownership and cash holdings. However, we find no evidence (not 
reported) for such a relationship in our sample.  
Our result is in contrast to previous findings in the literature that executive ownership 
exerts a significant influence on cash holdings of firms. For example, Ozkan and Ozkan, 
(2004) provide evidence, for the UK, of a non-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and cash holdings, which they attribute to the opposing influences of 
incentive alignment and the entrenchment effect.  In contrast, Opler et al. (1999) find no 
significant evidence, for US firms, for a non-linear relationship; in fact, they report a 
positive relationship (significant at 10 per cent) between cash holdings and managerial 
ownership at low levels of ownership. However, there is no significant influence of 
managerial ownership on cash holdings at higher ownership levels.   
In models (3) and (4), we detect a significant non-linear relationship between cash 
holdings and founding family ownership. The results provide support for our earlier 
prediction that founding family ownership exerts a significant influence on the cash 
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holding decisions of Jordanian firms. More specifically, the estimated coefficients of 
founding family ownership and founding family ownership squared suggest that firms 
first reduce their cash holdings as the levels of ownership by founding families increase, 
which we interpret as alignment of the interests of insiders (founding family owners) 
and outside shareholders. This may also be due to the changing perception of the market 
as a whole regarding the incentives of founding family owners. We argue that the 
negative relationship between cash holdings and founding family ownership at 
relatively lower levels of founding family ownership suggests that the market perceives 
increasing founding family ownership favourably, as it may show stronger commitment 
and greater incentive to monitor and discipline the management that may be 
independent of or closely linked to founding family owners. This in turn reduces the 
expected cost of external finance (both debt and equity) leading to a lower cash holding 
policy.  
We observe that cash holdings continue to decrease as founding family ownership 
increases up to 36 per cent of founding family ownership
1
. However, at higher levels of 
ownership, firms start increasing their cash balances. Again, this may occur for two 
reasons. First, the market perceives high levels of founding family ownership less 
favourably now as the expropriation of minority shareholders by strong/large controllers 
becomes more likely and large family owners are more likely to control the 
management and be free from monitoring and disciplining. That is, they become 
entrenched at high levels of ownership. This, in turn, increases the expected cost of 
external finance and firms may choose to increase their cash reserves voluntarily as a 
precautionary move in an attempt to reduce the costs of foregone investment 
                                                 
1
 It is worth mentioning that 35 out of 134 observations (i.e. 26% of our sample) have founding 
family ownership exceeding 36%. 
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opportunities due to insufficient resources. Second, it is also possible that founding 
family owners choose to hold larger cash balances as this policy would increase their 
chance of using readily available liquid resources in their own interests. As they are 
able to do so only at high levels of ownership, which allows them to control the 
decision making process and the management, we observe a positive relation between 
cash holdings and founding family ownership at high levels of ownership. 
There is also a possibility that the nature of the relationship between founding family 
ownership and cash holdings differs, depending on firms' growth opportunities. For 
example, it would be suggested that the entrenchment effect becomes less significant as 
the firm's growth opportunities increase, because in such circumstances the interest of 
the founding family and other shareholders are better aligned. This possibility can be 
explored by interacting founding family ownership and market-to-book ratio. We find 
no evidence (not reported) that the impact of founding family ownership on cash 
holdings changes with the presence of growth opportunities. In our unreported results, 
we find that the estimated coefficients of the interaction variables are not significant.  
5.5.2.2.2. Board Characteristics, Large Shareholders and Cash Holdings 
In this sub-section, we construct several regression models to examine cross-sectionally 
the relations between board characteristic and large shareholders and corporate cash 
holdings and present the results in models (5) and (6) in Table 5.8. We include all 
control variables which we used in the previous models.  
Models (5) and (6) in Table 5.8 show that the estimated signs of our control variables 
are consistent with the predictors, and estimated coefficients are all significant. In 
particular, we find that the cash holdings ratio is positively associated with the market-
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to-book ratio and dividend payout ratios and negatively associated with cash flow, 
leverage, size and tangibility. Furthermore, similar to our earlier findings, executive 
ownership is not associated with corporate cash holdings and founding family 
ownership still has a non-linear relationship with corporate cash holdings.  
In model (5) Table 5.8, we regress cash holdings against board size and the duality 
dummy which identifies firms in which the CEO is also Chairman of the Board. These 
results suggest that board size and the CEO-Chairman duality dummy have no 
significant impact on corporate cash holdings. We further interact founding family 
ownership with the board characteristics (i.e. board size and the CEO-Chairman duality 
dummy) to test if the effect of founding family ownership on cash holdings changes 
with these characteristics. In our unreported results we find no significant effect. Thus, 
we may conclude that board characteristics do not significantly influence the cash 
policy of Jordanian firms either directly or indirectly through interactions with founding 
family ownership. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, most Jordanian companies lack 
independence from controlling shareholders and from management. Furthermore, in 
Jordan as in many other Arab and developing countries, management and the board of 
directors are frequently dominated by members of the founding families. Therefore, 
Jordanian company board characteristics are not expected to have an important impact 
on corporate cash holdings. 
We next turn our attention to the question of whether corporate cash holdings are 
affected when there is a large shareholder among the firm's shareholders (i.e. large local 
institutional investors and large foreign ownership). We regress corporate cash holdings 
against large domestic institutional ownership and large foreign investors and other 
control variables and present the results in model (6) of Table 5.8.  Our result provides 
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evidence that local institutional investors do not have any significant impact on 
corporate cash holdings. This finding is consistent with our expectation and in support 
of our earlier prediction that institutional investors in Jordan are relatively passive in 
disciplining management because most of the local institutional investors are banks and 
insurance companies. Theoretically, such institutions, with their large holdings, might 
be expected to act as external governance agents for other shareholders, especially 
minority shareholders.  
However, in practice, they are constrained in their ability to do so because of their 
significant ties with the companies, through family and personal connections. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the representatives of the Social Security Investment 
Unit is weakened by the lack of business expertise, since they are typically bureaucrats. 
Even when nominees' knowledge and expertise are sufficient to enable them to exercise 
governance, there is little incentive for them to do so, as they owe their tenure and 
career prospects to the civil service system, rather than to the performance of the firm 
concerned.  
In model (6) Table 5.8, we also examine the impact of large foreign investors on 
corporate cash holdings. Foreign ownership, a variable associated with effective 
monitoring, has a negative relationship with cash holdings
1
. This possibly suggests that 
the oversight afforded by influential foreign investors deters owner-managers from 
accumulating a firm‟s assets in the form of cash to spend on unprofitable activities or on 
acquiring low-performing investment assets with small or even negative NPV. In other 
words, where there is a substantial concentration of foreign ownership, it is more 
                                                 
1
 We re-estimated our regression by including a dummy variable to make the distinction 
between foreign financial institutions and foreign industrial corporations. However, the results 
do not reveal any significant effect and hence they are not reported 
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difficult for corporate managers to make decisions for their own benefit and they are 
forced to act more as value-enhancing agents on behalf of their shareholders. 
 Table 5.8:  Cross sectional regressions prediction of cash holdings 
Independent variables Predicted sign Model 5 Model 6 
Cash flow -/+ -0.321*               
(-1.93) 
-0.308*               
(-1.81) 
Leverage -/+ -0.002**             
(-2.01) 
-0.001**             
(-2.11) 
Market-to-book ratio + 0.095***    
(4.48) 
0.096***     
(4.80) 
Size -/+ -0.049**             
(-2.32) 
-0.048**            
(-2.35) 
Dividend -/+ 0.569*        
(1.93) 
0.526*        
(1.84) 
Tangibility  - -0.09**              
(-2.08) 
-0.089**            
(-2.06) 
Executive ownership -/+ -0.0005               
(-0.64) 
-0.0002               
(-0.26) 
Founding family ownership - -0.004**            
(-2.02) 
-0.005**            
(-2.02) 
Founding family squared + 0.0001*      
(1.76) 
0.0001*       
(1.86) 
Board size - -0.007                
(-1.10) 
-0.002                
(-1.34) 
Duality + -0.015                
(-0.59) 
-0.019                
(-0.79) 
Institutions investors -/+ - -0.001                
(-0.95) 
Large foreign ownership - - -0.001*              
(-1.71) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
R²  0.52 0.53 
No. of observations  134 134 
This table presents cross-sectional regression predicting cash holdings. The dependent variable 
is Cash holdings, measured in 2006, as the ratio of total cash and equivalent items to total assets 
and the independent variables average values for two years (i.e. 2004-2005). Definitions of 
variables are provided in Table 5.3. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the estimation, 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used. 
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There is also a possibility that the nature of the relationship between large foreign 
ownership and cash holdings depends on firms' market-to-book ratio. For example, it is 
likely that large foreign stockholders might choose profitable firms (i.e. high market-to-
book ratio) to invest in, and these firms will be the ones that perform well and 
accumulate more cash. This possibility can be explored by interacting large foreign 
stockholders and market-to-book ratio. Thus, one would expect a positive relationship 
between the interaction term and cash holdings. However, we find no evidence (not 
reported) that the impact of large foreign stockholders on cash holdings changes with 
firms' market-to-book ratio. We find that the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
variable is negative, but insignificant.  
5.5.2.2.3. Executive Ownership, Founding Family Ownership and Independent CEOs 
The above discussion provides important new insights into the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings. Firstly, in contrast to previous 
research our findings show no significant relationship between executive ownership and 
cash holdings. On the other hand, there is strong evidence of the important role played 
by founding family ownership in determining cash holdings. The results provide 
support for a non-linear relationship between founding family ownership and cash 
holdings. Thus, our results show that founding family ownership is more influential 
than managerial discretion in the Jordanian context. However, one could argue that the 
nature of the relationship between executive ownership and founding family ownership 
with cash holdings may vary in the presence of independent CEOs. This possibility can 
be explored by including independent CEOs in our model and by interacting executive 
ownership and founding family ownership with independent CEOs. Independent CEOs 
identified using as a dummy variable: one indicates that the CEO is not a member of the 
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founding family and zero otherwise.  In model (1) Table 5.9, we regress cash holdings 
against independent CEOs and other control variables. In model (2), we add executive 
ownership and executive ownership squared. In model (3), we interact executive 
ownership and executive ownership squared with independent CEOs to test whether the 
effect of executive ownership on cash depends on the characteristics of the CEOs. Our 
results provide no support for the view that the impact of managerial ownership on cash 
holdings changes with the presence of independent CEOs. The estimated coefficients of 
independent CEOs, executive ownership and executive ownership squared and the 
interaction variables are not significant. These results further support our earlier 
expectations and findings that executive ownership does not exert a significant 
influence on cash holdings of firms. In model (4) Table 5.9, we drop executive 
ownership and executive ownership squared, because they were insignificant and we 
add founding family ownership and founding family ownership squared. In model (5) 
we interact founding family ownership and founding family ownership squared with 
independent CEOs to test whether this effect depends on the nature of the CEOs.  Our 
findings confirm our earlier findings that founding family ownership plays an important 
role in determining cash holdings of Jordanian companies. The estimated coefficients of 
interaction suggest that independent CEOs may have some impact on the nature of the 
relationship between cash holdings and founding family ownership. In particular, we 
find that the alignment effect is greater in the presence of independent CEOs, as shown 
by the negative estimated coefficient of the first interaction term, i.e., (FFamily*Indep. 
CEOs). Furthermore, the entrenchment effect also becomes larger in the presence of 
independent CEOs, i.e., (FFown2*Indp. CEOs). In general, these results show that 
founding family ownership is more important than managerial discretion in the 
Jordanian context.  
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Table 5.9: Cross sectional regressions prediction of cash holdings. 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Cash flow -/+ -0.342**   
(-2.31) 
-0.344**   
(-2.31) 
-0.328**   
(-2.19) 
-0.272*        
(-1.93) 
-0.269*      
(-1.97) 
Leverage -/+ -0.002*     
(-1.77) 
-0.002*     
(-1.77) 
-0.002*    
(-1.91) 
-0.002*        
(-1.97) 
-0.002*        
(-1.97) 
Market-to-book ratio + 0.099*** 
(4.72) 
0.099*** 
(4.64) 
0.10*** 
(4.74) 
0.094*** 
(4.61) 
0.092*** 
(4.52) 
Size -/+ -0.036*   
(-1.77) 
-0.038*   
(-1.68) 
-0.042*     
(-1.84) 
-0.043**      
(-2.20) 
-0.052**    
(-2.45) 
Dividend -/+ 0.534* 
(1.84) 
0.562* 
(1.92) 
0.570* 
(1.97) 
0.604*  
(1.90) 
0.482       
(1.48) 
Tangibility  - -0.106** 
(-2.42) 
-0.103** 
(-2.36) 
-0.095**  
(-2.15) 
-0.089**      
(-2.18) 
-0.074*      
(-1.93) 
Independent CEOs -/+ -0.005     
(-0.24) 
-0.003     
(-0.13) 
-0.007      
(-0.19) 
0.005    
(0.25) 
0.036  
(1.05) 
Executive ownership -/+ - -0.001     
(-0.48) 
-0.001      
(-0.44) 
- - 
Executive ownership 
squared 
-/+ - 7.05e-06 
(0.27) 
-1.64e-06 
(-0.06) 
- - 
Exown*Indp. CEOs -/+ - - -0.001      
(-0.39) 
- - 
Exown2*Indp. CEOs -/+ - - 0.00004 
(1.05) 
- - 
Founding family - - - - -0.006***    
(-3.84) 
-0.004        
(-1.55) 
Founding family 
squared 
+ - - - 0.00008*** 
(3.45) 
0.00005 
(1.48) 
FFown*Indp. CEOs -/+ - - - - -0.008*      
(-1.77) 
FFown2*Indp. CEOs -/+ - - - - 0.0002* 
(1.86) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R²  0.48 0.48 0.49 0.54 0.56 
No. of observations  134 134 134 134 134 
This table presents cross-sectional regression predicting cash holdings. The dependent variable is Cash 
holdings, measured in 2006, as the ratio of total cash and equivalent items to total assets and the 
independent variables average values for two years (i.e. 2004-2005).  t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. See 
Table 5.3 for exact definitions of variables For the estimation, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
used.  – indicates that the variable is not in the model.  
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5.5.3. Further Checks 
In this section, we carry out additional tests to check whether the findings are robust in 
the face of alternative specifications and present the results in Table 5.10. 
 First, we present OLS results for the pooled regression analysis (i.e. 360 firm-year 
observations). The pooled regression results in model (1) Table 5.10 strongly support 
the previous findings. In particular, we find that firms' cash holdings increase with 
market-to-book ratio and dividends; and decrease with leverage, size and tangibility. 
Furthermore, as expected, the results suggest that executive ownership is not associated 
with corporate cash holdings and founding family ownership still has a non-linear 
relationship with corporate cash holdings. The results suggest that the levels of 
founding family ownership exert a significant influence on cash holding decisions of 
Jordanian firms. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of founding family 
ownership and founding family ownership squared suggest that founding families move 
from alignment to entrenchment as their shareholdings in the firm increase. However, 
the relationship between cash flow and foreign ownership with cash holdings is still 
negative but insignificant. Furthermore, unlike the previous findings, we find that the 
relationship between board size and cash holdings is positive and significant at 5 per 
cent. One possible explanation for this result is that as board size increases, the board 
may perform less effectively as a monitoring mechanism. This implies that firms with 
such boards would suffer from more severe agency problems and poor corporate 
governance.   
Next, in model (2) Table 5.10, we also re-estimate our cross sectional model (model, 6 
of Table 5.8) by using alternative cash holdings measures. We now use cash and cash 
equivalent to net assets (defined as total assets minus cash and cash equivalent) as the 
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dependent variable in our cash holdings model. This definition has been widely used in 
previous research (see, Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003).  
Our results show that the mean cash and cash equivalent to net assets is 17.62 per cent 
and the median is 5.25 per cent. Moreover, the results in model (2) Table 5.10 
demonstrate that the main finding as to the effect of founding family ownership on cash 
holdings  is robust, regardless of alternative definition of cash holdings. In particular, 
our findings suggest that the levels of founding family ownership exert a significant 
influence on cash holdings decisions of Jordanian firms. More specifically, the 
estimated coefficients of founding family ownership and founding family ownership 
squared suggest that founding families move from alignment to entrenchment as their 
shareholdings in the firm increase. However, foreign ownership is still negatively 
related to cash holdings, but insignificant. 
Furthermore, we find that cash holdings is positively associated with market-to-book 
ratio and negatively associated with cash flow, leverage and tangibility. However, 
dividends and size are not associated with corporate cash holdings. 
Our results are robust, regardless of using other definitions. Apart from the finding of a 
significant relationship between board size and cash holdings, in the first model, all 
findings are consistent with those reported in the previous section. 
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Table 5.10:  Pooled and cross sectional regressions prediction of cash holdings.  
Independent variables Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 
Cash flow -/+ 0.014          
(0.13) 
-0.498**            
(-2.20) 
Leverage -/+ -0.001*              
(-1.70) 
-0.003**            
(-2.13) 
Market-to-book ratio + 0.088***    
(5.23) 
0.073**      
(2.46) 
Size -/+ -0.018*              
(-1.93) 
-0.020                
(-0.56) 
Dividend -/+ 0.424**       
(2.11) 
0.514           
(1.16) 
Tangibility  - -0.151***          
(-5.48) 
-0.263***           
(-3.56) 
Executive ownership -/+ -0.0001              
(-0.16) 
-0.0001              
(-0.08) 
Founding family ownership - -0.003***          
(-3.01) 
-0.007**            
(-1.99) 
Founding family squared + 0.00002*     
(1.69) 
0.0001**     
(2.21) 
Board size - 0.007**      
(2.11) 
-0.011                
(-1.25) 
Duality + -0.012                
(-0.70) 
-0.001                
(-0.03) 
Institutional investors -/+ -0.00001            
(-0.04) 
-0.002                
(-1.16) 
Large foreign ownership - -0.0002              
(-0.40) 
-0.0001              
(-0.12) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
R²  0.45 0.40 
No. of observations   360 134 
This table presents cross-sectional regression predicting cash holdings. In model (1) we use 
pooled regression, the dependent variable cash defined as cash and equivalent items to total 
assets and the independent variables measured at the end of each year. All regressions include 
time dummies. In model (2) the dependent variable is Cash, measured in 2006, as the ratio of 
total cash and cash equivalent to total assets minus cash and cash equivalent. The independent 
variables show average values for two years (i.e. 2004-2005). t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. See Table 5.3 for exact definitions of variables.  
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5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we empirically investigated the determinants of corporate cash holdings 
for a sample of 360 firm-year observations based on firm-level data of Jordanian listed 
corporations over a period of 2004-2006.  
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate cash holdings on several grounds. 
First, to our knowledge, this study is the first to test whether founding family ownership 
at the firm-level has an association with corporate cash holdings, and the nature of this 
relationship, which has not yet been considered in other concurrent studies.  
Second, to our knowledge, this study is the first to test the effect of large foreign 
investors, which is an issue that has gone unnoticed in the existing literature dedicated 
to the analysis of the determinants of corporate cash holdings.  
Third, our findings enhance our understanding of corporate cash holdings of firms 
operating in an emerging market.  To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyse 
corporate cash holdings in an emerging equity market, namely Jordan, one of the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) countries.  
Our last contribution lies in the important limitations of cross-country studies. For 
example, previous studies such as Dittmar et al. (2003) are based on the country-wide 
measures of shareholder rights as developed by La Porta et al. (1998). In the absence of 
firm-level data, their study does not provide clear conclusion at the firm level for the 
effect of agency costs on cash holdings. To circumvent these limitations, therefore, in 
this chapter, we analyse an extensive range of firm-level attributes which are suggested 
by previous studies to be important proxies for internal corporate governance. These 
governance attributes include executive ownership, founding family ownership, board 
size, CEO-Chairman duality, domestic large institutional investors and large foreign 
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investors, to provide additional empirical evidence on the determinants of firms‟ cash 
holdings in Jordan. 
The results reported in our work provide strong evidence that founding family 
ownership plays an important role in determining cash holdings of Jordanian 
companies. These results provide support for a non-linear relationship between 
founding family ownership and cash holdings. We find that founding family owners 
move from alignment to entrenchment as their shareholdings in the firm increase. Cash 
holdings of firms fall as founding family ownership increases up to 36 per cent and then 
rise as founding family ownership increases above 36 per cent. The main findings as to 
the effect of founding family ownership on cash holdings are shown to be robust, 
regardless of alternative definitions of cash holdings and do not change significantly 
with either board attributes or the presence of other large shareholders. In addition, we 
provide evidence that the presence of large foreign investors leads to lower cash 
holdings.  
Our analysis also reveals that cash holdings is positively associated with market-to-
book value and dividends; and negatively associated with cash flow, leverage, size and 
tangibility. Furthermore, our results provide evidence that local institutional investors 
do not have any significant impact on corporate cash holdings. This finding provides 
support for the view that institutional investors in Jordan are relatively passive in 
disciplining management. Finally, Jordanian company board characteristics do not have 
any important impact on corporate cash holdings.  
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of corporate governance and agency 
conflicts in determining corporate performance, foreign investment and corporate 
financial decisions. For this purpose, it uses firm-level corporate governance and 
ownership data from Jordan. Jordan is an economy in which the prevailing corporate 
structures and regulatory mechanisms provide a data set that lends itself particularly 
well to the examination of these issues. Our work contains a number of important 
aspects that potentially contribute to the literature in several respects. 
Chapter 2 presents through extensive descriptive statistics a timely review of ownership 
and corporate governance structure among publicly listed companies, both financial and 
non-financial, in Jordan, which we hand-collected for this thesis, for 519 firm-year 
observations of financial and non-financial Jordanian listed firms for the years 2004-
2006. This chapter significantly contributes to the existing body of knowledge, by 
presenting a detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance structure in an 
emerging market by focusing on ownership and board structure among publicly listed 
companies in Jordan. The detailed investigations performed in Chapter 2 documented 
three important features about the Jordanian companies. First, most firms, both financial 
and non-financial, are family firms. The boards and management are frequently 
dominated by the founding families. Founding family members are involved in the 
management of the institution, as chairman of board, board members or senior 
managers. In addition, board size is relatively constant over time, with an average of 
nine directors, a large proportion of who are non-executives. Furthermore, role duality, 
whereby the chairman of the board is also the CEO, is still common, although 
decreasing slightly over time.  
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Other interesting facts were revealed by analysis of CEOs‟ salaries and compensations 
of both financial and non-financial firms listed at the Amman Stock Exchange. We find 
that the financial benefits accrued by founder, family and dual-role CEOs, in terms of 
mean salary and compensation, are significantly higher than average. These findings of 
high compensation packages for founder, family and dual-role CEOs may reflect their 
use of power in their own interest.   
Finally, our findings show that firm ownership tends to be concentrated, with a 
prevalence of strong large shareholders, particularly family shareholders, local financial 
institutions and foreign shareholders. Family owners have an important involvement in 
all sectors. Their holdings may create a source of power for them, enabling them to 
influence firm policies and exercise their voting rights to control managers‟ actions, in 
their own interests. Local institutional owners, too, have sufficiently large holdings in 
the Jordanian firms. Additionally, for the most part, the evidence suggests that the role 
of foreign investors in the Jordanian market is significant high, and that foreign 
directors constitute a relatively increasing proportion of the board.  
Chapter 3 investigated the relationship between internal corporate governance and 
corporate performance. The analysis contributes to the understanding of the role of 
agency issues in a developing country context. In particular, the research contributes to 
filling a gap identified in relation to corporate governance in the Arab region. In the 
existing performance-governance literature, the main corporate governance/agency 
issue is the one between managers and shareholders. Consequently, prior research on 
the subject puts more emphasis on the interactions between managerial ownership, 
incentives, entrenchment and performance. There is relatively little work addressing 
agency issues that may be dominant in different countries, so our study is important to 
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fill this gap. Second, this study extends previous research on corporate governance (see, 
among others, Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; and 
Ghosh, 2006) by considering the impact of an important board characteristic (i.e. when 
the CEO is a member of the board) on firm performance, which can potentially work as 
an important governance devices. 
Our analysis revealed a negative relationship between founding family ownership and 
corporate performance. No significant relationship was detected between executive 
ownership and firm value. The findings provide strong support for the view that the 
main agency concern for Jordanian firms seems to be the one between founding 
families and minority shareholders. Managerial ownership does not play any role in the 
corporate governance of Jordanian firms, whereas family ownership aims to protect and 
preserve family wealth. The findings support the view that CEO duality has an adverse 
effect on firm performance. However, CEO membership of the board tends to have a 
positive effect on company performance. This result suggests that if the CEO is a board 
member, he or she may facilitate and participate in the decision making process rather 
than dominate the decisions of the board, as may be the case when he/she is CEO and 
COB together. Concentration of ownership is positively related to firm value. A 
negative and significant relation between performance and large domestic institutional 
investors is detected, and large foreign investors have a significant and positive effect 
on firm performance. This implies that the monitoring function of foreign investors 
enhances firm performance and complements the relatively weak monitoring by 
domestic institutional investors. Finally, we find that corporate performance is 
positively associated with dividends; and negatively associated with size. Also, leverage 
has no significant impact on performance.  
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In Chapter 4, we empirically investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and other firm characteristics and foreign investment decisions. The 
analysis focused on two important questions; first, how do founding family ownership 
and control affect the investment decisions of foreign investors in the Jordanian market? 
Second, how do other potential corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. institutional 
investors and board characteristics) and firm-specific characteristics (i.e. market-to-
book-ratio, size, leverage and dividends) affect investment foreign investors in the 
Jordanian market?  
We contribute to the existing literature on foreign ownership and corporate governance 
on – at least – two important grounds. Our first contribution in Chapter 4 is concerned 
with the empirical investigation of the impact of founding family ownership and control 
on foreign investment decisions. Previous studies in this field have generally 
investigated the total insider ownership or controlling shareholders (i.e. families and 
management) without taking the identity of the insider or controlling shareholder into 
consideration. Furthermore, very few studies have investigated the impact of board 
structure on foreign ownership. This study, by examining the impact of founding and 
local institutional involvement on foreign ownership, advances the knowledge in this 
field. Second, by using two alternative definitions of foreign ownership, namely, large 
foreign ownership and total foreign ownership, we are able to assess to what extent the 
findings depend on the threshold of foreign equity shares. 
Our results reveal that founding family ownership and founding family control exerts a 
significant influence on foreign investors‟ decisions. More specifically, our finding 
suggests foreign ownership is likely to be lower in firms in which founding family 
ownership is high and in family controlled firms (i.e. when founding family members 
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are on the board of directors). The results also suggest that firms with large domestic 
intuitional ownership are related to lower foreign holdings. Board characteristics (i.e. 
board size and the proportion of non-executive directors) also have a negative effect on 
foreign investors, although the impact is significant only for board size. This result 
suggests that foreign investors perceive large boards as likely to encounter problems of 
coordination, control, and decision-making. Regarding firm-specific characteristics, we 
find that firms with higher growth potential (high market-to-book equity ratios) and 
large firms seem to be more attractive to foreign investors and they avoid firms that pay 
high dividends. Finally, leverage is not related to the level of foreign investment.  
In Chapter 5, we sought to extend the empirical literature on the determinants of cash 
holding decisions. Our first major contribution in this chapter is concerned with the 
empirical investigation of the impact of founding family ownership on corporate cash 
holdings. Prior research provides support for the significant influence of managerial 
ownership on cash holdings decisions (see, e.g., Opler et al., 1999 and Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004). However, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
investigate the relationship between founding family equity ownership and cash 
holdings. Second, to our knowledge, this study is the first to test the effect of large 
foreign investors, which is an issue that is neglected in the existing literature examining 
the determinants of corporate cash holdings. Finally, our findings enhance our 
understanding of corporate cash holdings of firms operating in an emerging market 
which are characterised by less-developed capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997). This 
contrasts with previous studies, which generally focus on single high-income countries 
with uniformly high investor protection laws (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; and Opler et al., 
1999 for US firms and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004 for UK firms). 
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The empirical results in Chapter 5 provide strong evidence that founding family 
ownership exerts a significant influence on cash holding decisions of Jordanian firms. 
These results provide support for a non-linear relationship between founding families 
ownership and cash holdings. More specifically, we find that founding family move 
from alignment to entrenchment as their shareholdings in the firm increase. In addition, 
we provide evidence that the presence of large foreign investors leads to lower cash 
holdings. Furthermore, our result provides evidence that local institutional investors do 
not have any significant impact on corporate cash holdings. Jordanian company board 
characteristics do not have any important impact on corporate cash holdings. Finally, 
the results suggest that corporate cash holding is positively associated with market-to-
book value and dividends; and negatively associated with cash flow, leverage, size and 
tangibility. 
This thesis has addressed a number of important questions, targeted a number of 
important objectives and has made a significant contribution as one of the first attempts 
to explore empirically corporate governance practices at firm-level in Jordan, to 
investigate the relationship between internal corporate governance and corporate 
performance, to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and foreign 
investment decisions and to investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
and cash holding decisions. However, further research is needed to confirm the results 
of the present study by employing a longer sample period, different techniques and 
other variables.  
There are other issues that deserve further attention in future studies. First, there is a 
need to develop a more sophisticated classification of family and non-family firms. 
Most previous studies approach the research of family firms from two perspectives: 
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whether family firm performance‟s different from that of non-family firms, or whether 
founder-controlled firms behave differently from descendant-controlled firms. The 
result from such an investigation will enhance our understanding about how family 
firms under family members (founders or descendants) are related to firm performance, 
and how these family firms perform relative to non-family firms.  
Second, a natural extension of our work would be to investigate the potential impact of 
founding families on other corporate policy decisions than cash holdings such as capital 
structure, dividends policy and corporate disclosure quality. To the extent that corporate 
policies are strongly influenced by different structures of ownership of public firms, it is 
important to understand how the prevalence of founding families in an emerging market 
affects corporate policy decisions. The literature has so far provided very few empirical 
studies, mainly among samples of Standard and Poor‟s (S&P) 500 firms, of the impact 
of founding family ownership on leverage (Anderson et al., 2003), corporate pay out 
policy (Hu et al., 2007) and corporate earning and disclosure quality (Ali et al., 2007).  
Third, it would be interesting to investigate the potential impact of ultimate ownership 
structures on firm value. This generates an entirely different set of agency conflicts, and 
these have been shown to be greater than those investigated at the direct ownership 
level (Bebchnuk et al., 2000). However, the literature on ultimate ownership structure 
has so far provided very few empirical studies of the impact of ultimate controller on 
corporate performance and other corporate decisions (see, Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio 
et al., 2001). 
Fourth, further research is needed on boards of directors. For example, an explanatory 
study could be undertaken to investigate the determinants of board effectiveness in 
Jordanian listed firms, specifically answering questions such as which are the most 
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important factors that drive the adoption/operation of specific board structures, 
mechanisms and practices? To what extent do factors such as ownership structure 
(founding family ownership, institutional ownership, etc.) board member characteristics 
(education, experience, reputation, etc.), and organization characteristics (industry, age, 
leverage, growth, etc.) also influence board effectiveness? A satisfactory answer to 
these questions will enhance our understanding of several board practices and help to 
identify any „gaps‟ in the governance structure of Jordanian firms.  
Fifth, since the present study is limited to non-financial listed firms, it may also be 
worthwhile to study the specific governance of financial firms listed in the same capital 
market. As banks, for example, are among the most highly regulated firms in Jordan, 
their corporate governance practices should be different from other non-financial firms. 
The result will provide another perspective on corporate governance practices in this 
country and can be expected to support the current study.  
Sixth, further study is needed to explore the role of foreign investors in the Jordanian 
market. For example, research which employs a case study design could be conducted 
to explore in more depth the effect of foreign investment on the quality of corporate 
governance in the Jordanian firms. 
Seventh, a natural extension of our work would be to investigate the potential impact of 
market conditions in the determination of cash holdings decisions. However, we need to 
extend our sample to include panel data estimations.   
Finally, a future potential extension to our work would be to investigate public 
companies in other Arab and Middle Eastern countries, which could increase the 
validity of our findings.  
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